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Introduction 
 
 
This book consists of papers which were prepared within the framework of the research 
project (No. T 048539) entitled Futures Studies in the Interactive Society (project 
leader: Éva Hideg) and funded by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA) 
between 2005 and 2009. Some discuss the theoretical and methodological questions of 
futures studies and foresight; others present new approaches to or procedures of certain 
questions which are very important and topical from the perspective of forecast and 
foresight practice. Each study was conducted in pursuit of improvement in futures 
fields.   
 
Interconnectedness and interactivity are the guidelines of studies. Interactivity shows 
the characteristics of the dynamic relations and interconnections of the world and also 
the importance of the human factor’s new role in interactivity. Living in interactivity we 
have to be aware of how to act in certain situations, and how we can become creative as 
components of different complex systems. The ability to create foreseeing knowledge 
and its continuous creation are elementary of interactive human existence. Therefore, 
interactivity is of great importance from the aspect of the further development of futures 
fields as well. Each study deals with certain concerns of interactivity challenge that is 
sensible in futures fields and seeks to respond to them theoretically, methodologically or 
through development of futures procedures and methods.  
   
Éva Hideg’s first study deals with the future of future studies in an environment of 
instability and strengthening interactivity. Her starting point is that the present of 
futures fields is determined by competition between two lines of futures studies, 
evolutionary and critical futures studies. The end of the competition between the two 
trends is still uncertain, however, the idea of integral futures has just emerged in the 
futures literature. She shows the possibility and interpretation of integral futures 
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embedded in the evolving process of the futures field, and as a paradigmatic answer to 
new social challenges, to sustainability, democratic participation and continuous 
knowledge creation. The three new challenges are interconnected by interactivity. 
Futures studies should also respond to challenges with the development of its own 
activity and paradigms. She defines integral futures and its new paradigms by way of 
reconstructing the history of futures paradigm and a dynamic and comparative analysis 
of paradigms. In one respect, integral futures is the cooperation of theoretical and 
practical futures studies, that is gaining independence, but at the same time interlinked 
by many threads. In another, it is the complementary development of co-evolutionary 
and participatory paradigms and competition within the paradigms that leads to the 
evolvement of sustainability, participation and continuous knowledge integration, in 
response to social demand for production of new knowledge.  
 
Providing a framework of today’s globalisation, Endre Kiss proves that globalisation is 
a new system of power and dominance with new interdependences. In this new global 
order actors’ freedom to shape the future has increased significantly, while their actions 
serve only their own short-sighted interest. At the same time, global future shaping 
competence also lacks its actorial foundation. Neither traditional forecast, nor traditional 
consensus-making, traditional decision-making, nor any other traditional institutions are 
capable of improving global future shaping competence. On the other hand, global 
indebtedness narrows future alternatives significantly. He claims that today’s 
globalisation creates new circumstances for shaping the future and cultivating futures 
studies as well. Futures studies can help to improve the global competence of actors 
through participative future shaping procedures, during which increased actorial 
freedom is connected to actorial responsibility and the interest of humanity. 
 
András Vág provides a general overview of the effectiveness of environmental 
policymaking, and, through it, the new needs of policy practice in scientific research 
and futures fields. He emphasizes that the application of models of environment and 
society interactivity makes possible to get new knowledge for policymaking and its 
assessment and to explore possible future scenarios. If planning comes to the fore, then 
the traditional role of futures research and studies can reinforce the foundation of 
planning, especially in setting long term goals. Foresight procedure associated with 
models of interactivity and future scenario alternatives could help stakeholders to shape 
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and accept environmental policy. Stakeholders’ participation and acceptance could also 
improve the effectiveness of environmental policymaking. 
 
Péter Alács developed a comprehensive definition of foresight that can involve both 
notions of foresight, namely foresight as practice and foresight as a discipline within 
futures studies. He interprets foresight as an intellectual activity because it has no 
definite output or measurement of efficiency, objective or testable statement. Rather, 
foresight is the product of methods and know-how. For methodological construction of 
foresight he applies the communication theory and the tree-level approach to theoretical 
progress in science. In the foresight of micro-level stakeholders use subjective and 
creative methods to shape their own individual desirable future. In the foresight of 
meso-level the key factors of future are explored and selected by getting consensus 
among stakeholders. Scientific methods – microsimulation, dynamic modelling, etc – 
can enter foresight on this level through modelling futures studies. In the foresight of 
factors of macro-level importance for stakeholders’ targeting are set to help 
stakeholders to personify the message of foresight by using networking and 
communication channels. The three levels of foresight are interconnected and interact 
with each other if the system of methods has a theoretical foundation associated with 
each level, and transparency and involvement are provided for all stakeholders.        
 
In her study Helga Veigl places the weak signals research into the topics of futures 
studies. Her starting point is that individuals perceive signs and attribute a meaning to 
them in different ways depending on their cognitive structure and mental attitude. Weak 
signals research is becoming an important issue in futures studies because of the early 
sensing and different interpretation of signs. If different meanings of signs are attributed 
to emerging processes that may occur in the future, then weak signals can be seen as 
alternative future constructions that can also influence other people’ thoughts about the 
future. Therefore, the construction of the meaning of weak signals can be a new part of 
subjective futures methods. She shows an example of how the process of meaning of 
weak signals can be integrated into the process of scenario building.  
 
Éva Hideg’s second study focuses on establishing closer connections between 
technology foresight and participatory democracy. She argues that the meaning of 
foresight and developed foresight procedures, including the meaning and procedures of 
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technology foresight, provides a suitable platform for advancing anticipatory 
democracy. An analysis of studies concerning the presence and forms of anticipatory 
democracy in different foresight activities/procedures, has led to the conclusion that the 
participation of stakeholders and citizens in foresight activities conform basically to 
different ideas of democracy. It was revealed that currently the practice of technology 
foresight serves the idea of representative democracy better than the idea of 
participatory democracy. Applying the participatory methodology of futures studies and 
open innovation to the area of technology foresight should open the way to achieving 
participatory democracy in this field.  
 
Erzsébet Nováky and Éva Hideg’s study gathers methodological experience that can be 
deducted from the educational, regional and macro-level social foresight practice based 
critical futures studies and developed in Hungary. Methodological considerations, 
methods and combinations of methods were discussed through case studies developed 
by the authors. Using participatory tools developed in critical futures studies in order to 
involve stakeholders, including non-professionals as well, and integrate their future 
expectations into the future shaping process is a very effective procedure. They 
emphasise that the freedom of speech and the free expression of opinion are the focal 
point of the whole foresight procedure. Laymen are mature enough to articulate their 
opinions and their future expectations, while futurists can open the process and involve 
them in helping to develop future alternatives. They recommend that these experiences 
should be applied in the area of technology foresight in order that its social effectiveness 
can be improved.   
 
Éva Hideg, Erzsébet Nováky and András Vág’s study presents a new procedure for 
shaping a future image in unstable environmental and social circumstances and by using 
an information technology background. The procedure is constructed in such a way that 
it can be refreshed lately. The subject of a future image is seen as an emerging complex 
social system whose future cannot be forecasted, however, the fields of its change can 
be explored, the signals and early forms of social changes and possible consequences of 
their cross-impacts can be meant and constructed. The developed two-way – objective 
and subjective – approach interrelated with each other and its almost real-time 
application is showed by shaping future image of Hungary in 2010. This case study 
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demonstrates the use of a web-based tool and the integration of hard and soft 
foresighting methods. 
 
Gábor Neszveda and Fang Xin’s study considers plausible solutions to situations like 
the so-called General Game by simulation. In the General Game many competing actors 
play a game in which each actor wants to earn the largest benefit that they can. One 
player’s success depends on the number of players, and the strategies they give one-by-
one; they do not have any previous information on the behaviour of other actors. 
Neszveda and Xin created a procedure to find fairly good strategies by combining 
cooperative and competitive strategies. This procedure is named the General Simulator. 
They tested the General Simulator by using their generated strategies in a real-life game 
with the participation of 200 students. They proved that the deliberate use of the mixed 
logic of cooperative and competitive strategy creation can be very useful in practice 
under uncertain circumstances. 
 
Tamás Kristóf’s study contributes to the discussion of methodological problems of 
corporate survival and solvency prediction.  Within the framework of this study the 
most frequently applied bankruptcy prediction methods are competed on a Hungarian 
corporate database. Model reliability is evaluated by ROC curve analysis. The study 
seeks to answer the question whether the simultaneous application of data reduction and 
univariate splitting (or just one of them) improves model performance, and identify the 
methods to which it is worth applying such transformations. He has concluded that 
univariate splitting adds more value to model improvement than data reduction in the 
field of bankruptcy prediction. The simultaneous application of data reduction and 
univariate splitting can be recommended mostly for neural network practitioners. 
 
The editor and all the authors hope that this book provides an excellent insight into the 
topical development issues of futures studies and foresight. Answers shaping in certain 
studies inform the reader about new approaches to the future, the interconnections and 
interactions of futures research, futures studies and the foresight, and about the 
renewing practice orientation of futures fields. Draft versions of some answers were 
also presented and discussed in meetings of COST Action 22 – Advancing Foresight 
Methodologies: Exploring new ways to explore, European Cooperation in Science and 
Technology sponsored by European Science Foundation from 2004 until 2007 – so, to 
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some extent, the studies reflect the European dimensions of changing futures concepts 
and practice.  
 
Finally, I express my thanks to all collaborators, fellow researchers, students, the 
publisher’s readers and proof-readers for their work and cooperation contributed to 
completion of the research project and this book. I thank the Hungarian Scientific 
Research Fund (OTKA) in particular for the grant given to this research project.  
 
Éva Hideg  
Editor and project leader 
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Interactivity and the Development of Futures Studies 
 
 
The research issue and its approach  
 
The present state of futures fields is determined by the competition between two lines of 
futures studies, evolutionary and critical futures studies. This competition could be 
considered favourable as it stimulates the evolution of approach and methodology to 
answer always-upcoming problems about the future. The competition is unfavourable as 
representatives of the two trends experience communication problems tending to 
eliminate each other, professional communication is filled with misunderstandings, 
those futurists that force one side do not learn from the other side, and they are not 
interested in producing theoretical consequences from empirical futurist work. The end 
of competition of the two trends is yet uncertain; however the idea of integral futures 
has just appeared in the futures literature. Slaughter declared in 2004 that present 
circumstance and way of cultivating futures despite its variation is ‘not a good place’ – 
anti-utopia – that should be left behind (Slaughter, 2004). By the beginning of the 21st 
century the futurists’ work has become fragmented, which is why it is unable to 
contribute efficiently to the solving of the civilisational crisis. The Futurists’ community 
should not be busy finding answers to questions such as: which future concept or 
methodology or method is correct or incorrect, they should however find answers to 
those that intend to lead the way for cultivating futures fields, and in a way that all 
futurists and schools of futures may contribute to the enrichment of the knowledge base 
and tools of futures fields. This new approach was called integral futures by Slaughter.   
 
There are two main ideas regarding integral futures. In the first one integral futures 
studies is the improvement of critical futures studies when different future concepts and 
imaginations are connected at the transcendent level with transcendental meditation 
(Slaughter, 2008). The second idea of integral futures is based on the free will of the 
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futurist: all futurists can freely select their research goal, perspective and methods, 
which also include paradigms, grasping paradigms, as it is now usual in the fields of the 
social sciences (Voros, 2008).  
 
This study shows the possibility and interpretation of integral futures embedded in the 
evolving process of futures field, and as a paradigmatic answer to new social 
challenges. This is fundamentally due to the fact that futures fields have a 40 year past.  
In the past 40 years there have been successful and difficult times as well. Futures have 
become a scientific field, having developed its paradigms, and the widening of its 
practice, were the main points of success; while the main difficulties were found in the 
ideological discussion as it developed into a science, and loss of confidence in the 
forecasts during the 1980s. Futures has been able to improve itself while reacting to 
problems; hence the experience of its development process could have been used for 
shaping the possibility space of its future, and showing the subject matter of integral 
futures from this aspect.  
 
Futures has become an individual discipline and science in the 1970s and 1980s as a 
basic and an applied science at the same time, in addition to the practical need in society 
in relation to gaining further knowledge and influencing the formation of the future, 
these tendencies, both played a definitive role in this process. The change in societal 
needs has also played a significant role in the evolving process as futures fields are very 
sensitively connected to practice itself. Futures fields’ responses to social needs also 
depend on the ability of the entire science and the futures fields as such, meaning a 
knowledge base, scientific approach and methodology could all be used for dealing with 
the future. This study examines the future evolution of futures fields within this dual 
binding. It searches for answers to the following questions: how the clash of trends 
could end reflecting new social needs; whether a new change of paradigm could 
actually occur; whether integral futures could come into existence; and which 
paradigms in relation to futures fields could be restructured. In seeking answers the 
study first goes through the past evolution of futures fields from the point of changing 
social needs, secondly it examines those social challenges that require answers from 
futures fields, and thirdly it searches for the responding possibilities of futures fields 
with the dynamic and comparative meta-analysis of the paradigms of futures fields.  
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The development of futures fields with regard to changing social needs up until 
today   
 
Futures as futures research developed into an individual and normal science in the 
1970s and 1980s. Reacting to the most instinctive human need it promised to foresee 
the future on a scientific basis with the forecast of probable futures. It supposed that 
governance supports or influences the shaping of the future within the forecasted range 
of future. 
 
Prognostics had a definitive role in futures fields becoming a science. Prognostics was 
successfully cultivated in connection with or as a part of specialised disciplines from as 
early on as the 1920s. Prognostics as a scientific predecessor of the later individualising 
futures fields became its part as an approach and methodology. Futures fields carried on 
its prognostics’s focus on the later forthcoming future, with its the emphasis of the 
genetic connection of the past, the present and the future, and its forecasting 
methodology1.  
 
The upcoming of futures research did not begin with the development of its own 
paradigm, but with forecasting and the creating of futures images, where futurists 
parallelly dealt with theoretical and methodological questions, adaptations and the 
development of methods, at the same time as focusing on the solutions of new 
assignments. The forecasting of economics and especially the scientific-technical 
development developed within the concept of whoever ‘knows the future’, will indeed 
progress faster. The future and the importance of progress are elemental parts of 
Western culture, however the two world order’s living side by side, and their 
competition raised the significance of both areas.  Moreover they were not just 
culturally important, but also at the level of daily political, social, economic and 
governmental decisions.  
 
Ideological discussions and confrontations followed this golden age when forecasts and 
future images emerged. Futures as futures research which was developing into a 
scientific field, was at first rendered more difficult by its approach as an ideological 
issue in the ideologically divided world, as in the East, and as in the West. Futures 
research was considered as the shaper of the official ideology (e.g.: Kahn and Wiener, 
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and the activity of the Hudson Institute (Kahn, Wiener, 1967)) or as major left side 
critics (as reading reflections to ‘Limits to Growth’ by Meadows and his fellows 
(Meadows et al., 1972)), while the futurological elements of futures research was 
labelled as a bourgeois science in the socialist world at that time.  
 
Furthermore the first soviet futurist who was most acknowledged at that time, 
Bestushev-Lada wrote about bourgeois futurology, while his book entitled ‘Window 
into the Future’ incited activity in relation to Marxist futurology and social prognostics 
in the Eastern block (Bestushev-Lada, 1970). The era of détente brought peaceful 
coexistence and competition, in which ideological discussions and confrontations were 
moderated, as the main focus was on working on daily problems and on the 
acceleration of social-economic development.  
 
At the same time this rejection incited those who were dealing with futures research to 
develop this new scientific discipline the more free of value judgements as they could in 
addition to the search of new connections within the same approach. This last statement 
is also valid, since we know that futures research in socialist countries was in service to 
socialist planning, while futures research in Western countries was connected to civil 
democracy and/or to democratic planning2. The selection of the research topic and the 
tolerance among futurists grounded for the independence from social systems and 
ideologies. Science and technology, the future economic development of countries, or 
the forecast of the growing and developing potential of the world, were typical research 
topics that were important for every kind of societal structure and ideology, based on 
the general idea that growth and development were in the spotlight. The tolerance of 
futurists was founded on the idea that science is free of value judgement and it serves 
progress. If we deal with the future on a scientific basis, then ideological confrontations 
and discussions could be eliminated. The above-mentioned change of international and 
local environment in society fostered the increase in tolerance.  
 
Futures research developing into an individual area of science was taking place with 
more processes facilitating each other: it was helped by the future oriented social praxis 
that defined its new and unique needs, and also by the fact that dealing with the future 
in science had its predecessor, besides the predictions of the specialised disciplines and 
forecasts of prognostics. Futures research became a new and individual research area in 
17 
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the 1970s and 1980s with scientific research shops, international organisations, 
scientific journals, specialist books and textbooks, using science’s ideological neutrality 
and concept of serving social progress. The cultivation of futures research created an 
inspiring environment for the development of its specialised discipline’s specialities and 
its own paradigm.  
 
Until the 1980s futures research overviewed and structured its theoretical and scientific 
basics, such as its methodology and the various tools of methods. According to the main 
scientific wave it gave a positivist answer to the question of how we should deal with 
the future. The subject matter of research was future that materialises later. It drew a 
conclusion to the future based on knowing reality and the tendencies of development 
derived from that. The possibility range of probable futures was founded on probability 
considering also the uncertainty of the future. Positivist futures research methods were 
gathered from the science of revealing reality, but it also had individually developed 
methods. It supposed that its forecasts were used to shape the aims of practice. As a 
result of the development of this scientific approach, methods and their application in 
relation to constructing forecasts on a scientific basis became a regular activity at 
different institutional levels, which also included national and international institutions.   
 
Table 1. Matrix of the positivist futures paradigm 
 
Components  Paradigm characteristics 
Comprehension of the future and the world The future that materialises later, that connects 
to the past and the present genetically, and the 
objective world is knowable with observation 
and thinking 
The futurist’s and their community’s situation Observant 
The field of inquiry in futures research  The future of society and issues concerning 
the future of human beings, complexity and 
dynamics  
The objective and task of futures research Gaining preliminary knowledge about the 
future, forecasting the possibility range of 
probable futures 
Methodological principals  Complex problem treatment, dynamic 
modelling 
Rules for method application The various procedures’ and methods’ – both  
the objective and subjective – associated usage 
18 
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The ‘worthwhileness’ and usefulness of 
futures research results 
Verification, reliability and fulfilment 
 
 
 
Not noticing those futures that do exist in the present is a blind spot of the positivist 
futures research paradigm, because it interprets future itself and the knowledge of the 
future only for the forthcoming times. This causes an incapacity to deal with human 
activity as an effect on the future, to decide whether choosing futures has any 
significance, to deal with future shaping originating from individual endeavour, or to 
see the extent to which social values based on different cultures influence the future and 
the forecasting process itself.  
 
Despite all the success the beginning of the 1980s and in the 1990s, futures research 
encountered critical times. Most of the forecasts of the 1970s and 1980s were not 
standing in good stead, because there were unexpected turning points, new and 
unwonted phenomena instead of the forecasted consequent futures and their variations. 
These included the oil crises and the economic downturn that followed, in addition to 
the collapse of the socialist system. Disappointing results meant that decision makers 
became increasingly dissatisfied when more forecasts did not prevail as thought, and so 
these forecasts had also lost their power to be supportive for decision-making processes. 
In addition to the fact that forecasts had not materialized, they were also leading the 
attention of decision makers to events that could not have followed after such decision 
making situations, neither at the national, nor at the international level. For example the 
Club of Rome’s forecast preferred zero growth, or there was a normative future image 
that was characterised by sustainable development (Meadows et al., 1972, Our Common 
Future, 1987). Decision makers and the employers of the forecasts were right in feeling 
that forecasts did not help them in making better decisions. Under these circumstances 
futurists had to come up with long and complicated explanations with regard to what 
futures research really was, what could be expected from forecasts and why forecasts 
did not prevail.  
 
During times of accelerated changes and the even more obvious instability, societies 
reacted differently to forecasts’ capacity of foreseeing and supporting decisions. 
Objection to forecasting escalated, it was also declared unnecessary, however there 
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was a strong need to forecast expected changes, even just for the short term. New 
questions emerged as a result of practice, which could not have been answered within 
the thinking of the positivist futures research paradigm, or if it could, practice would not 
have accepted such answers. The following are some examples of those questions: Do 
we have the possibility to decide and choose at all, or are we drifting with the events? 
Can we have an effect on the future at all? Can we know ahead at least those that we 
cannot avoid? At what level can we decide about the future, if we can decide at all? 
How will we shape the future so as to be unique and to belong to us, if we think that in 
fact we are also responsible for our future? Who exactly, and what institutions at which 
level may have a role? and what kind of role could they have in shaping the future? Is 
the future based on one justified value system, and is it possible to create a solid, 
coherent future image, or only thinking in partial futures based on different value 
systems is the only possibility in a strongly differentiated world? 
 
Discovering these confrontations futurists became aware that futures research and 
forecasts were not well communicated, and laymen and decision makers were both 
uninformed: they had different expectations regarding futures research moreover futures 
research had a different answer for them. However it became clear that the way the 
world operated had changed. Instability and sudden changes disturb the course of life 
and the flow of events. All these factors inspired futurists to self-analysis and to rethink 
their work, how did they examine the future? what did they really undertake when 
making a forecast?. The position of futures research and forecasts in the 1980s and 
1990s and the reaction of futurists and the employers of forecasts typically show the 
circumstances of a paradigmatic crisis, and that the way out of the crisis is through a 
change in  paradigm.  
 
Throughout the 1990’s self-reflection, the collection, evaluation and development of 
theoretical and methodological experiences gradually became characteristic of the 
cultivation of futures research. Self-analysis and self-reflection were interconnected to 
the overview of evolution of futures research and the way it had been passed on, in the 
classification of future concepts pictured in forecasts and in forecasting methods, in 
addition to the review and re-evaluation of the possibilities of using forecasts (Hideg, 
1992). We can say that these are the normal tasks of every scientific activity; this is not 
peculiar, because science evolves in this way. However from these reviewing and 
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developing studies we can heighten those research trends that reflected the changed 
circumstances and the critics of futures research, as well. These studies throw new light 
upon the goal and the social role of futures research, moreover have guided the 
cultivation of futures research towards new research perspectives. The research 
perspectives renewing futures research appeared in connection with the search for a new 
concept of the future, with turning to possible future interpretations different from the 
present and its trends, and with the recognition of the future-shaping role of social 
actors.  
 
Throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s theoretical discussions and the exposition of 
different viewpoints were somewhat underplayed, and those forecasting projects, 
methods and method developments which elaborated and solved the realisation of 
various new research perspectives got to the foreground. Paradigms stemmed from 
those researches within the new research perspective that could react to the post-
modern change of era and the spread of the idea of a post-normal science at the same 
time (Hideg, Kiss, Nováky, 1998). The post-modern change of era brought the 
strengthening of globalisation and the valorisation of locality at the same time. Both of 
them go hand in hand with the rising importance of freedom of social actors and 
stakeholders and with the re-evaluation of the future in the present (Kiss, 2005). With 
the re-evaluation of the social role of science, post-modern trends of thoughts and the 
idea of post-normal science put forward the social utility and expedience of scientific 
results within the changed circumstances.  
 
Futures research recognised that even though it is not possible to forecast the future, it 
then could in fact help social actors’, stakeholders’ activity in shaping the future 
thinking individually or in a group, if studying the future being shaped in the present 
draws attention to possibilities and risks, and/or supports the development of future 
orientation and future thinking of actors and social groups with its research results. 
This recognition was the reaction to the new circumstances and social needs.  
 
Evolutionary and critical research perspectives of futures managed to find new 
methodology and new ways of cultivating futures scientifically upon the new social 
assignment (Hideg, 2002). The futures field that concentrates on the future that exists in 
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the present in thinking and in emotions was not called futures research, but futures 
studies in the English literature (Masini, 1993). 
 
Evolutionary futures studies3 focuses on the complexity and the simultaneously 
determinate and indeterminate characteristic of the future. The futurists as observant 
and the acting participants use general evolutionary theory as a world view and as a 
heuristic. They examine the subject of research, which contains the human factor as 
well, holistically interconnecting each other’s perspective. Evolutionary futures studies, 
examines the new possibility range of futures within a different context using the 
generalised concept/metaphor of evolution for the movement of self-organizing and 
emerging social complexities. As a consequence it assigns the possibility range of 
futures arranged in evolutionary patterns. It breaks with the positivist approach, 
assuming that forecasting probable future is not possible within unstable circumstances. 
Subsequently from its approach, preliminary knowledge on the future could not be 
gathered. All knowledge that refers to the future is reflective, that could be falsified 
only partially, and then should be set to be reflected again.     
 
Evolutionary futures studies has hypothetical future thinking as it considers possible 
emerging and declining or even catastrophic futures too. In a certain subject and space-
time it considers possible to form scientifically based concepts about the possibility 
range of futures, the alternative futures and the processes that take place within them. It 
keeps future open notwithstanding any research results, because future could not be 
foreseen according to events, or the human-social reactions and actions. That is the 
reason why future should be explored through the study of future possibility.  
 
Table 2. Matrix of the evolutionary futures paradigm 
 
Components  Paradigm characteristics 
Comprehension of the future and the world The future is dynamically complex, 
determinated and indeterminated, the human 
factor is also part of it, revealing evolutionary 
possible futures with knowledge, creating new 
knowledge and reflection 
The futurist’s and their community’s situation Participative observant 
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The field of inquiry in futures studies Issues relating to the future of society and 
mankind, self organisation, emergence and 
complex dynamics, which the human factor is 
also part of  
The objective and task of futures studies Reflective interpretations and theories about 
possible futures, and their inclusion in social 
communication 
Methodological principals  Holistic point of view, thinking in 
evolutionary patterns  
Rules for method application Combined use of subjective methods and 
evolutionary models  
The ‘wothwhilness’ and usefulness of futures 
studies’ results 
Setting in the process of (partial) falsification 
and reflection,  reflection of the reflected, 
trial in practice, possibility of pursuing  
the research in concrete space-time   
 
 
 
Critical futures studies4 focuses on the future existing in the present and on human 
foresight. Its starting point is that foresight as a human capacity is an evolutionary 
capability; hence it works for every human being. Man deals with the future with all of 
his mental capacity, thus his future thinking consists not only of clearly conscious and 
rational thoughts, but also of emotions, faiths and beliefs. Man lives in community and 
so is able to deal not only with his own future, but also with his community’s. Critical 
futures studies is interested in this last topic: how do ideas relating to the future and 
common future thinking emerge, moreover how they could be shaped.  
 
Critical futures studies sets futures fields in the transformational cycle of community 
level’s future thinking. The task of futures studies is the critique of community’s future 
ideas and the development of such methods that could help begin the shaping of the 
community’s future ideas. The critical futurist does not make forecasts, but organises 
and supports the foresight process. The process and its results, future ideas are 
considered good and useful if they are transparent, controllable and can be repeated, 
accepted by community, and considered to be reflected by other communities, and other 
communities really do reflect them, thus the social discourse about the future is a free, 
continuous and open social learning process. Therefore critical futures studies has a 
subject, human thoughts about the future, that are examined by the participant, an 
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observant critical futurist, and the existing and forming techniques and methods shaping 
concepts and ideas of the individual and society are used and improved.   
 
Critical futures studies does have, and at the same time does not have an actual future 
thinking. It does have it, because it is embodied in several future ideas, in futures case 
studies and as a result of future workshops of the practice. However on the other hand, 
it does not have an actual future thinking, because as a consequence of its main point, 
when elaborating on the expectations about the future, future images and strategies are 
not the task of the futurist. A Futurist as a participant observant can influence future 
thinking with analyses and criticism, moreover the futurist can develop and use methods 
to elaborate different future shaping ideas.  
 
The output of the critics and workshops differ in space and in time, so there is not a 
synthesis of one future idea, unless considering the fact that they are all motivated by 
overcoming and restructuring the relation system of the industrial age. However this 
kind of synthesis does not even cross the minds of critical futurists, because they all 
agree that the age of big narratives has ended. Critical futurists do not have an actual 
future thinking but an action program that includes continuous critical activity, and the 
development of critical methods and approaches, and the methodology of participatory 
foresight.   
 
Table 3. Matrix of the critical futures paradigm 
 
Components  Paradigm characteristics 
Comprehension of the future and the world Future is part of the human world, is existing 
in the present, and is a thought, emotion, faith 
and belief that is continuously constructed by 
people and their communicational interactions, 
that influences the present activity; future 
could be interpreted and improved by learning  
The futurist’s and their community’s situation Participant observant 
The field of inquiry in futures studies  People’s and their groups’ relation to the 
future, formation of ideas and relations about 
the future of communities 
The objective and task of futures studies Participation in the social transformational 
cycle, support of forming future thinking at 
community level 
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Methodological principals  Communicative simulation of critic and 
transformational cycle, placed in context 
Rules for method application Combined use of subjective methods 
The ‘worthwhileness’ and usefulness of 
futures studies’ results 
Becoming subject of social discourse, 
transparency, controllability, repeatability, 
acceptance at community level, reflection on 
the reflected 
 
 
 
Both of the paradigms have materialised blind spots. The evolutionary futures studies’ 
paradigm does not define the extent to which the human factor plays a role in 
consciously shaping the future and sustaining changes, moreover the extent to which 
these two roles have changed. Therefore the paradigm does not define when the 
individual and the community are active, when they are passive observant, and when 
they are sustaining, moreover when studying each complexity’s future what is the 
proportion of these two statuses that relate to each other. Thus the paradigm could not 
answer the question of why and how human factors change its two positions in the 
complexities. The critical futures studies’ blind spot is given by the fact, that critical 
futures studies concentrates on deconstructing and reconstructing future ideas, and it 
does not consider as its subject,  research how each future concept forms other areas 
and other communities of the society, the life of the individuals and the world outside of 
society.  
 
Table 4. The renewed paradigm tools of futures fields 
 
Evolutionary paradigm Critical paradigm Positivist paradigm of 
futures research of futures studies  
   
Future in the future Future in the present 
Future is determined but can 
be influenced 
The future is open and can be constructed  
Future is constructed by human, social actors 
  
Futurist is observant Futurist is a participant observant 
   
Search for probable futures Study of possible futuresStudy and construction of 
acceptable/preferable futures 
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Exploration and projection of 
development tendencies by 
conditional plausibility 
Exploration and study of 
evolutionary patterns
Participating in shaping human 
foresight 
Modelling simple dynamism  Modelling complex dynamics Critic, social/post-structural 
discourse 
   
Scientific support for 
decisions of community and 
for policy 
Science contributes and supports the future idea construction 
of the actors  
Human factor’s future shaping 
effects could not be studied 
Change in role of human 
factor as active participant and 
passive side could not be 
studied 
Effects of 
acceptable/preferable futures 
on other communities, 
individuals and on the non-
human factors of the future 
could not be studied  
 
 
Futures fields, during its development until today, have formed three paradigms 
according to the social needs that it reflected. With the positivist paradigm it satisfies 
the need of knowing the future in a preliminarily form. Evolutionary and critical 
paradigms both allow futures fields to support the future shaping activity of the actors 
that form the future. The renewed future fields do not give preliminary knowledge about 
the coming future which occurs later, but supports to shape present thoughts about the 
future by exploring the evolutionary patterns and/or with the critics and improvement of 
future thinking.  
 
The capacity of futures studies to solve problems and its possibility to change 
 
The dynamic and comparative analysis of futures paradigm shows that there was a 
paradigm shift in futures studies. With this shift futures studies has discovered the 
future that already exists in the present and its role played in societal future shaping. It 
has also changed its world and future concept, and its idea about the place and role of 
futures studies and futurist too. The future of society is not formed by laws or 
development tendencies, but by the activity of societal actors. The compass for action of 
social actors is their thinking about the future. Scientific futures studies does not 
forecast the future, it rather supports actors of society and individuals to improve their 
positive attitude to the future and their future thinking. Futurists have scientific tools to 
study ideas about the future and their materialisation or non-materialisation, in addition 
to the role of other future shaping forces and factors. The futurist can be a participant 
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observant and has the possibility to deal with the future according to a new paradigm. 
The two new paradigms of futures studies resulted from the paradigm shift allowed 
futures studies to refine and adjust its goals, tasks and the way to reach and solve them, 
according to changing circumstances and needs. The capacity of futures studies to solve 
problems has risen with the appearance of these new paradigms. The paradigm shift 
occurred according to Kuhn’s concept (Kuhn, 1962) because both evolutionary and 
critical paradigms of futures studies have overwritten the paradigm matrix of futures 
studies according to the paradigm matrix of positivist paradigm.  
 
If we follow paradigm history’s change in time we can see the following periods: the 
1970s and the 1980s: the beginning; end of the 1980s and the 1990s: the paradigm 
crisis; the 1990s and the early 2000s: paradigm shift. The present competition of 
paradigms can be considered as a period of preparation for a new paradigm crisis, in 
which futures studies form new paradigm(s) answering to upcoming societal needs. The 
history of futures studies continues with a new paradigm crisis, followed by a paradigm 
shift, according to Kuhn’s pattern of scientific evolution (Kuhn, 1962).  
 
If we consider that the paradigm shift did not entirely follow Kuhn’s pattern, because 
the positivist paradigm was substituted by not one but two others, then the present 
competition of paradigms could be considered part of the process of the paradigm shift. 
We can suppose that the first paradigm shift would finish when one of the two 
paradigms would overcome the other. 
 
Futures studies has a set of paradigms that consist of three paradigms. With the 
paradigm shift and with the appearance of the two new ones, futures studies has a 
greater capacity to solve problems. Futures studies’ set of paradigms faciltates the 
solving of problems, using forecasting and foresight tools. Futures studies through 
paradigm shift has also become a post-normal science (Funtowitz, Ravetz, 1993), 
because its practice orientation, its capacity for reflection and self-reflection and for 
considering users’ viewpoints and evaluation have grown. Futures studies' post-normal 
scientific approach would not have been able to be completed, regarding the 
interconnection of different practical experiences and theoretical futures knowledge 
that are continuous and also evolve each other (Hideg, 2007). If we consider that with 
the paradigm shift futures studies has become a post-normal science, we must admit that 
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futures studies is unlikely to again become a science with one paradigm The process of 
futures studies developing into a post-normal science has not yet finished, hence the gap 
between theory and practice could be a catalyst for the evolution of futures studies’. The 
elimination of the gap could help generate a new paradigm shift and the development of 
new paradigms.  
 
The two paradigms evolving after the paradigm shift are alternative and theoretically 
complementary. They are alternative because their answers to the future shaping role of 
human factor are both possible and also theoretically complementary. Evolutionary 
paradigm answers the question concerning the role of human factors in the complexity 
of the future and in the shaping of evolution’s cultural-societal pattern. The critical 
paradigm supports the improvement of the future thinking of individuals and societal 
groups, because within that paradigm societal actors shape the future of society 
according to this paradigm. While the evolutionary paradigm focuses on possible 
futures, the critical one concentrates on acceptable and preferable futures.  
 
After the paradigm shift the evolution of futures studies has been characterised by the 
competition of the two paradigms. Competition has accelerated the perfection of both 
paradigms and their spread in practice. None of them could beat the other, throughout 
the paradigm competition, indeed there are many undesirable effects of the competition 
as well. Undesirable effects include the moderation of communication between those 
futurists who work along different paradigms, the new mentality that aims at beating 
each other, and the secession of several foresight activities, like autonomous foresight 
(Keenan, 2006)5 or praxis foresight (Hideg, 2007) did. The tendency of introversion and 
enmity is detrimental as it distracts futurists’ attention and capacity from responding to 
societal challenges. The gap between futures theory and practice is based on 
communicational problems between the representatives of the paradigm as well (Hideg, 
2007). Futures studies could have overcome its detrimental form and the harmful effect 
of paradigm competition, if its self-reflection would operate in relation to its reflection. 
So it would also give attention and reflect the hanging needs of practice, and that would 
give possibility to a new paradigm shift which would definitely not bring another 
competition of paradigms.  
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The blind spots of paradigms show that futures studies is not able to manage problems 
of the future with three paradigms. Futures studies can raise its practical utility even 
with these three paradigms, if it uses its tools of paradigm to form a new variant of 
paradigm. In this way the development of futures studies can be shifted into a 
variational-selectional scientific evolutionary track (Popper, 1972).  
 
The appearance of blind spots in a paradigm illustrates that the blind spots of former 
paradigms could be eliminated. If we systematically search the possibility to eliminate 
blind spots of the two new and alternative paradigms, then we can make a 
recombination of paradigms according to a selected external point of view. Studying 
the reactions to new challenges could create the external point of view. The alternative 
paradigms are the ones that could be appropriated to this restructuration, as they are also 
complementary. This kind of restructuration could bring the contentual modification of 
the components of the alternative paradigms, thus a successful recombination could 
bring another paradigm shift. The paradigm shift that follows the recombination raises 
the capacity of futures studies in dealing with its tasks, as well as making it possible for 
futures studies to switch its variational-selectional evolutionary track after the new 
paradigm shift (Popper, 1972), using its enlarged paradigm tools.   
 
The interdisciplinary nature of futures fields (Hideg, 2008) has had a paradigm-
generating role in the formation and change of paradigm. Futures studies was 
established in a positivist paradigm, by the representatives of positivist sciences, indeed 
the representatives of the social sciences and humanities had a great role in the 
paradigm shift and the formation of the two new paradigms. In the competition of 
paradigms well-defined and specific futures paradigms were developing, that has started 
to resist always-upcoming external interdisciplinary effects, and has been able to take 
part in other interdisciplinary researches with its own paradigm6. As a consequence we 
can appoint that futures studies is able to do development on its paradigms, but for this 
the futurist must inevitably regularly educate himself. This process does not prevent 
futures studies from widening its view and refreshing its methods along 
interdisciplinary lines it does however give it more space to be scientifically influenced 
by internal effects rather than the external ones.    
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Table 5. The paradigmatically possible futures of futures studies according to the 
complex meta-analysis of paradigms  
 
Factors that influence the dynamism  Possible futures 
Tracking the changes in time Emergence of paradigm – crisis in paradigm –
paradigm shift – the process of change in 
paradigm is followed by another crisis of 
paradigm and paradigm shift, reacting to new 
societal needs  
 
The outcome of the competition of paradigms A/ the end of paradigm shift according to 
Kuhn,  will result in the victory of one 
paradigm 
B/ eliminating undesirable consequences with 
the interconnected actuation of reflection and 
self-reflection – a paradigm shift with  the 
development of new, but not competitive 
paradigms 
The fulfilment of post-normal scientific 
aspect  
Eliminating the gap between futures theory 
and practice with a new paradigm shift and 
with the development of new paradigms 
Using the paradigm tool  Creating variant of paradigms and with their 
selection running the track of variational-
selectional evolution 
Elimination and eliminability of blind spots  Recombination subsumed to the external 
point of view that influences the content of 
components, that results in a new paradigm 
shift 
The effect of interdisciplinarity A paradigm generating role in formation and 
shift of paradigm – in the future the inner own 
power falls into the line by the regular 
education of professional futurists 
 
 
The factors that influence the paradigmatically possible futures within the futures 
studies project are illustrated by more evolutionary tracks in the future. Any of them 
could materialise if certain factors become dominant. If all six factors have an effect at 
the same time, then the possible evolutionary forms could be estimated by analysing 
those factors that strengthen and weaken, or even contradict each other. In this case 
there are only three possible evolutionary forms left. In the first form, the new paradigm 
shift occurs  with the development of new paradigm(s), and during that self-reflection 
connected to reflection, new blind spots are eliminated (and also the newest ones 
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become visible), moreover the gap between futures theory and practice is also 
eliminated. Futures studies could materialise this way by developing its inner power and 
interdisciplinarity. The paradigm tool could help it through recombination that intends 
to eliminate blind spots. After the new paradigm shift futures studies can shift to a 
variational-selectional evolutionary track that has a raised capacity. The second form is 
to overcome one paradigm, finishing the paradigm shift according to Kuhn, using its 
own inner power.  The third form is the variation of the existing paradigm tool, 
basically with  its own inner power, which results in futures studies’ shift to the 
variational-selectional evolutionary of track unchanged capacity. 
 
Table 6. The paradigmatically possible evolutionary forms of futures studies 
 
Evolutionary forms  Characteristics 
Form 1 New change of paradigm with new paradigm(s) 
           - with self-reflection connected to reflection 
     - eliminating new blind spots  
     - eliminating the gap between futures theory and practice 
     - using its own inner and interdisciplinary scientific capacity 
path that raises capacity to solve tasks  
Form 2 The overcoming of one paradigm completing the paradigm shift 
according to Kuhn  
- Using its own inner scientific capacity 
path that reduces capacity to solve tasks with unsolved problems 
Form 3 Variation and combination of the existing paradigm tool 
- basically with own inner scientific capacity 
path of unchanged capacity to solve tasks with unsolved problems 
 
 
The probability of the second and third forms have decreased due to the fact that they 
include less dynamising factors, leaving the following questions unanswered: how the 
gap between futures theory and practice, furthermore all their blind spots could be 
eliminated? furthermore how interdisciplinary lines could be used to refresh the concept 
and methodology of futures studies. Both forms are followed by narrowed futures 
studies, and the loss of its interdisciplinary character. It is a thread for the third form 
moreover if futures studies would vary and combine its paradigm tools with great 
flexibility. Both forms proceed toward a paradigm crisis, because futures studies is not 
able to flexibly respond to the new challenges with one paradigm and with its restricted 
paradigm tools.  
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The possible evolutionary tracks that raise the capacity to solve tasks and the 
interpretation of integral futures studies 
 
The possibility of the first evolutionary track is more expounded than the others, 
because it includes most of the factors that induce the dynamism and the 
interconnection of the paradigms, thus it makes it possible to define integral futures 
itself. It is impossible to foresee how and in what combination of the evolutionary 
track’s dynamising factors that raises the capacity to solve tasks could materialise, 
hence I will not describe that. However I will draw attention to the significant role of 
the developing activity of futurists and of those who arrive from other disciplines in the 
materialisation of the evolutionary track. I am concerned how one integral futures 
studies could be constructed with these ‘ingredients’. 
 
For this exercise I will first select one external point of view concerning new societal 
needs, to which futures studies should react. I will then analyse whether the factors that 
induce the dynamism of the paradigm subsumed to the external point of view could be 
formed and connected, making the recombination of the alternative paradigms and the 
formation of new paradigms possible, that are able to manage the process of futures 
studies, and its development into  integral futures studies.  
 
 Sustainability, democratic participation, new societal needs in relation to the 
continuously widening creation of knowledge  
 
The challenge for futures studies in the early years of the 21st century is that societal 
practice has faced great instability, with regard to the risks human-societal formability 
and its limitations of the future pose. Knowledge, varied in nature, the scientific, the 
empirical and the tacit should be continuously connected in all fields of life, built within 
each other, to create new knowledge to sustain community’s and humanity’s and their 
environment’s existence and prosperity. In this process of creating knowledge, human, 
community organisation, environmental, technical and economical problems should be 
handled together and interconnected to realise real time subsistence and sustainability. 
At the beginning of the 21st century societal challenges became especially important in 
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three fields: sustainability, democratic participation and the problems of creating new 
knowledge.  
 
In the years following the Millennium it has become evident that dealing with 
environmental issues could not be postponed. The possibility of global climate change 
raises more and more questions (The IPCC Assessment Report, 2007), and besides this 
other environmental components do have a worsening status (Global Environmental 
Outlook, 2007). Sustainability and the passing to the way of sustainable development 
should be taken seriously at a global and at a local level as well (Jackson, 2009). The 
exploration studies of environmental degradation and climate change show that human 
effects have a definitive role in unfavourable changes. Societies could act for 
sustainability only if they get to know those mechanisms of action that function within 
the environmental changes and the societies’ need to satisfy actions, placing human 
interference in the mechanism of action. Dealing with sustainability emphasises the 
analysis between environmental and human interactions, and their foreseeing and 
planning.  
 
Democratic participation is becoming increasingly important in the operation of global 
and multicultural societies. Wars and violent conflicts as solving societal problems 
could be eliminated by widening the democratic participation of individuals and societal 
groups. Developing democratic participation is an important goal in modernising the 
operation of political, economic and social institutions (Pateman, 1970, Heinelt and et 
al., 2002, Barber, 1984, Hippel, 2005, Bezold, 2006).  
 
Democratic participation is based on interactivity between individuals and social 
groups. Leydesdorff appoints that this interactivity represents the functionality of post-
modern societies (Leydesdorff, 2001). New solutions for problematic issues gained with 
interactivities between individuals and individuals, as well as individuals and groups, in 
addition to groups and groups show how society works. Democratisation developed by 
participation does indeed belong to the category of societal evolution. Democratic 
participation expresses a new position for individuals, in which they are able to affect 
their own living environment and their own societal position (Barber, 1984, Baiocchi, 
2003). 
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The continuous and widening creation of knowledge is the focus of contemporary 
societies, because new knowledge is needed to realise both sustainability and 
democratic participation as well. New knowledge is not only created by the social elite, 
but also by all individuals in society (Gáspár, 2009). Additionally new knowledge has 
to be organised and created within the process of participating in interactivities. The 
creation of new knowledge is not only a continuous action, but also a part of a reflective 
societal learning process (Bandura, 1986). This means that new and socially useful 
knowledge is put into context and is creative. New knowledge evolves in specific 
problematic situations where new knowledge is shared among people, hence knowledge 
integration is realised. Thus the key issue of societal evolution is the development of 
such individual and societal knowledge base, which has a very strong interconnection.  
 
The three new challenges are interconnected by interactivity. Interactivity shows the 
characteristics of the dynamic relations and interconnections of the world, in addition to 
the importance of human factor’s new role in interactivity. Living in a state of 
interactivity demands that we are aware of how to act in certain situations, furthermore 
how we can become creative as components of different complex systems. We should be 
able to define our place in a complex system, to communicate, co-operate and interpret 
the signs, answering with reflection, thinking and acting with responsibility according 
to our situation. Moreover we should be able to estimate the possibilities of the complex 
system’s components’ reactions to our ideas and actions, and the changes the other 
components’ reflective answers induce in our own situation.  
 
The net of interactivities have a different nature, and living in them the individuals’ and 
society’s knowledge that could evolve, that is practice-oriented and that includes 
foresight has become more valuable. That is why the three challenges and their 
consequent issues become research topics in the research of sustainable, knowledge-
based, interactive and societal networking models. These societal models have also 
resuscitated programs on societal development (e.g.: the knowledge society program in 
the European Union (Europe and the Global Information Society, 1994, Memorandum 
on Lifelong Learning, 2000) or the educational or vocational  development programs 
(Hideg, Nováky, 1998)). 
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Futures studies reacted with continuous participation in the research of these issues. 
There are many forecasts and foresight activities on these challenges and their partial 
problems. Futures studies is very active in revealing environmental problems, and in 
shaping the future model of sustainable society, knowledge society and interactive 
society (some examples for further reading: Meadows et al., 1972, Our Common 
Future, 1987, Malaska, 1991, Rosnay, 1979 and Eder, 1997 and Hideg, 1999). These 
activities are very important but not enough to react to challenges. Futures studies 
should also react to challenges with the development of its own activity, because the 
capacity of creating, foreseeing knowledge and its continuous creation are elementary 
in relation to interactive human existence.  
 
Interactivity and the interpretation of integral futures studies 
 
The main point of the challenges is the real-time realisation of complexly defined by 
sustainability and the extension of individuals’, communities’, social actors’ 
participation in relation to knowledge integration and the creation of new knowledge. 
Futures studies should also react to interconnectedness of tasks with the development of 
its paradigms. 
  
Sustainability is not just an upcoming research topic, but also a new world view as it 
considers that interactions of evolutionary systems of different nature are specific 
functioning systems in itself. This functioning system is specific as the evolutionary 
systems that participate in the interactions do indeed preserve their capacity to function 
and evolve also after the series of interactions, they do namely change in a form of co-
evolution, which in due course means that several systems are the successful survivors. 
This concept of the world's dynamism is human centric and is optimal only from human 
aspects. Apart from the already interpreted optimisation, we can see that behind this 
there is a world view that supposes that cultural-societal systems and the system that 
shapes its environment are interconnected, that they indeed shape each other in mutual 
interaction. Their mutual movement is defined as  co-evolution (Csányi, 1999).   
 
This world view is different from futures studies' evolutionary approach as this 
considers the environment(s) of the society as an evolutionary system as well. However 
this is not a great difference, the concept and world view of futures studies must be 
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modified to be able to consider the non human environment more than the server of 
cultural-societal evolution. The critical futures studies have to change its world view as 
well, not to consider human culture and society as independent from the non human 
world, and as a system that could be shaped by the actors unlimitedly. If futures studies 
tends to deal with futures that are co-evolutionarily possible and sustainable, keeping its 
present paradigms, and tends to participate in shaping concepts that regard these futures, 
then it will have to modify its view and in consequence also the content of the other 
components of its paradigms. 
 
Regarding the participation of individuals, communities and social actors, futures 
studies, especially critical futures studies has already reacted and actively taken part in 
the development and spread of paradigms. Despite this it has to develop its 
actor/participant relations within the critical paradigm too. In relation to social actors, 
the hunting and integration of new and possible actors into futures studies should get a 
greater role and the non human future shaping factors should appear as actors in societal 
discourse, representing the fact that social actors have freedom to shape their future, 
even though this freedom is not totally without limitations. Within these limitations the 
role of non-human factors, like natural-geographical environment, the biosphere, the 
ecosystem etc. is growing. Evolutionary futures studies has identified the future shaping 
role of social actors, but it analyses them only in terms of evolutionary patterns and in 
relation to interconnection with other future shaping factors.  
 
If we consider futures studies’ level of development and its characteristics we can 
appoint knowledge integration and its recreation in relation to futures studies, has to 
develop new knowledge that could interpret the world and its connections of human 
culture and society within interactivities’ changing network, thus this could be used in 
the shaping of human interactions. For this futures studies should produce new 
theoretical-methodological and practical knowledge. New theoretical-methodological 
knowledge is based on the integration of new scientific results and its own scientific 
creation of knowledge. Futures studies could get its new practical knowledge by its new 
theoretical-methodological knowledge, when it merges scientific, empirical and tacit 
knowledge values and expectations into acceptable/preferable futures. Besides this, 
futures studies has to secure its continuous creation of knowledge and the 
interconnection of its theoretical-methodological and practical knowledge. Moreover it 
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has to maintain its interdisciplinarity and adapting it to its new tasks. In the practice of 
knowledge production, evolutionary futures studies has a disadvantage, while critical 
futures studies has problems in the creation of theoretical-methodological knowledge. 
The continuous creation of new knowledge is secured by the paradigm of critical futures 
studies, but the evolutionary futures paradigm does not. The connection of theoretical 
and practical knowledge is unresolved in both paradigms.  
 
To differentiate the creation of theoretical and practical knowledge regarding the future 
is necessary because of the following issues: Not all practical future work can be raised 
to a scientific and methodological level, as futures studies would disappear as science.  
Within these circumstances testing, comparing, reflecting and self-reflecting these 
scientific results would not be possible. But not all theoretical-methodological research 
results could become practice, because the individual characteristics of practice would 
be eliminated in space and time. The theoretical-methodological futurists cannot 
participate in each practical futures studies work, because they are few, in addition to 
specific knowledge about producing forecasts and foresight in practice. Theoretical 
professionals may write handbooks, but there is no guarantee that those people are also 
involved in the practice. Theoretical-methodological futures studies requires a strong 
connection with practice, because without knowing how to produce a certain forecast, it 
is impossible to be self-reflective. The development of theory and methodology and 
future practice do all create new knowledge, but they are different in the way in which 
they are produced and what their validity and competence is.  
 
Futures studies is able to reflect challenges; interconnected operation of reflection and 
self-reflection, elimination of blind spots by recombining the paradigm according to an 
external point of view. The common use of interdisciplinary capacities are all 
possibilities of development, that allow futures studies to reflection in the case when 
futures studies answers the challenges with the development of a paradigm. During the 
development of a paradigm, futures studies has to concentrate on the development of 
new theoretical-methodological and practical knowledge and their interconnection, and 
it should use complementary characteristic of the two alternative paradigms, and then 
the development of a paradigm could be made by the recombination of paradigms 
brought by the contentual modification of the components of the paradigms. The 
question is whether the paradigms developed in this process result in integral futures 
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studies. With the new development of paradigms futures studies could be integrated if 
developing new paradigms along the complementary and interconnected paths that 
create new knowledge eliminates the undesirable effects of the present competition of 
paradigms. These paths could be formed by recombining the two, theoretically 
complementary paradigms. The paths that create new futures knowledge could be found 
in theoretical and practical futures studies.  
 
Theoretical futures studies creates knowledge on future theories and methodology; 
scientific knowledge referring to evolutionary patterns, and creates hypotheses. 
Practical futures studies indeed develops and improves the process of creating 
knowledge, in accordance with the practical work of forecasts and foresights in space 
and time. Both theoretical and practical futures studies create specific knowledge, so 
they could be effective if they operate separately but in continuous connection with the 
other path of creating new knowledge. Thus integral futures studies is a process within 
scientific futures studies that with the recombination of paradigms creates a new 
section. Indeed we can also say that integral futures studies is a result of the 
differentiation within futures studies, which is the separation of several knowledge 
creating paths, and of integration which is the paradigmatic builder of the 
interconnections of the knowledge creating paths. Integral Futures Studies is science 
with two or more paradigms, of which the paradigms are complementary and could be 
completed and reflective to new societal needs, only if they are interconnected. Integral 
futures studies does not stop the competition, but replaces it inside the certain 
paradigms. Integral futures studies could not be a science with one paradigm as it would 
not have anything to integrate; it could not be without a paradigm either as there are no 
common rules of cultivation, lastly neither could its knowledge be integrated. Integral 
futures studies is not the end of the development of futures studies, but a new possible 
period that widens and modernises the capacity of futures studies to solve tasks by 
eliminating its blind spots. Integral futures studies widens the paradigmatic tool, and 
maybe it will be the one that opens the way for futures studies towards a variational-
selectional scientific development track.  
 
The idea of Slaughter for integral futures could be connected to the integral futures 
studies developed by meta-analysis in the second evolutionary form, and the integration 
of knowledge. Slaughter in his study of 2008 moves on along the critical paradigm. His 
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approach states that integration of the knowledge could be realised with the 
transcendence of scientific and non-scientific future ideas, and with transcendental 
meditation, that is what he calls integral futures studies (Slaughter, 2008). I think that 
this kind of integration of knowledge does not belong to the interest of futures studies as 
a science, and the competition of paradigms is not yet closed, and still many 
requirements to be met.  
 
Some statements of Voros on integral futures studies are very important for my study. 
According to Voros futures studies could be integrated only when its paradigm is a 
meta-paradigm, which stays afloat freely above other ones (Voros, 2008). From this 
paradigm futurists could select arbitrarily according to situations, in relation to what 
they would like to study, the goals and the contexts. A paradigm like this does not exist 
yet, thus Voros advices to grasp the thesaurus of social sciences’ paradigms. This idea is 
considerable: if futures studies become integrating or integrated, then we will not leave 
paradigms behind. As the specific disciplines’ paradigms represent different approaches 
and methodologies, paradigms could be integrated only at the level of meta-paradigms. 
But Voros does not undertake to do that, so he suggests an approximate solution: futures 
studies as social sciences without its own meta-paradigm could use all meta-paradigms 
as its own meta-paradigm, and can freely grasp them. According to him then in fact 
integral futures studies would admit all point of views, trends and paradigms. This 
operation method is not typical of present futures studies, because there is the 
competition of paradigms, and futurists need some standard requirements for futures 
studies. Voros’ suggestion is reasonable and acceptable regarding the fact that the 
unproductive competition of the paradigms should be solved on neutral ground. With 
this the professional-scientific experience, the accumulated knowledge base of futures 
studies that have been collected for many years would have been lost; moreover he 
suggests resumption. That is why I think that if I finish the meta-analysis of the 
development of futures studies and its paradigms, I can contribute to clarify the 
paradigm of integral futures studies, and based on that, the interpretation of integral 
futures studies.   
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The paradigms of integral futures studies 
 
Based on the train of thoughts that I have just described, I can say that integral futures 
studies consist of two futures studies that are independent but develop in strong 
interconnection. One is theoretical; the other is practical. Both fields integrate and 
create scientific knowledge. The theoretical futures studies of integral futures studies 
develops future theory, methodology and paradigm to explore the co-evolutionary 
patterns and their change, and concentrates on the changing role of societal actors. The 
practical futures studies of integral futures studies develop and apply integral 
forecasting and foresight methods during its practical work, and its scientific activity 
aims to methodologically solve the integration of knowledge of different nature.   
 
The two fields have a division of labour by cultivating scientific futures studies. The 
theoretical futures studies develop the science of futures studies, which makes complex 
study of the development of practical futures studies, and with or without its help 
produces forecasts and foresights. Practical futures studies use, criticise and develop the 
results of theoretical futures studies during its practical scientific activity, adapting to 
certain space-time and exercises.  
 
This division of labour also assumes that there are futurists who are not cultivating 
scientific futures studies, and whose profession would be the making of integral 
forecasts and foresight. This assumption is not unreal as dealing with the future is quite 
prevalent at different institutions. Hence the advisor and supporter of future activity has 
become an individual undertaking, and the foresight manager is an individual job and 
position in most countries of the world. If science of futures studies evolve towards 
integral futures studies, then integral futures studies will be able to have a renewal effect 
on the widely run forecasting and foresight activities in the practice, and that will also 
be used for developing its theoretical and methodological questions. One of the 
motivations is the regular education of professional futurists. Cultivating integral 
futures studies can assure the prepared educators and create a modern knowledge basis 
and system of professional requirements, which is the theoretical base for the 
continuation of established and practice-oriented education of futurists.  
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The two independent fields must have two different paradigms. Theoretical futures 
studies reflect the new challenges as it adjusts its own world and future view to the 
forming of a co-evolutionary world view, indeed it also willing to participate in the 
global-societal program of forming sustainability, with the forming of its own 
knowledge that refers to co-evolutionary and sustainable future concepts. Towards this 
it needs to form the future concept, the approach, the methodology and the paradigm of 
the science of futures studies, furthermore it has to create new knowledge. Developing 
its own co-evolutionary paradigm solves this task, because the creation of theoretical 
knowledge adjusts to reality7.  
 
Practical futures studies reflect the challenges too, as it would like to participate in 
forming the acceptable/preferable future of sustainability. This task will be completed if 
it develops different integral forecasting/foresight methods for the new future concept 
and approach. During this, we will notice the improvement of participation, the 
connection and unification of scientific, experimental and tacit knowledge of the future, 
we can also say that the connection of professionals’ and laymen’s knowledge and 
expectations of the future. Its paradigm is based on a participatory paradigm, that 
adjusts to its own task and that is developed by itself8. 
 
Modifying and recombining the content of the components of evolutionary and critical 
paradigms to suit the aspects of co-evolution, participation, knowledge integration and 
the continuous creation of new knowledge could form two new paradigms of integral 
futures studies.  
 
Following the co-evolutionary world concept requires change in the world and future 
concept of futures studies. The approach in which the future approach at present and 
the openness of the future both remain unchanged in the paradigm of integral futures 
studies as well. However their content is restructured as the importance of possible, 
acceptable/preferable interactions of the human system, the systems of their 
environment rise. This future is a multitude of mental construction that is continuously 
born in the human world of men/society, that reflect the systems of the environment and 
themselves; and this future affects and shapes the co-evolutionary processes of 
men/society and the non-human world by human interactions.  
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Theoretical futures studies develops the definition, the scientific basis and the exploring 
methodology of the futures, that are interpreted by the co-evolutionary paradigm. The 
possible and also acceptable/preferable human concepts should be formed in the 
practice with the participatory involvement of future shaping actors, in different fields, 
time and place during integral forecasting/foresight activities. The practical futures 
studies develop its methodology and practice for different integral forecasting/foresight 
activities based on the participatory paradigm.  
 
Futurists and their community are participant observants in both new paradigms that do 
not make any change in the content of the components of the paradigm. Likewise the 
societal role and general goals of futures studies do not change, thus we can say that 
integral futures studies support the formation and improvement of society’s future 
shaping thoughts.  
 
The components of the paradigm change in their subject, goal, task, methodological 
principles, rules for method application, ‘worthwhileness’ and utility. The subject of 
theoretical futures studies is the study of the formation and change of the co-
evolutionary patterns of evolutionary systems of different nature, and how the role of 
human and non-human factors and their incidence change in their pattern.  
 
The goal of theoretical futures studies is to create reflective knowledge (interpretation, 
assumptions, conditional theories and methodology) regarding the human and non-
human world’s common surviving/further possibilities. Its methodological principles 
are characterised by complex dynamism, and thinking in holistic co-evolutionary 
patterns, while its methods are characterised by co-evolutionary modelling and building 
model systems, and the development of simulations of possible interactions of the 
emerging systems. The criterion of ‘worthwhileness’ of the theoretical results is 
falsification, possibility to improve and to place in societal discourse about the future, 
and also the utility in practical futures studies and in the production of certain 
forecasts/foresights.  
 
As theoretical futures studies is a continuous activity of integrating knowledge and 
creating new knowledge first, it has to maintain its paradigm – the interpretation of 
possible futures, the co-evolutionary patterns, the co-evolutionary methodologies – and 
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has to construct new variants of paradigms. Secondly, it also has to develop its theory 
on integral futures studies, in order to do that it should study the history of futures 
studies and the different practices for the production of forecasts/foresight. Thirdly, it 
should be in continuous connection and interconnection with practical futures studies in 
developing the methodology and process for the production of forecasts/foresight. This 
new or emphasised role is not a new component of the paradigm, because it affects only 
its operating form, whether it causes additional research goals, tasks and development 
of methods.  
 
Table 7. The outline of the co-evolutionary paradigm matrix of theoretical futures 
studies 
 
Components  Paradigm characteristics 
Comprehension of the future and the 
world 
The future is a multitude of mental constructions that 
are continuously born in the human world of 
men/society that reflect the systems of the environment 
and themselves; and this future is affected and shaped 
by human interactions the co-evolutionary processes of 
men/society and the non-human world too.  
The futurist’s and their community’s 
situation 
Observant participant 
The field of inquiry in integral 
futures studies  
The possible connection of the dynamic processes of 
evolutionary systems of different nature, depending on  
chance, determinism/inertia and the reflective and self-
reflective changeability of human constructions of the 
future 
The history of futures studies and the different practice 
of producing forecasts/foresight: self-reflection of 
futures studies as a science 
The objective and task of integral 
futures studies 
Create new reflective knowledge (interpretation, 
conditional theories and methodology) regarding the 
human and non-human world’s common 
surviving/further possibilities 
Self-reflection of futures studies as a science: creation 
of integral futures knowledge, construction of a new 
variant of paradigms, maintenance and development of 
futures studies’ knowledge basis, interactive connection 
with practical futures studies 
Methodological principals  Complex dynamism, thinking in holistic co-
evolutionary patterns 
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Rules for method application Inducing new knowledge on the future with dynamic 
modelling and building model systems of the 
connections of the emerging systems, and the 
simulation of possible interconnections and interactions 
within the system 
The ‘worthwhileness’ and utility of 
results of integral futures studies 
Falsification, and the possibility to place in societal 
discourse and in process of construction of the future in 
a certain space and time, in addition to improvement 
 
 
On the contrary the subject of practical futures studies is to search for future shaping 
human actors and non-human factors that appear in the participatory process, to 
interconnect them and to induce new knowledge among them regarding the future 
constructional tasks that emerge in space and time. In the process of creating societal 
knowledge of the future, non-human factors have to be considered, not just as critical 
futures studies does. In foresight these forms of knowledge that are not controlled and 
are not developed in the foresight process are in the background knowledge of human 
actors. In practical integral futures studies these forms of knowledge are systematically 
developed and used, that is why these forms of knowledge have to be visualised by the 
actors, adjusting it to the actorial environment of the integral forecast/foresight. With 
this integral factor forecasts/foresights will not be the forecasts/foresights of the 
futurists, but the scientifically based future concepts of the participant actors.  
 
The goal of practical futures studies is to maintain with different kinds of participation, 
the cultural-societal and individual cycles that construct futures within the 
interconnecting process of constructing futures at different levels of communities and 
individuals. The methodological principle is the organisation of participative future 
constructions, based on the participation of different actors into a creative learning 
process. Practical futures studies is subjective in its method application, as it applies and 
develops the individual, group-based and internet-based methods, moreover these 
become subservient to them in objective and quantitative methods and model 
simulations as well. These methods aim to create and control the new and modernised 
participatory future ideas.  
 
Knowledge created by practical futures studies is not scientific but they are set up in 
scientifically organised ways and by scientific methods. These forms of knowledge 
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could not be falsified by all aspects, but are comprehensible, acceptable, criticisable, 
they are even transparent in their set up. Besides this they have to be useful and 
developed in other human actions as well, like the realisation as part of a planning 
process or in using them to maintain the co-evolutionary pattern in theoretical futures 
studies.  
 
Practical futures studies is built according to a paradigm of one participatory thinking 
process, where the characteristic of the process is paradigmatically emphasised. Over 
that this process should be continuous, so the maintenance, development of future 
thinking is its goal in space and time, and also the development of the process 
organising methodology, namely the examination of integral forecasts/foresight. 
Additionally practical futures studies has to be connected to theoretical futures studies 
as with newly developed future ideas, as well as its methodology.   
 
Table 8. The outline of the participatory paradigm matrix of practical futures 
studies 
 
Components  Paradigm characteristics 
Comprehension of the future and the 
world 
Future is a process of mental constructions and 
reconstructions born in a certain space and time of the 
human world 
The futurist’s and their community’s 
situation 
Observant participant 
The field of inquiry in integral 
futures studies  
Find different actors and knowledge, among others the 
representatives of non-human systems and scientific 
knowledge, interconnect them in space and time 
regarding the future constructional tasks 
The objective and task of integral 
futures studies 
Maintenance with different kinds of participation, the 
cultural-societal and individual cycles that construct 
futures within the interconnecting process of 
constructing futures at different levels of communities 
and individuals 
Methodological principals  Organisation of participative future constructions based 
on the participation of different actors into a creative 
learning process 
Rules for method application Subjective, individual, group-based and internet-based 
methods to connect different knowledge and create new 
knowledge of the future, and the use of objective and 
quantitative methods subservient to the participatory 
creation of new knowledge 
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The ‘worthwhileness’ and utility of 
results of integral futures studies 
Partial falsification, transparency, comprehensibility, 
acceptability, used in other human actions, possibility 
to improve, utilisable and explorable for theoretical 
futures studies 
 
 
Both paradigms will have blind spots. The following could be expected with regard to 
the construction of paradigms based on complex meta-analysis:  
 
- within the co-evolutionary paradigm we cannot decide and examine whether a 
compound system that works and changes in different environments, change and 
develop due to the interaction between the several systems or by reason of external or 
internal determining factors 
- within the participatory paradigm there is no such rule, how to integrate 
knowledge of different nature, to be more precise there are rules only for process 
organisation. As a consequence the context of scientific and reliable knowledge, the 
intuition and the fears and hopes of the practical integral forecasts and foresights could 
not be fixed in advance. The different future ideas resulted in practical futures studies 
are not commensurable in relation to the different nature of their knowledge.  
 
The development and evolution of the interconnected theoretical and practical 
paradigms could be realised by:  
 
 - new knowledge created by theoretical futures studies becoming part of the 
tangible /methodological knowledge, that take part in certain practical futures studies 
work,   
 - certain future constructions of practical futures studies become a source of 
knowledge and research topic with the cultivation of theoretical futures studies, 
 - both paradigms’ creation of knowledge connected to their own research topic 
and goals refresh its interdisciplinarity with common research and/or understanding,  
 - regular education of professional futurists, that create a continuous, direct and 
living connection between the two ways of scientific cultivation of futures studies. 
 
The blind spots of the new paradigms draw the attention to the fact that both theoretical, 
both practical futures studies will have to search for new variants of paradigms, to find 
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solutions that suit their future tasks. For this the paradigmatic tool of integral futures 
studies that is enriched with two new paradigms could be used.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
According to the analysis of the development track of futures fields and its paradigms, 
and its capacity to react to the new needs of integral futures studies, consists of the joint 
of theoretical and practical futures studies that have new and independent paradigms, 
that are interconnected in many aspects and that are co-operating. Integral futures 
studies is the manifestation of the rationality of the 21st century, of men who create 
knowledge with foresight and who are active as well. Integral futures studies is not 
created by the competition of paradigms, because it represents different phases of the 
creation of future ideas of the co-evolutionary and participatory paradigm, moreover 
developing them could be realised by a tolerant, co-operative and interactive research 
approach and attitude. The competition is not over yet, but is transmitting to answer 
internal questions of each paradigm. The science of futures studies can step the 
evolutionary form of the variational-selectional model of scientific evolution with a new 
paradigm shift and with the development/evolution of the interconnected paradigms of 
theory and practice. Futures fields’ paradigmatic tools and its capacity to solve 
problems can be further widened with the development of integral futures studies. Its 
operationalisation is summed up in Table 9.  
 
Table 9. The widening of the paradigmatic tool of futures studies  
 
Integral Futures 
 
Reflection: to the co-evolutionary world concept, to the societal participation, to the 
continuous integration of knowledge and to the needs of creating new knowledge as 
they are the different manifestations of interactivity 
Futures in the present: the ideas about the future of cultural-societal system regarding 
the intershaping effects of the human system and its environmental system – the future 
is open 
 
Theoretical integral futures studies Practical integral futures studies 
Based on the co-evolutionary paradigm Based on the participatory paradigm 
Relativity of independence and interaction between them 
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Theoretical integral futures studies Practical integral futures studies 
Co-evolution between the human and non 
human evolutionary system that induce the 
future 
Participation in shaping integral forecasts and 
foresights 
Exploring co-evolutionary patterns; the real 
and possible/imaginary system of past-
present-future and the examination and study 
of the complex dynamism of their 
interactivity; development of integral future 
theories 
Exploring and improving the future ideas of 
human factors/human actors and the 
circumstances that shape them; enforce the 
widespread of the participatory principle 
Complex dynamism with holistic and co-
evolutionary modelling; development of 
interactive models and model systems 
Representing human actors and also the non-
humans by humans in the integral forecasts 
and foresights and their participation in the 
expanded societal/post-structural discourse 
Possible futures in co-evolution, and placing 
cultural-societal futures within them; forming 
the scientific basis for practical futures 
studies activities 
Acceptable/preferable futures constructed by 
participation; forming the scientific basis for 
integral forecasting and foresight process 
Continuous activities 
Maintenance and development of integral 
future knowledge, possible futures and 
paradigms 
Maintenance and development of 
acceptable/preferable futures and the integral 
forecasting and foresight process  
Observing the interaction systems between 
human and non-human, and exploring and 
interpreting the changes in the possible 
futures’ co-evolutionary patterns the 
exploration of spreading effects induced by 
the realisation of future ideas, development of 
future theories, of models and of methods, the 
study of practical futures activity, 
development of paradigm  
Following up the realisation process and the 
environment of the acceptable/preferable 
futures, feedback to induce a new integral 
forecast/foresight process and to improve the 
process using new theoretical and 
methodological knowledge 
The continuous realisation of knowledge integration and the induction of creating new 
knowledge 
Connection of hypothetical and non-
hypothetical knowledge regarding the 
different co-evolutionary systems, and 
creation of new knowledge of future theory 
and methodology, contributing to develop the 
knowledge base of integral futures studies 
Creation of knowledge regarding the 
interconnection and the development of 
different actors’ different knowledge of the 
future, and their beliefs, hopes and fears, 
contribution to the development of the 
knowledge base of  integral futures studies 
Interdisciplinary lines 
Matching the approach and topics of theoretical and practical integral futures studies 
Sources of blind spots 
Changes by non mutual interactions cannot be 
examined 
The criteria of connecting knowledge, beliefs, 
hopes and fears are not defined 
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Theoretical integral futures studies Practical integral futures studies 
The connection of theoretical and practical integral futures studies 
Paradigmatic assignment of continuous interactions; setting up regular education of 
professional futurists 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 Here I have to mention some writers and their work that have been very important in 
prognostics and still have a great impact. Kondratieff’s method for analysing macro-
statistic data, his theory and methodology for analysing long waves was published in 
1922 (Kondratieff, 1993). Morgenstern wrote a book about economic forecasting in 
1928 (Morgenstern, 1828). E. Jantsh published a handbook on the methodology of 
technological forecast in 1967, R. Ayres wrote a book on using technological forecast in 
long term planning in 1969 (Jantch, 1967, Ayres, 1969). Box and Jenkins published a 
book for using statistical time series analysis in forecasting in 1970 (Box, Jenkins, 
1970). 
 
2 Géza Kovács and his research group and followers were in the vanguard of 
domestication of futurology and futures research in Hungary (Kovács, 1970, Besenyei, 
Gidai, Nováky, 1977). 
  
3 Developing the evolutionary futures studies Laszlo and his research fellows (Laszlo 
ed., 1991 and Laszlo, Masulli, Artigiani, Csányi eds., 1993), Dator (Dator, 1998), 
Malaska (Malaska, 1995) and Mannermaa (Mannermaa, 1991) were on top. 
 
4 In developing critical futures Masini (Masini, 1993), Slaughter (Slaughter, 1995), 
Inayatullah (Inayatullah, 1998) and Loveridge (Loveridge, 1998) had a definitive role.  
 
5 Besides communicational problems the intention of separation and individualisation 
of foresight activity that adapts serving the one-needed political-institutional decision-
making practice has appeared. This new foresight activity considers legitimate and 
authentic only its methods, but does not consider itself as part of futures studies 
(Country Specific Practical Guides to Regional Foresight, 2002, Keenan,  Miles,  Koi-
Ova, 2003). The idea and methodology of autonomous foresight that is defined outside 
futures studies could be found in the literature of technological, regional and 
institutional foresight. This intention of separation is problematic as it doubts the 
legitimacy of other foresight activities instead of criticising them. 
 
6 Organisational foresight is connected to strategic management and knowledge 
management too through with the researches and with solving practical problems 
(Loveridge, 1998, Tsoukas, 2004, Gáspár, 2008 and Daheim, Uez, 2006). 
 
7 The concept of co-evolution was first used in the biological sciences and in ecological 
researches, but there some other denominations for co-evolution and to similar systems 
of interconnections, like connectionism, interconnectedness or interactionism. These 
denominations mark that this phenomenon, system and the approach deriving from that 
has been revealed in different researches and in other scientific disciplines as well. The 
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co-evolutionary paradigm has become a meta-paradigm showing its popularity in other 
scientific disciplines (Csányi, 1997, Pléh, 2007, Leydesdorff, 2001). 
 
8 The participatory paradigm is such a paradigm of the social sciences that systematises 
the general rules of the process of societal knowledge creation for practice. It supposes 
that knowledge is always connected to humans and individuals, and the augmentation of 
knowledge is valuable in itself, because it serves the completion of men. Because 
knowledge is always personal, all need to take part in the social creation of knowledge, 
as equal participants. The creation of knowledge is a process that is embedded in the 
social and cultural environment. New knowledge will be created if knowledge of the 
participant grows or transforms, and if it could be improved; and its assumption is equal 
participation, and a knowledge creating process that is legal, transparent for everyone 
and reflective (Heron, Reason, 1997). 
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Globalization and the Pitfall of Cataclysms 
 
 
Theoretical considerations  
 
According to a widely accepted great interpretation, globalization is a science of 
extensive problems, each of which concern everyone, and humanity in general as well, 
in new, qualitative, and in their tendencies existential ways. In this sense, the legitimate 
fields of globalization are e.g. the issues of ecology, raw materials, migration, the global 
health problems of the world (for they can’t be restricted beyond state limits any more), 
the global positive or negative tendencies of population, energy, arms trading, the drug 
crisis, or dilemmas of integration and world economy. There is another huge 
interpretation as well – and that’s what we follow in our present work –, which doesn’t 
bind the problems and phenomena of globalization to concrete and singularly appearing 
’global’ issues (or to a random set made up of them), but examines structural and 
functional connections of the whole new global situation. 
  
The grades of the process of globalization have always manifested throughout the 
history of the 20th Century as radical and irrevocable transformations in history and 
society. This experience has come up at each leap of modernization towards ‘globality’; 
yet a theory of the history of globalization shall be elaborated, which depicts it as a 
gradual process. First, the grades of globalization before the 20th century should be 
taken by their proper value, as for example the telegraph already fulfilled the 
opportunity of global action and communication, and had immeasurable effects on 
international politics and finance even before the 20th century. The correctly interpreted 
history of globalization is of extraordinary importance for every scientific and other 
kind of research, because it might distract scientific and everyday consciousness from 
the intellectual forced course according to which every generation, every decade, every 
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world-political turn, or significant step in civilization is the victory of globalization(!) 
over a ‘not-yet-globalized’ preceding state.  
  
The above thoughts nevertheless don’t contradict our definite starting thesis that says 
the world-historical turn of 1989 is an outstanding stage in the evolving of globalization 
indeed. The primary cause of this is the fact that up to 1989, the mere existence of the 
two world regimes restricted the process of globalization in the centre, between 
concrete, down-to-earth limits. Each carefully selected element of globalization could 
get through the systems of these regimes only by extraordinary efforts. The specifically 
real-socialistic bureaucratism of Existing Socialism, especially of the Soviet Union, 
most obviously didn’t fit the requirements of globalization concerning the arrangement 
of natural everyday processes. This gradually led to various kinds of tension and 
pressure. 
  
When analysing the great leap of globalization in 1989, we must remember that 
globalization and Existing Socialism have influenced one another mutually right from 
the beginning. For it wasn’t only that the dynamic forces of globalization shattered the 
Iron Curtain more and more violently, but there was an opposite tendency as well, as 
members of the elite of Existing Socialism became more and more anxious about the 
more and more triumphant achievements of globalization and they felt that they would 
irrevocably fall behind if they hadn’t join in these processes. 
  
The image of globalization mainly appears both for the everyday consciousness and the 
intelligentsia as a new system of power and domination, as a peculiar and yet 
undiscovered new kind of ‘centralization’ alike the old centres of power, yet different in 
its operation. This fundamental vision is right and appropriate in several aspects, and it 
is also not a coincidence that the ones who took the first signs of globalization with the 
less enthusiasm were the ones who possess some kind of concrete and real power 
(which of course was not considered ‘global’). Yet the real model of globalization is 
fundamentally different than these visions. From the point of the philosophy of society, 
globalization is not a new, rigid and utopist structure of (global) power most of all, but 
its main point is the fact that the economical, political, cultural and social processes can 
only take place within the framework of globality. But the primary consequence of this 
is not an abstract and unintelligible new system of power and dependence, but a new 
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world with a new kind of functioning, a world that is not simply ‘multi-polar’, but 
straight infinitely polarized.  
 
Globalization is the new latitude for all of the actors. The new logistics for the actions 
possible within its framework get realised in structures of micro- medium- and macro-
levels. Existing and real globalization creates new social states of affairs in every aspect. 
The access to the ocean of globalization is at stake in the fight between subject and 
subject, subject and group, group and group, or smaller and larger groups. The 
structuring power of globalization penetrates all strata of social life. 
  
The great leap of globalization that started in 1989 and realized one of the possible 
versions of globalization, i.e. the one related to monetarism and the international debt 
crisis, therefore the all-penetrating practice of globalization shall be related to both the 
problems of monetarism and those of the international debt crisis. Nevertheless, 
globalization can intermingle with several other extended social or world-economical 
tendencies without losing its authentic and legitimate character 
 
One of the most important and also the most difficult fields of the social-philosophical 
research of globalization is the continual way its functional and non-functional elements 
and moments are interconnected, like the cogs of a machinery. The more the global 
processes fulfil their global character, the more obviously they feature ‘clearly’ 
functional characteristics in their operations. For example, the more obviously ‘global’ 
the structure of world economy gets, the more clearly do the functional theoretical 
definitions prevail. From a theoretical aspect, functional and non-functional elements 
are heterogenic, but from a practical aspect, they fit into one another in an organic and 
homogenic manner. 
  
Globalization is therefore not a new, yet unknown centre of power, not world-
government, but in principle it is a qualitatively new system of the relations of all 
actors. One of its specific traits is the possibility of access to global processes and 
networks in a rather ‘democratic’ way. It would absolutely make sense to describe the 
fundamental phenomenon of globalization with the criteria of access and accessibility. 
But this is also the field where we can find the two weakest points of globalization. 
Globalization demolishes a whole row of particular differences and limits by ensuring 
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in principle total accessibility. In this sense it is therefore ‘democratic’: the participation 
in global processes could even outline a new concept of ‘equality’. Globalization that 
builds from elements of discrimination in its dynamic progress would be a contradiction 
not only in a theoretical, but in a practical sense as well. The world-historical balance of 
globalization shall prevail in this connection. This balance will depend on the final 
proportions between the democracy moreover, the equality of accessibility, and the 
discriminative moments i.e. the self-destructive real social processes in the field of the 
forces of these two tendencies. 
  
The second especially critical problem of the globalization past the 1989 qualitative leap 
is related to this issue. It is namely only one side of the coin that globalization 
establishes new relations in a qualitative and manifold sense, while the qualitatively 
new character of relations is made up right by the fact that the mediums and strata that 
used to separate the individual from global affairs drop out, and the individual can 
access the multi-faceted communication of global networks directly i.e. without these 
mediums, just like any other actor. But the other side of this coin is the question 
whether there will evolve really new resources on the side of globalization, which shall 
be able to fulfil the increasing demands accessibility generates. The triumphant 
breakthrough of globalization increases the number of resources by itself, but to a much 
smaller extent than the possible ‘amount of resources’ required for the world of more 
and more perfect accessibility. The fail of access requirements namely critically 
deforms the well-built system of global networks. This negative vision resembles the 
kind of mass-communication that offers a wide variety of TV-channels, while it fails at 
increasing the ‘resources’ of entertainment and culture in a qualitative sense parallel 
with the growing accessibility, therefore all it can offer for the increasing demand is 
low-niveau programs, or endless repetitions of tried and trusted ‘canned’ programs. 
  
The whole of globalization i.e. its essential and specific appearance in its particular 
functional (sub)systems is a process impossible to follow for everyday consciousness. 
These are specific intellectual problems of understanding the real globalization and its 
real functional (sub)systems, which are per definitionem inaccessible for everyday 
consciousness. 
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The representation of the reality of globalization is firstly an immensely huge 
‘extensive’ task for social actors, but secondly, it is also a new, ‘qualitative’ task of 
representing the new functional and abstract qualities of globalization in the per 
definitionem non-functional and non-abstract dimensions of everyday consciousness. 
  
Globalization as a whole, as a new world order, or a system of new structural relations 
cannot appear in the global flow of information the same way particular global 
problems (e.g. the drug issue) do. The interpretation and understanding of the 
globalizing world depends right on the capacity to handle these codes. Decoding these 
new codes is difficult for everyone (although the objects and dimensions of these 
difficulties are quite variable), i.e. not only for everyday consciousness in the traditional 
sense, but for the scientific and the artistic forms of consciousness as well. 
  
The problem of decoding the new codes also divides society by the capacity of 
‘decoding’. For ‘decoding’ can be interpreted as evolving a capacity to ‘access’ the 
processes of globalization to some extent, i.e. a capacity to use the opportunities 
information systems offer. But there is also another interpretation of ‘decoding’, which 
is worlds apart from the former capacity, and that is the capacity of understanding 
independently the processes of globalization represented in the information systems, i.e. 
the capacity to ‘read’ them independently. At this point, the situation of information 
systems is exactly like that of modern art at the time when modern functional systems 
appeared. Bertolt Brecht expressed this phenomenon by the example that a photo of the 
building of AEG says nothing about the various functional processes that take place 
inside the building. 
  
Shaping spatial and temporal structure of globalization 
 
Globalization is the most extended framework of the interpretation of the present. It is a 
high-level theoretical generalization, and at the same time also an empirical reality 
anyone can experience. The qualification of the action of each actor can be made on the 
basis of a preliminary consideration of concepts of space and time. Re-thinking the 
problem of historical space and time might be an objective measure of progression. 
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This new, threefold aspect also possesses a coercive discursive - logical force. For in the 
evolutionary systems theory, the total absence of coercive power and coherence in each 
particular connection and statement was really relevant. The General Evolutionary 
Theory has become a popular philosophical theory, but – lacking coercive power – it 
acquired a strange tautological character as well. ‘Reality’, ‘future’, and ‘progress’ do 
not lie in the intellectually risky cognition of new and unknown facts, but simply in 
tautologically forcing the evolutionary systems theory upon certain facts or phenomena. 
  
Many traits of the phenomenon of globalization, but most of all its actorial structure are 
the reason why this extremely coercive and coherent theory and logic have to face the 
significant contingency of future processes, the strongly limited opportunities of real 
foresight, and the extraordinary measures of some relevant particular actors’ degrees 
of freedom. 
  
This contradiction might be decisive at evolving the paradigms of future research. We 
have to understand an extremely relevant and totally self-evident paradox. On one side, 
we have started a violent fight against decisive methodological schools, mainly for the 
reasons that their inclinations are tautological, they do not describe their scientific 
objects as results of complex and sophisticated analysis, but treat their cognitive 
schemes more or less as ontological constants, so no wonder if they find these 
preliminarily ontologically defined schemes in their research fields. On the other side 
we arrive to a strict, coherent, and coercive methodology we consider optimal, but at the 
same time we call attention to its limits, already while explaining it. But the reason of 
this paradox lies in the new character of holistic relations evolved by globalization 
itself. It was not evoked by methodological confusion, but on the contrary, by 
methodological insight. The eternal question of the reference of the method and its 
object appears here. There are objects of cognition, which allow only limited results 
even for the most perfect method. Therefore our argumentation shall find limited, open, 
and ‘non-linear’ answers on the basis of the right methodology. These answers are in 
fact equivalent with the transition of ‘hard’ processes of control and communication 
into ‘soft’ style processes. 
  
The present is: a mixture of the spacetime-relations of (global) structures, and the 
spacetime-relations of actors. Whatever abstract – and for the empirical research of 
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society, even esoteric – this approach might seem for the first sight, it nevertheless 
becomes one of the most decisive characteristics of the present. The fact that the spaces 
of the present acquire the temporal factor is not new. Moreover, today’s discussion is 
right to inquire into issues of the global regression and devaluation of space. 
  
This object (i.e. the society of globalization in its theoretical and abstract form) does 
not fit into the heuristic space of the traditional theories of democracy or bureaucracy, 
or even traditional social issues any more, right for this shift in the structure of 
spacetime. Because for example, neither the principle, nor the representations of the 
liberal and democratic political structure does suffer any harm by the fact that both the 
urging power of the creation of simultaneities and the possibility of unlimited spatial 
relocation lead to a devaluation of all spatial factors, or a higher value of all factors that 
possess the power of creating total simultaneity or perpetual spatial movement that also 
converges to simultaneity. Globalization is the final, dynamic form of the (social) 
temporalization of (social) space. 
  
Neither the traditional, nor the new problem of historical-social spacetime can be 
solved by the analogy of sciences. And beside the traditional concepts of space and time, 
new concepts appear as well, which are becoming more and more decisive from the 
aspects of globalization.  
  
Social-historical time is a specifically social i.e. non-natural constitution and 
construction. Social time is being generated by social life, and not the scientific 
concepts of time. Social time is generated by the following socio-ontologically general 
all-encompassing measures: 
  - physical reproduction, 
- temporal components of natural rationalisation and  
- temporal components of political power and administration. 
  
Two models have been evolved in the tradition to interpret the specifically historical 
(social) time (spacetime). The circular model means, time does not conquer social 
space (both in the narrow and the broader sense). Although circularity entails the 
moment of temporality, it perpetually falls back to the starting conditions and thus 
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restores them. Globalization fits neither into the circular, nor the linear model of time. 
It is a totally new quality of spacetime, a totally new situation, a new social spacetime. 
  
This time we have no intention of making a positive judgement (with an ontological 
demand) on the character of reality. Our intention is only to point out the mere existence 
of the tension that might hold between the ‘sharpness’ of the complete theory and the 
‘opaqueness’ of possible answers in principle. We would prefer to describe this new 
kind of reality as one of an ‘uncertain’ character (after Heisenberg), but we accept the 
attributes like ‘chaotic’, ‘non-linear’, or even ‘soft’ as well.  Our concrete 
accomplishments will not be directly determined by these theoretical considerations, as 
the functional systems of globalization, their dynamic structures and spacetime-
relations, and most of all, the measure of the latitude of the ‘actors’ gives a sufficient 
positive explanation in the positive and objectively grounded definitions of this 
character of ‘uncertainty’. 
 
The extensive and fundamental approach to globalization seems to triumph in the theory 
and research of society. There are new types of mentalities developing in the global 
structure of society. 
 
In social sciences, the scientific method they use is always of highest importance. The 
laws discovered by social sciences mostly prevail only within the closed, protective, but 
also hindering system of science and scientific methods. In our present inquiry we 
attempt to examine phenomena of politics with the seemingly abstract means of the 
philosophy of society. 
  
Globalization raises a row of alternatives, all of which need to be interpreted, on the 
field of ideology as well as the state, society, and culture. From the aspect of the theory 
of science, the theory of globalization is a theory of society, and no matter how many 
unprecedented new definitions there are on the phenomenon of globalization, it is 
neither necessary, nor possible to create a new model of theory-making for any of them. 
  
The extensive social-theoretical and philosophical approach to this issue leads further to 
the sphere of more empirical problems of the philosophy of history and the theory of 
society. Globalization is also a fundamental problem of the post-socialistic regime 
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change, and thus one of the most important tasks and challenges of Hungarian society 
as well. An approach to post-communistic democratisation, which starts out from the 
aspect of globalization, might offer new perspectives of the theory of democracy, 
compared to the widespread points of view in the science of politics. 
  
As we have seen, the real globalization is neither a new and unknown centre of power, 
nor a world government, but a qualitatively new system of the relation of every actor, of 
which main characteristic is ‘globality’, i.e. the access to global processes and networks 
in a specially ‘democratic’ manner. The relationship of the East and the West changes 
in the globalized world-society; the roles of debtors and creditors, winners and losers 
get interwoven in this new world order that is based upon new interdependencies. In 
respect to social capital, we have to mention the tendency of a ‘downward spiral’, which 
was induced by globalization, and which means that the types of social capital society 
invest into individuals reduce both in quality and quantity. This is mainly the 
consequence of the crisis of the public sphere, according to which the evolving of 
knowledge society could be a remedy for this problem. An approach based on 
globalization could show the limits of the approaches which have stuck at national 
development. On the level of philosophical generalization, we can also approach the 
trends of globalization with the categories subject, practice, and emancipation as 
criteria.  
 
The theoretical interpretation of globalization shall by no means be built up as a 
reconstruction of the globalization of one concrete problem (like ecology or arms 
industry), but it should start out from the whole, i.e. a thorough examination of 
structural and functional relations originally are interpreted as holistic. 
  
The fall of Existing Socialism put the neo-liberal complex of politics and economy in a 
hegemonous position, and this led to the illegitimate identification of neo-liberalism and 
liberalism. The structural and functional characteristics of the global world are being 
shaped by this neo-liberal complex. In this context, Anthony Giddens’ and Tony Blair’s 
Third Way appears as the inequal relation between neo-liberalism and social 
democracy. 
 
Globalization and the Pitfall of Cataclysms 
 
 
64
Whether intended or not, the research of globalization extends into the dimensions of 
the philosophy of history. It slits world history into two parts: the description and 
comparison of these two great eras resurrect the great constitutional procedures of the 
classical philosophy of history. 
  
Globalization gets fulfilled in the universe of post-modern values. With respect to the 
history-philosophical method, we do not attempt to define the main characteristics of 
post-modernism by its contrast to modernism. We break up with the widespread 
contrast of modernism and post-modernism, because we firmly believe that the essence 
of post-modernism can be revealed in its relations to structuralism and neo-Marxism. 
These two streams were emblematic of the philosophy of the sixties. Sometimes they 
amplified one another, and sometimes they got polemic with each other. By the mid-
seventies, neo-Marxism ceased to exist as abruptly as a natural disaster, and around that 
time, structuralism also recognized its failure. The place of these two great streams was 
taken by a philosophical vacuum, which however didn’t mean a ‘philosophers’ 
vacuum’, i.e. the absence of philosophers; as there came philosophers who although 
possessed positions of political power, but no philosophy of their own. As post-
modernism was born on the ruins of neo-Marxism and structuralism, it took over the 
achievements of these philosophical streams which had been relativizing and 
deconstructing normal sciences, but at the same time it also dismissed their positive 
aspirations for reconstruction. Therefore, post-modernism is the use of the discourse of 
cognition without an intention of cognition. 
  
But post-modernism is not the only hegemonous stream (now in a narrower, also 
philosophical sense) nowadays. By the fall of neo-Marxism, the neo-liberal-neo-
positivistic philosophical methodology that was following the Vienna Circle, got into a 
strategically decisive position in politics as well as in economy and philosophical 
methodology. Therefore, today’s philosophy is under the twofold hegemony of post-
modernism and neo-liberalism-neo-positivism. The most important symmetry-relation 
between these two streams is the attempt to re-regulate the whole process of thinking by 
the regulation of notion-building and object constitution. But their strategies are 
opposite to one another: neo-liberalism-neo-positivism sets reductionist verification as 
its chief requirement, while post-modernism delegitimates verification. However, these 
two streams have one more thing in common: both the limitation of the scope of the 
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rules of philosophical verification and its total elimination got realized not through 
power-free intersubjective discourses, but in the medium of interpersonal power. 
  
There is a simple but so far neglected, however quite decisive fact, namely that the 
launch of the processes of globalization and the post-communist regime change took 
place practically at the same time. In our opinion this is not a coincidence, but there is a 
manifold relation behind this simultaneity. The connection between globalization and 
the fall of communism is obvious, but the analysis of the multitude of its components 
still awaits future researches. 
  
In respect of neo-liberalism – which is of an outstanding importance in connection of 
globalization and post-communism – it is a decisive theoretical fact that monetarism 
and liberalism are not identical phenomena, as the former is able to function even under 
totalitarian regimes. Would the communist dictatorship have been incompatible with the 
monetarism that ruled the world? After the resolute start of Pinochet, some weak 
attempts by Jaruzelski, Grósz and Gorbachev really make us believe this. Liberalism 
and monetarism are not necessarily joined together. Their closeness that made them 
seemingly identical was made possible by a particular historical situation: the decline 
and fall of communism. This was the fact that made monetarist theoreticians mix up the 
social care of Western welfare societies with the ‘real Existing Socialism’ of Eastern 
societies, and they found the opportunity of a simultaneous criticism of both systems in 
liberalism. In this exceptional situation, in which human and civil rights were 
conspicuously violated in the states of real Existing Socialism, the two – otherwise quite 
incompatible – aspects of liberalism i.e. economic and civil rights liberalism could be 
brought together. 
 
The socio-theoretical concept of globalization does not mean a new, rigid structure of 
(world) power, but a new framework and environment of social action, in which 
economy, politics, culture, and all other actors of society are shaping their relations in a 
new and unprecedented, originally global context.  
 
To show all the political factors and value components of globalization evolved from 
over the totality of political and social reality, needs an extraordinarily thorough and 
extensive analysis of the total world history after 1945. This is in fact the problem of the 
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unification of the divided world after 1945, as an actual and real division of the world 
would evidently automatically exclude any meaningful use of the term ‘globalization’. 
  
The decisive processes of globalization are part of the development of modern 
rationalism. Yet the decisive process of modern rationality cannot be reconstructed 
without reference to emancipation, which is also of great historical importance. 
Rationalization, the ‘deprivation of mystique’ (Entzauberung), the ‘dialectics of 
Enlightenment’ must appear in a new context. The concept of emancipation must be 
present also in the history-philosophical discourse of the world-historical ‘farewell’ to 
myths. All critiques of modern rationality were stated because of emancipation that had 
not taken place, although its necessity was increasing parallel with the progress of 
rationalization. The omission of emancipation might put the process of rationalization 
and globalization into a critical danger.   
  
The relation to modernity in a history-philosophical sense is decisive not only from the 
aspect of potential enemies and enemy images. In a positive sense, it is decisive because 
in several important aspects, globalization, which in fact sprung out from the soil of 
modernity intends to eliminate the so far most important achievements of modernity as 
well. It is about the collision of the totalizing, social-democratic type development of 
the welfare state and its also totalizing, neo-liberal demolishment. For the most typical 
fundamental characteristic of today’s world is not globalization in its pure form, nor 
integration in its pure form, but globalization or integration qualified by state debt, 
which is a specific characteristic of all states. 
  
The downward spiral of social capital is also a consequence of this concrete structure of 
globalization. And right because this phenomenon is a consequence of globalization, it 
is global as well. We are not trying to ignore the numerous impressive civilizatory 
accomplishments, ‘success stories’ of globalization. But right the actually manifested 
structural characteristics of globalization are the cause of the fact that the upward spiral 
of great accomplishments and the downward spiral of social capital do not cross each 
other. The knowledge component that operates in modern production is part of a 
broader concept of knowledge capital, while social capital, which is being invested in 
successive generations does not reproduce itself on the level of human civilization. This 
also means that the future shall become the field of the new battle of civilization and 
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barbarism, even if none of the definitions of these terms will remind of the concepts of 
civilization or barbarism that have occured in history so far.  
 
While globalization – for functional and structural reasons – pushes the less versatile 
and overloaded state backwards and makes the spiral of social capital move downwards, 
it provides real space for action to the new historical actors down to the level of the 
individual. Under the circumstances of globalization, the latitude and freedom of the 
action of actors can be extreme. 
  
It’s not easy to build the actorial side into the theory of globalization. First, because it’s 
extremely trivial; it is often difficult even to make it accepted that the free action of 
singular actions could be a legitimate part of scientific research. Second, because the 
importance of the actorial side is a less theoretical element, no matter how ‘incredible’ it 
is. Third, because the actorial side in its arbitrariness does not always reveal the 
dynamic structures and functions behind it, therefore stressing it might even seem a 
misinterpretation. The actorial side underlines the specific ‘uncertainty’ (in a 
Heisenbergian sense) of the theories of globalization (and the future), while the 
functional systems of globalization, their dynamic structures and spacetime relations, 
and most of all, the extent of the latitude of the actors might provide sufficient objective 
explanation for a positive and objectively founded description of this ‘uncertainty’ 
character. 
  
The micro-strata of globalization are scarcely different from the usual micro-
circumstances, therefore they cannot be apprehended. The macro-strata cannot be 
apprehended by society either, because – in accordance with the key concepts that have 
already become universal – they are virtual, abstract, functional, holistic, and global. 
The sphere of decisive confrontations is therefore the medium-sphere, which evokes the 
false appearance as if globalization were no more than a row of collisions. 
  
While globalization provides enormous latitude for the action of the actors, there are 
hardly any global actors for the representation of individuals organized in social 
formations. The problem of missing actors is completed with the problem of missing 
groups of competence. The task of global competence does not possess any actors, and 
the global actor does not possess competence. Neither traditional forecast, nor 
Globalization and the Pitfall of Cataclysms 
 
 
68
traditional consensus-making, nor traditional bureaucracy (administration), nor any 
traditional ‘institutions’ are appropriate or able to develop competence legitimately. 
This increases the possibility that global decisions might be the most irrational. 
  
Another important element of the new order of international politics (the ‘new world 
order’) is the new interpretation of ‘identity’ and ‘difference’. By 1989, the logic of neo-
liberal identity and difference exchanged the basic notions of identity and difference of 
socialism, as well as those of Christianity. This means that neither the solidarity of 
socialism, nor the brotherly love of Christianity can diminish the brutal power of 
difference. Neo-liberal identity consists in nothing else but the unconditioned respect 
and guarantee of the freedom and the rights of the individual (which rights might 
become merely formal at a certain extent of social differences). In such cases, difference 
is not a mere difference, value, or ideology, but it might even become an essential 
feature of social existence. 
  
The exceptionally great importance of the difference-moment is made up by the fact 
that in our age, a divided world has been replaced by a unipolar one. While in the 
divided world, difference was founded by hidden identity, the concrete contents of the 
neo-liberal equality of human rights are ensured by unreconciliable differences. The 
power of difference is the final character of difference, and its absolute measure. The 
power of difference over identity establishes rigid and static states of affairs. If the 
measure of difference exceeds a certain extent, the dimensions of mediation 
(communication) are eliminated therefore the two poles of the difference-relation cannot 
get into interaction with each other. The total freedom of every actor and a system of 
rigid oppositions inapt for communication – this duality is the most important one of the 
problems that binds the present to the future. 
  
The bias of self-destruction 
 
The end of the Soviet World Regime, Gorbachev’s of the Soviet Union as a superpower 
and its magnificient ideology, became not only a decisive, but also an irrevocable fact 
of today’s universal history. As ultima ratio, it might appear in a different colour in 
each different interpretation of historical eras. However, its self-evident final world-
historical value could hardly be traced back to any other process. Although this concrete 
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fact of the end of history has not yet lost its universal quality, it seems like this 
macroscopic, Gorbachevian ‘end of history’ itself is a part of a higher and also universal 
transformation process. With the end of the divided world, which took place in the blink 
of an eye, disappeared all ideological bias. At the same time, a new vision emerged: the 
vision of a self-destructive society. 
  
The Gorbachevian ‘end of history’ blasted the ‘moment of truth’ in the society of 
Existing Socialism. But it is also a cosmic and colossally ironic gesture, a cunning of 
reason (List der Vernunft), that this moment of truth has become reality for Western 
societies as well. As the Great Enemy bade farewell, the self-image of Western society 
was also removed from its overall determining framework of bipolarity, which had 
provided the Western part of the world with a position of comfortable and unchallenged 
superiority before. 
  
The nearest past of the society was based on good intention, or at least trust in the future 
– elements welfare society had promoted to the status of an overall political program, a 
so-called ‘official humanism’. We do not mean, of course, to make the welfare society 
of the 60’s and 70’s responsible for a society that became more and more self-
destructive in the 80’s and 90’s. Yet one followed right after the other. 
  
A fundamental tendency of a self-destructive society is an extent of state debt that 
makes it impossible for the economy to catch up with it even by the most favourable 
conjunctural conditions. Achilles cannot pass the turtle. The self-destructive society is 
therefore a society that is unable to maintain (via its own legitimated state institutions) 
the highly developed post-welfare level of civilization. It is originally a question of 
budget and economy still it is not simply a question of economy. If a coalmine is shut 
down because of inefficiency, it won’t lead automatically to social self-destruction. But 
if the state is forced to back out from the fields of education or healthcare, of which it 
used to be the only supporter, the self-destructive tendencies become clear at once. A 
bankruptcy in economy is not necessarily self-destructive, while a bankruptcy of 
institutions that used to be supported by the state is necessarily self-destructive. 
Therefore the fundamental problem of the self-destructive society is not simply an 
economic one. The state debt is not equal with economic recession. The latter one can 
namely only be followed by economic boost. The self-identity of the state, the society 
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and the citizen is seriously questioned from this aspect. Therefore the state, the society, 
or the citizen either doesn’t have an opportunity to improve all-human values, or they 
are even bound to use up, or even directly destroy these values. 
  
The self-destructive society is the new and extensive reality. It reminds of the general 
reformulation of the fundamental notions of social life. The ‘West’, the developed part 
of the world should be considered the winner of Gorbachev’s farewell and it drew profit 
from the global transformation of world economy. On the other hand, even this ‘West’ 
had to struggle against the consequences of self-destructive society, also because of the 
growing importance of the debt challenge. At the same historical time, the former 
‘second’ world did not get the financial support it needed to establish its new political 
democracy and new competitive market economy. At the same period, the old or new 
‘third’ world reached the bottom at mass migration and poverty. In this ‘post-historical’ 
history, a new question has arisen: can the politically hegemonous liberalism break 
away from the downward-circling spiral of self-destructive society? 
  
The double function of the post-socialistic regime 
  
The states and societies of the former real socialist part of the world had to solve 
several, not only different, but straight fundamentally antagonistic problems. First, they 
had to evolve a real and reliable democratic political system, with all known problems 
of this ‘project’. Second, these states and societies had to take successful and effective 
measures to reduce or even gradually bridge the critically deepening economic and 
civilizatory gaps between the West and the East by shaping their own competitive 
economy.  
  
The two simultaneous great missions of the post-socialistic part of the world are: (1) 
building out a democracy that works, and (2) if not straight solving or using problems of 
state debt in favour of changing the economic structure. These two, in the major aspects 
antagonistic tasks have been calling for an international and conscious solution right 
from the start. The all-time western partners have clearly stated that they did not want to 
think in such a solution. In the post-socialistic societies however, these two huge 
projects (building out a democracy that works, and handling the problem of state debt) 
remind of the necessity of such an international and conscious solution time after time. 
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The two most important projects are in some pragmatic view necessarily antagonistic. 
This antagonistic relation fundamentally re-shapes and revaluates even the basic 
functions of post-socialistic democracy. Such a democracy cannot realize the ideal type 
of the democratic system. It cannot fulfil itself; it cannot be a self-justifying and self-
supporting basic fact in the reproduction of a more just and legitimate society. So it 
becomes the most important function of the post-socialistic democracy to bail out the 
economic heritage of Existing Socialism. It becomes the real function of post-socialistic 
democracy in the circumstances given, to manage the whole debt problem of former 
Existing Socialism. 
  
Its fundamental function to bail out state debts puts post-socialistic democracy more or 
less directly into the nightmare of a classic Weimar type. If we put it this way, post-
socialistic democracy loses its privileged and singularly fortunate character of a general 
liberation and unveils its extraordinary character. It is so because the main motives of 
post-socialistic democracy were namely exceeding totalitarianism and the occasion of 
reaching an optimum of historical dimension. But right after this democracy was born to 
success, it could get into a Weimar type crisis; a row of political crises caused by the 
bailout, or – on the contrary – huge civilizatory shocks following successful bailouts. 
  
The double function of post-socialistic democracy (shaping a classic type democracy 
plus managing state debt) also appears definitely in the specific raising of the 
mechanisms of political decision-making. While in a democratic political system that 
consciously accomplishes its historical missions the whole chain of decision-making 
reaches into the web of society in multiple ways. Therefore it is also ‘building up from 
below’, and it gains its unappealable legitimation from formal or informal agreements 
of its elected representatives. But in a democracy that has to bail out debts, obviously 
the whole technique of decision-making should change. It is because financial decision-
making strongly limits the latitude of the decision-making of elected representatives. If 
the budgets of local governments, governments of social insurance, and other 
autonomous organizations and associations of civil society get empty, it results in 
serious democracy-theoretical deficits. 
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Similar shifts in emphases can be shown in the shaping of social structure as well. The 
greatest central mission of democracy is the shaping of the more or less optimal social 
side of an existing democratic structure. However, the fact that the present structure of a 
post-socialistic society is not influenced and shaped by the new impulses of existing 
democracy but monetarist restriction, must have the binding power of evidence for 
everyone. 
  
The two simultaneous and in many aspects antagonistic functions of post-socialistic 
democracy clash particularly sharply the term legitimacy. Post-socialistic democracy – 
as every post-totalitarian democracy – is one of the most legitimate political structures 
right from the beginning. But this most stable legitimacy suffers damages each day 
because this same (‘the most legitimate’) structure cannot provide a minimum level of 
vital conditions and chances for its citizens in any era. This alone won’t critically 
weaken the otherwise exceptional legitimacy of post-socialistic democracy. But it 
would be foolish to think that the actual monetarism that follows from the bailout 
function of democracy would not have any influence on the legitimacy of the same 
democracy. In this pressing tension namely, two concepts of legitimacy outline and turn 
against one another, i.e. the (flawless) classical political-theoretical concept of 
legitimacy and the (fallible) practical problem-solving legitimacy. 
 
Globalization and politics as a subsystem  
  
Every research of the post-socialistic transition is starting out from totally new and 
unprecedented universal characteristics of globalization, virtuality, and post-
industrialism. On the other side, contrary to the still unmapped significance and 
magnitude of these unprecedented new traits stands the concrete appearance of global 
everyday life. This unbelievable distance of a holistic and theoretical approach and the 
microscopic and particular everyday practice creates a specific space of theory and 
practice. 
  
In this framework, it would be necessary to analyze also the actual relationship of 
globalization and politics. This would follow from the fact that in a strict sense, the 
politics of the present is not the same as it was a few decades ago. But we are excused 
from this task by the fact that politics, the political subsystem, and political classes 
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slowly seem to find their proper new places in the world of globalization (and the new 
world economy). Therefore a closer investigation of the sphere of politics (das 
Politische) slowly becomes possible even without enumerating a theoretical totality of 
the new world-historical co-ordinates.  
  
The double face of democracy becomes a fundamental issue of globalization. On one 
side, this is a commonly functional and structural moment. It is because global 
operation can (could) only evolve and operate on the basis of democratic liberalism or 
liberal democracy. In this sense, liberal democracy is the ‘modus vivendi’ of 
globalization. But, on the other side, its functional and structural foundation shall not 
make us forget the immanent and original value components of liberal democracy (like 
all kinds of human freedom, etc.), which used to ensure exceptionally strong legitimacy 
for the political system even before the functional and structural dimensions were 
developed completely. 
  
The fundamentally democratic character of the political face of globalization got 
expanded by a row of yet unclarified new functions. Democratic values left the realm of 
founding values and became pragmatic and constructive components of concrete 
structures and functions. 
  
Political contents overlap with each other. The pragmatic dimensions eliminate the 
distinction between ‘left’ and ‘right’. A great number of social and socio-cultural 
transitions appear. Each of these factors is quite weighty and serious even on its own, so 
they make the common use of the old categories critically difficult. The historical 
shutdown of Existing Socialism also accomplishes its own revaluation of values. In 
spite of all this, it is no more impossible to define the greatest political initiatives. 
Giving up the intention of defining the new great initiatives would be dangerous both 
intellectually and ethically. It refers not only to the ‘left’-‘right’ distinction, but also to 
that of liberalism and conservatism, and other important conceptual definitions, even the 
issue of the ‘nation’ as well.  
  
The whole liberal democracy stands before new, often unrecognized challenges. First, 
they are the functional and structural foundations of globalization, and second, the 
challenges of concrete global relations unknown before. For example, the democratic 
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order is expected to limit migration, but at the same time it is also expected to make it 
possible and human.  
  
If we define liberal democracy by its aspect that the party that wins the elections 
controls the operation of state administration and redistribution for a cycle, we can 
clearly realize a new trend of modern democracies. Possessing the totality of state 
power means power of a smaller extent and a narrower scope of action than before 
globalization. The dimension of political power (in the relative extent of power) is 
smaller, yet the role it plays in answering global challenges is more important than 
before. A state in the hands of the ruling political party can no more possess instruments 
of production, neither does it produce. It redistributes the taxes of other producers and it 
tries to fulfil its tasks that no other player was willing to undertake. But contrary to the 
weakening power and competence of the state stand the (both absolutely and relatively) 
renewing demands and pretensions of insatiable individuals and groups. 
 
The present model of the world should be considered the mature form of globalization. 
Its decisive trait (beside several other important definitions) is the phenomenon of state 
debt, which phenomenon fundamentally defines the economic and political framework 
of globalization for the societies and for human life. This model is fundamental in the 
development of the deeply monetarist profile of present globalization. This is the 
general model, in which the extremely extensive process of accession to the EU is 
taking place. These multiple functions cause that even the lack of a theory has its own 
victims.  
  
One of the great challenges of the future is made up by problems of the state. The 
starting point is the relationship between globalization and the nation state; public 
consciousness is aware of the new tensions and problems of competence that arise here. 
From the aspect of the state, the regulation of political and economic processes is also 
an important element therefore their results are of great importance. The great 
dimension of the future (and the row of questions to be decided) springs from the fact 
that the state is not a neutral actor that can be characterized solely by functional 
characteristics, but since the modern state after 1945, it undertook civilizatory and 
social tasks at an extreme measure totally unknown before, which tasks can only be 
lifted from the bonds of the state shattered by the processes of globalization by 
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destroying huge ‘areas’ in the social network. The states are the losers in this process. 
But there is also another tendency, which also has its first stark signs already in today’s 
global processes. There are namely also fortunate (nation) states, which could use the 
achievements of globalization and even integration to realize their original ends and 
pretensions as nation states, or even their long forgotten aspirations to expand as nation 
states. These nation states are already the winners of the expansion of the EU in 
multiple aspects, which can also be interpreted as a process of globalization. The 
accession to the EU hides the dramatic importance of future state functions from public 
opinion and research, while the absolute and relative decline of the state that – for 
historical reasons – centralizes every social and civilizatory function in itself, results in 
several concrete practical difficulties. 
 
The problem of the duality of the political sphere (das Politische) and economy shows 
also the new quality of globalization. It is a question of theory of systems. If we 
examined the phenomena solely from the one (the political) or the other (the 
economical) viewpoint, we would not get to any special conclusion. In this case we 
would make the new complexes of present phenomena – shaped by globalization – the 
subject of a past, pre-globalization kind of reconstruction, and instead of using the 
language the new complexes would require, both one-sided approaches (the economical 
or the political discourse) would use the language of (exceeded) normality. 
  
If we used the traditional political terminology as medium of the inquiry of 
globalization, we would not just get to an average image of normality, but straight to 
one of idyllic normality. It emanates the vision of the victory of liberal values, and the 
worldwide spreading triumph of the democratic order. But if we used the traditional 
economic terminology, the image of the globalizing world might no more seem so 
idyllic. All details, relation and dimensions of the economic and political qualities of 
globalization can be described by the language of normality – except for the fact of 
globalization itself. 
  
On the level of macro-theories, the mature form of present globalization is called 
monetarism. We have already justified the use of this term earlier. We are well aware of 
other meanings of this term, as well as of the factor of arbitrariness when labeling an 
already complex form of something that had possessed no name before. The fruitful 
Globalization and the Pitfall of Cataclysms 
 
 
76
component of using the term ‘monetarism’ is that it does not only refer to the 
outstanding importance of global cash flow in general, but it also refers to the gigantic 
amount of money in this flow and, indirectly, to the eminent importance of global stock 
markets, and by this, also to the decisive new problem of state debt. 
  
The specific problem by the reconstruction on the micro-level of globalization is the 
fact that while anyone can sense and understand this micro-level directly, one can only 
acquire models and patterns that make the well-known micro-level recognizable as the 
micro-level of globalization after a macro- and medium-level reconstruction. There is a 
set of phenomena, which could be characterized as the micro-sphere of globalization, 
but its specific micro-sphere can be identified as part of globalization just after a whole 
interpretation of the macro- and medium levels of globalization. 
  
It is the medium sphere that occupies a privileged position in the theoretical 
reconstruction of globalization. The medium sphere does not simply show a new side of 
the phenomenon of globalization, but it shows its most relevant new side, because 
globalization appears in this environment as the decisive determining factor of the 
whole social life. On this level do the new functional systems of globalization broadly 
confront with social life? It is the virtual, but also physical area, of which system-
theoretical functioning penetrates historical frameworks of non-functional nature, like 
values, contracts or tradition. As defined earlier, globalization is a state of exceeding a 
critical mass of functionally operating systems. Now we can understand, why the most 
dramatic confrontation takes place in the medium sphere, for here does the functional 
sphere overlap with the non-functional sphere.  
  
The present form of globalization is a coherent system called monetarism, of which 
macro-level definition’s most important conditions we have already stated. Of course, 
the coherence of the medium-level doesn’t mean a coherence of scientific laws. This 
coherence is a product of an ever-changing interpenetration and confrontation of huge 
functional systems and non-functional social and human activities. That’s why this 
system can change, and its qualities and relations can never be unchangeable 
necessities.  
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In the philosophical tradition, the semantics of all decisive terms of political philosophy 
and political practice was shaped when the political subsystem – in the pre-
globalization era – self-evidently was far identical with all social theories in general. In 
globalization qualified by functional operation and no more by (non-functional, 
therefore system-theoretically different) politics, the political subsystem is no more 
identical with social theory in general. What about the theory of Social Contract or the 
original Human Rights in a situation when the unconditioned respect towards them 
although remains, but at the same time, in the real conditions of global monetarism, 
these rights are obviously violated, while nobody can be made responsible for it either 
morally or politically! 
  
Because of this new systemic difference happens, the relative devaluation of the 
political subsystem towards all functional systems (mainly the economic one). On the 
medium-level of globalization, the relative devaluation of the political subsystem leads 
to the revealing of so far hidden genealogical dimensions. Who on Earth knew that 
Marxism that started to decline critically after the 70’ – 80’s, was still carrying a 
considerable measure of civilizatory-utopist potential? Who on Earth knew that it was 
the framework of the nation state that secretly carried the functions of the welfare state? 
Who knew that it did it in such a self-evident way that as soon as the nation states 
shattered financially, the whole future of the institutional framework of social politics 
shattered? Thus the relative devaluation of the political subsystem has already shown 
that the collapse of the political sphere also means the devaluation of ‘society’ in 
connection of shaping the most important relations. Moreover, there are some signs that 
indicate that the collapse of the political sphere might even lead to the devaluation of 
mankind. 
  
The decline of the system of politics – despite naïve expectations – will not liberate 
society from the conventional organization power and repression of the state. This is 
because it is right another decisive consequence of globalization-monetarism that the 
economy, like several other subsystems, can escape from the legal interventions of the 
state critically impoverished by the omnipresent networks of common debts. On one 
side, the impoverished state will no more be able to control the function of the 
subsystems within its territory. On the other side, paradoxically, it must use all of its 
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energies to control the functions of which existence and reproduction it can no more 
influence. 
  
Globalization and modernization  
  
The fundamental rise of modern rationality cannot be reconstructed without a historical 
analysis of emancipation. Of course, this does not only modify the interpretation of the 
shaping of rationality, but the interpretation of the whole strategy and direction of the 
historical process as well. Rationality, ‘disenchantment’ (Entzauberung), ‘the dialectic 
of enlightenment’ must appear in a new context. Thus the phenomenon and the issue of 
emancipation must appear in the historical and philosophical discourse of the ‘farewell 
to the myths’ as well. This refers to liberalism as a political concept on a theoretical 
level and the concretization and manifestation of modern rationality. Modern liberalism 
is the political face of modern rationality. The indifference towards various issues of 
emancipation was the great failure of liberal politics. As an integrating political 
concept, it should have integrated the immanent and necessary moments of 
emancipation in its modern rationality. Instead of having done that, the present neo-
liberalism obviously even protests against issues of emancipation with its indifference 
and ignorance. The lack of emancipation might thrust the whole process of 
rationalization into critical dangers.  
  
The collision of the social-democratic evolving of the welfare society, its neo-liberal 
demolishment, and their common dynamics fundamentally determined also the 
historical era that followed. For the most typical fundamental characteristic of today’s 
world is neither globalization, nor integration in its pure form, but is globalization or 
integration qualified by state debt. State debt, as a decisive moment is first the negative 
heritage of the welfare state. This is also the moment by which strategic 
instrumentalization of the monetaristic world order accomplished its own decisive 
breakthrough. 
  
The global world represents the basic dimensions of the problem of universal values. Its 
political and social triumph is due to the worldwide victory of neo-liberalism that is 
based on human rights, and of which values it had made universal in a most evident and 
seemingly natural manner. The functioning new world order embodies universal real 
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dimensions, and it does it in the trivial existentially bounded (seinsverbunden) manner 
of facticity.  
  
The classically new basic situation, i.e. the ‘universality of particularities’, the process 
of every individual and group becoming a global actor is in a sharply antagonistic 
position to the rule of universal values. But before judging the universal and at the same 
time particular universalism on grounds of justice or inequality, we must point out that 
in the all-round process of the transformation are a great number of components of 
emancipation and equality in competition. Without a doubt, it is a grave new 
contradiction of today’s globalization that this omnipresence of particular universalism 
makes the global pretension of particular interests a horrible near danger. This 
fundamental contradiction is also paradoxical: in a global world that is being constituted 
by a type of universal values that embody universal operation, every particular 
individual might evidently become an actor. But such dialectic of transformation to 
independent and monadic actors might become self-destructive.  
  
In our foresight, everyday globalization cannot compensate that danger even by its 
evidently twofold universal characteristic (like human rights neo-liberalism and 
functional universalism). It is because globalization is only capable of regulating the 
rules of vindicating particular interests to a limited extent. There might start a new 
historical era of ‘warren, as is of every man, against every man’. 
  
Liberalism and monetarism 
  
In the ‘70s and the ‘80s re-shaped liberal ideas did not appear in their full new 
splendour after a new historical cataclysm. They came at the decline of a worldwide 
social order that had been defined by special political and ideological characteristics. 
The similar way did the rise of ancient Christianity accompany with the decay of the 
late Roman Empire. This unique historical and structural position of liberalism was the 
real antecedent of the most important characteristics of the post-1989 liberalism, and 
also the reason of the fact that such a seemingly absolutely problem-free symbiosis of 
‘liberalism’ and ‘monetarism’ could evolve. Existing Socialism was in defence, and it 
could not find its proper place among the co-ordinates of a new, globalizing reality. It 
was the Real Socialism that shaped the whole political, social and also the 
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hermeneutical horizon, ahead of which classical, human rights-based liberalism and 
monetarist restriction could and did appear as two essentially connected consequences 
of one and the same theory. It was namely the ‘order’ of Existing Socialism itself, in 
which the ‘neo-liberalism’ of the critique of etatistic redistribution did not differ from 
the human rights idealism of classical liberalism!  
  
Before the horizon of Existing Socialism, the really ‘liberal’ description of modern 
market economy seemed to be fully isomorphic with its ‘monetarist’ description, which 
new isomorphism accepted an existing political and economic state (i.e. monetarist 
restriction) of the continually existing Western capitalism (apprehended from the 
embedded anti-totalitarian perspective) as ‘liberalism’. On such a hermeneutical basis, 
the actual politics of monetarist economy was called ‘liberalism’ as an opposite of both 
Existing Socialism and the Western-type redistribution. Now the big question is, how 
the form of market-economy would have been called that should have been initiated in 
the post-communist state of the ‘60s! Probably it would also have been called 
‘liberalism’, even though it was about distribution. 
  
Therefore that statement ‘liberalism = monetarism’ is not only wrong use of 
terminology, but it is extremely harmful and misleading as well. The economic policy 
of monetarist restriction was introduced first in England, then in the United States, 
actually by conservative politicians and parties, as a response to the Keynesian policy 
that was considered in another sense too ‘liberal’ that time. Therefore ‘monetarist 
restriction vs. social-democratic type redistribution’ is only a political conflict. 
Concerning the real field of economy, it is not so. To consider Maggie Thatcher or 
Ronald Reagan ‘liberal’ from any real aspect of liberalism would be quite an absurd 
assumption indeed. By this, again, we arrive to the fact that the complex of monetarist 
restriction is essentially incompatible with any basic vision of liberalism. 
  
Next we have to define, in what sense we use the term ‘monetarism’. ‘Monetarism’ is 
firstly a well-known concept of economic theory, which has not only appeared in 
several eras of history, but it even managed to find its proper place not only in the 
framework of neo-liberal, but of other economic concepts as well. This problem can 
proceed in several further directions, and now we would mention the ‘pope’ of the 
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economic neo-liberalism of the ‘70s von Hayek could also raise strong objections 
against the narrow economic approach of monetarism!  
  
In global context, by monetarism we mean the uniform fundamental complex of today’s 
political and fiscal order. It entails the international order of both inwards and outwards 
indebted states, in which the policy of monetarist restriction prevails both 
internationally and in the framework of the nation state. This is the complex we shall 
call ‘monetarism’ in the following, independent from the strongly different various 
views whether the state of indebtedness is only temporary or not. In international 
political and economic terminology, there is no special term for this extensive ruling 
global economic system. The lack of the proper term speaks for itself. It is an evidence 
for the fact that even other important actors consider today’s world economy and the 
system of world politics bound to it ‘normal’. While it cuts back social functions of the 
state (including several functions that had been taboo before), it strengthens the state’s 
debt-managing forced functions (what is totally anti-liberal), radically redefines politics 
that had been an intact and most important sphere of society for the fundamental vision 
of liberalism before.  
  
Monetarism makes – in a functional and system-theoretical sense – a theatre out of the 
central political environment that should have been the central subsystem from the 
aspect of political liberalism. It thrusts the whole system of politics on a course of a 
programmed failure. The other reason why monetarism is not liberalism is that at 
certain points of the financial system, it makes regulating and conscious (etatistic) 
intervention possible even into the seemingly most spontaneous processes. It is not only 
against its own ideology, but it even contradicts its own deeper definition as a system of 
a free play of free forces.  
 
Within the framework of Existing Socialism, the indebtedness of the state meant 
necessarily increasing freedom – but it is no wonder that so many things were 
considered progressive in the captivity of Existing Socialism. That’s why the 
economists and politicians representing the policy of indebtedness could win the 
support of the politically active part of society. It belongs to the negative antecedents 
that Hungarian financial policy could use every political situation in that one and a half 
decades as an opportunity to earn more credits. Hungarian financial policy could 
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manage to take new credits in whatever world political or world economical context, 
ideological course, or case of emergency. Meanwhile, the Hungarian political class was 
obviously less resourceful (and what is more important, less successful) at elaborating a 
concept to liberate the productive powers of society. Therefore, there was a point when 
the row of credits as a supposed starting point of future constructive economical 
processes inevitably turned to a destructive phase. But even past the critical point, 
neither economists, nor politicians could manage to get the economy off the forced 
course of this vicious circle. Moreover, in the meanwhile, an insightful outsider could 
not escape the suspicion that neither the political class, nor the opinion-making 
economists were aware and conscious of the further consequences of fatal debt 
problems. 
  
Globalization and its actors 
  
Globalization manifests itself through society, institutions and individuals, over long 
and uncertain transitional periods, in which the gained advantages are easy to lose and it 
is often not clear what would be the next step that makes sense. 
  
But the actors of globalization are often missing and it is shown clearly in comparison 
with the new specific global functions. The case of missing actors occurs when political 
or other processes of globalization create new and strong functions, but at the same 
time, there aren’t any equally strong, socially legitimated and responsible actors to fulfil 
these functions. This starting situation ‘distributes the actorial spaces’ originally in a 
wrong way. The empty places and functions of missing actors either remain 
unrecognized or tricky interest groups push themselves into this vacuum. The basic 
model is simple: an interest group pushing into the vacuum can only be called an actor 
in one specific sense, i.e. that it follows solely its own interests. To achieve this end, it 
must shape the political space to some extent, but it does not do it as a legitimate and 
constructive actor, therefore its activity inevitably implies the destruction of political 
space. 
  
The actorial aspect in general is a theoretically attractive new component of 
globalization. Although his term can also be used for the political and social reality of 
the pre-globalization era, yet globalization opens a new era in the history of this term, 
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mainly because globalization liberates individual actors from the organizational and 
original interconnectedness of bigger political and social integrities, mostly 
organizations and it arranges the universe of the actors in a new way. This means that 
after all, everyone is an actor and this is not just a mere play on words. We are actors 
both in a theoretical and in a practical sense. Unfortunately, we still identify this new 
side of globalization rather with the actually existing ‘caesaristic’ components of the 
actorial dimension, than with its also actually existing democratic components. Global 
competence itself also lacks actorial foundation. Neither traditional forecast, nor 
traditional consensus-making, nor traditional administration, nor any other traditional 
institutions are capable of shaping competence legitimately.  
 
The relation to modernity in a history-philosophical sense is decisive not only from the 
aspect of potential enemies and enemy images. In a positive sense, it is decisive because 
in several important aspects, globalization, which in fact sprung out from the soil of 
modernity intends to eliminate the so far most important achievements of modernity as 
well. It is about the collision of the totalizing, social-democratic type development of 
the welfare state and its also totalizing, neo-liberal demolishment2. For the most typical 
fundamental characteristic of today’s world is not globalization in its pure form, nor 
integration in its pure form, but globalization or integration qualified by state debt, 
which is a specific characteristic of all states.  
  
Therefore, on these bases, the sensible consequences of the deeply interdependent 
relationship of globalization and liberalism/neo-liberalism are getting chrystallized 
around the issue of the state. Now we can clearly see that the state as a ‘buffer’ is a 
central element of the battlefield of globalization, but of course, only if we consciously 
insist on the actual achievements of modernity and emancipation3 . 
  
Neo-liberalism has arrived to a great change. After its worldwide victory it remained as 
the only regulator of globalization on the political-ideological scene. And past the acme 
of its exclusive hegemony it became identical with the whole of the existing social and 
economic world order in common political consciousness. It is a not yet achieved high-
level realization of the present world order, globalization and rationalization that also 
amplifies the tendencies that follow from ‘bidding farewell’ to the myths. If neo-
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liberalism is really an outcome of such a height of rationalization in this theoretical 
framework, it must not pass by the developing new forms of emancipation. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 On 31st March 2004, a Bolivian miner blew up himself in front of the Bolivian 
parliament. The direct cause of his action was that he got no pension, and his 
argumentation was flawless. He demanded a sum he had gradually paid as taxes for the 
state of Bolivia during his working decades, and he did it not without any rightful 
ground. 
 
2 The most important characteristics of the theoretical starting situation created by 
globalization can be fully examined at this conflict. The demolishment of the welfare 
state does not basically appear as an economic or political problem in this discourse 
(although it might still be controversial in this context as well), but as a civilizatory, 
modern, cultural, and society-building factor. The context of globalization does not 
erase the validity (Gültigkeit) of the individual subsystems, but it positions new, general 
and painfully concrete ‘global’ i.e. general and universal contexts above their 
rationality.   
 
3 Pointing out these criteria is not an unnecessary theoretical enterprise nowadays. It is 
namely not included in the expectations concerning morals, society or even good 
manners that beyond pursuing his own particular interests, one had any duties in order 
to preserve the achievements of civilization, emancipation, or modernization. 
 
4 Our present inquiry relies upon several former works of us. We are hereby giving the 
data of some relevant works, so the reader might get sufficient information about the 
history of certain thesis in more detail.  
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Environment-Society Interactions and the Effectiveness of 
Environmental Policies 
 
 
Executive summary 
 
This study gives a general overview of some visual models of environment and society 
interactions in association with effectiveness of environmental policymaking. It 
discusses different definitions of effectiveness of environmental policies, and 
summarizes state-of-the-art research in effectiveness of environmental policy-making, 
and provides some conceptual implications. The study indicates the role of futures fields 
in the improvement of environmental policy effectiveness. 
 
A key criterion of effective environmental policy-making is how well regulatory 
systems achieve their objectives. The publication of the Hampton report (2005) sheds 
light on another aspect of effective policy-making, notably the reduction of 
administrative burdens. This aspect of the reform has received the most attention to date 
and has resulted in new agendas in research and assessment projects. For now, it is 
evident to both policy-makers and scientists that a well planned and managed 
environmental policy can achieve its goals at low cost and with minimal disruption to 
the economy.  
 
In spite of the increased interest, environmental policy effectiveness is not a well 
specified term. The majority of the studies contain neither well specified definition nor 
maintain effectiveness computations. The most frequently used approach in this context 
is called ‘policy assessment’ (a.k.a. impact assessment) that either means qualitative 
evaluations, or denotes discussion of the conclusions drawn from the comparisons of 
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specific goals (or trends) and factual figures. Hence, the results of policy assessments 
are indispensable reference points of effective policy-making.  
 
The chain of explanation starts with the presentation of some environment-society 
interaction models. The main reason of this is the assumption that the better conceptual 
understanding of environment-society interactions can improve the quality of policy 
design and leverage the effectiveness of environmental policies. Additionally, the 
forecasting and foresighting of these interactions can also contribute to the improvement 
of the quality of policy-making. 
 
The study continues with the definition of the term ‘efficiency’, continues with ‘policy 
efficiency’ and ends with ‘environmental policy efficiency’. According to the most 
common understanding, ‘environmental policy effectiveness’ is the ability to create 
significant improvement in the quality of the environment. However the notion looks 
more complicated when trying to quantify it. 
 
Literature giving an overview of the effectiveness of environmental policy has resulted 
in valuable lessons. It has become evident that there is a large gap between the 
requirements set out in official documents and the actual practice of impact assessment. 
More information is needed on the effects and effectiveness of different levels and 
measures. Data limitations are demanding, but not insurmountable. Several 
methodological tools exist for evaluating effects and supporting policymaking and 
regulatory processes. These assessments should consider the whole policy process and 
the coherence of legislation. Effectiveness evaluations contribute to capacity building 
and shared policy learning. Furthermore, sufficient engagement with regulators and 
other interested parties, and adhering to strict timelines in order to allow adequate time 
to implement decision-making is vital. Regulatory actions to promote compliance must 
take each of these into account. But even full compliance with a specific rule will not 
result in Social sciences, the achievement of the objectives if the rule’s underlying 
design is not appropriate, including futures fields, can contribute to the improvement of 
environmental policy effectiveness in multiple ways. 
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Some models of ‘environmental change – socio-economic responses’ 
 
This chapter shows some envirornmental change-society interaction models. The 
models, their structure and interlinks help gain better understanding the influential 
factors and support futures researchers to clarify the potential scenarios. Six models 
are presented: 1) Homer-Dixon’s ‘Environmental Change and Acute Conflict’ model, 2) 
Schwartz’s ‘Social, economic and political ramification of environmental stress’, 3) 
Barker’s ‘Integrated Assessment Framework for Climate Change with Adaptation and 
Mitigation’, 4) The IPCC’s ‘Assessment of Climate Change Impacts’, 5) The IPCC’s 
‘Sustainable development and adaptation to climate change’ model, and 6) Brauch’s 
‘Climate Change Impacts: Pentagon of Conflict Constellations’ model. 
 
Figure1. Homer-Dixon: Environmental Change and Acute Conflict 
 
 
 
Source: Homer-Dixon, 1999 
 
The figure ‘suggests that the total effect of human activity on the environment in a 
particular ecological region is mainly a function of two variables: first, the product of 
total population in the region and physical activity per capita, and second, the 
vulnerability of the ecosystem in that region to those particular activities. Activity per 
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capita, in turn, is a function of available physical resources (which include non 
renewable resources such as minerals, and renewable resources such as water, forests, 
and agricultural land) and ideational factors, including institutions, social relations, 
preferences, and beliefs. The figure also shows that environmental effects may cause 
social effects that in turn could lead to conflict. For example, the degradation of 
agricultural land might produce large-scale migration, which could create ethnic 
conflicts as migratory groups clash with indigenous populations. There are important 
feedback loops from social effects and conflict to the ideational factors and thence back 
to activity per capita and population. Thus, ethnic clashes arising from migration could 
alter the operation of a society's markets and thereby its economic activity.’ (Homer-
Dixon, 1999) 
Figure 2. Schwartz: Social, economic and political ramification of environmental 
stress 
 
 
Source: Schwartz, 2002, p143 
While explaining ‘The Roads to Conflict’ Schwartz considers population growth to be 
closely linked with environmental stress. Among the wide-ranging environmental 
factors he includes ozone depletion and global warming and among the localised ones 
those environmental factors that affect small areas at different times (desertification, 
water pollution). He points to ‘five pathways to indirect internal conflict that involve 
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environmental stress: economic decline, migrations, social fragmentation, erosion of 
civil society and curtailment of the state’ (Schwartz, 2002, p139). 
 
Figure 3. Barker: A ‘Cause and Effect’ Integrated Assessment Framework for 
Climate Change with Adaptation and Mitigation 
 
Source: Barker, 2001, p9  
 
The above figure shows the linkages between changes in human society and climate 
change as a set of ‘causes and effects’ in a driver-pressure-state-response methodology. 
More formally, it provides a schematic and simplified representation of an integrated 
assessment framework for considering anthropogenic climate change. The figure shows 
changes in four domains in the quadrants i.e. (1) human society, i.e. the socio-economic 
system with development paths described in the SRES (2) atmospheric gases with 
concentrations of greenhouse gases, aerosols and precursors (3) the climate system 
undergoing Climate Change as a result of higher concentrations and radiative forcing, 
and (4) human and natural systems including all plants and animals. 
 
The arrows show a full clockwise cycle of cause and effect between the domains. Each 
socio-economic development path, including development of the industrialized 
countries, has driving forces that can be grouped into the areas of population, economic 
growth, technology and governance. These driving forces give rise to emissions of 
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greenhouse gases, aerosols and precursors, with CO2 being the most important. The 
emissions accumulate and interact in the atmosphere as concentrations and disturb the 
natural balances, depending on physical processes such as solar radiation, cloud 
formation and rainfall. The aerosols also give rise to air pollution, e.g. acid rain, that 
damage human and the natural systems (not shown). The long-term effect is to change 
the global climate system (higher radiative forcing i.e. the enhanced greenhouse effect) 
with temperature rise leading to sea level rise and more global precipitation change. 
These climate changes, in turn, have impacts on natural systems through more storms, 
floods, droughts. There is a possibility of some feedback between the changes in these 
systems and the climate, such as albedo effects from changing land use, and other, 
perhaps larger interactions between the systems and atmospheric emissions, e.g. effects 
of changes in land use.  
 
Figure 4. IPCC: Assessment of Climate Change Impacts 
 
 
Source: Smit et al. 1999, quoted by IPCC 2001 p90. 
 
The IPCC’s WG II ‘s model clearly distinguishes mitigation and adaptation activities 
and the role of policy-making. 
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Figure 5. IPCC: Sustainable development and adaptation to climate change 
 
 
 
Source: IPCC, 2007, p815 
 
The ‘Sustainable development and adaptation to climate change’ figure locates the key 
topics schematically in the context of the three pillars of sustainable development. 
Topics shown in the centre of the triangle (the ‘three-legged stool’of sustainable 
development) are linked with all three pillars. Other topics, placed outside the triangle, 
are located closer to one leg or another. The arrows leading from the centre indicate that 
adaptation to climate change can influence the processes that join the pillars rather than 
the individual pillars themselves. For example, the technical and economic aspects of 
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renewable resource management could illustrate efforts to support sustainable 
development by working with the economy-ecology connection – all nested within a 
decision space of other global development pressures, including poverty. (IPCC, 2007) 
 
Figure 6. Brauch: Causes and Outcomes of Environmental Stress and Potential 
Outcomes 
 
 
 
 
Source: Brauch, 2003, p126 
 
The complex interaction between processes in the ecosphere and anthroposphere are 
visualised in a ‘survival hexagon’ of three resource challenges: air (climate change), 
land (soil, ecosystem degradation), and water (scarcity, degradation, floods) and the 
following three social challenges: human population (growth, changes of its value 
systems), urban systems (services, industries, pollution, health) and rural systems (on 
the left side of the chart). These six factors interact in different ways and contribute to 
environmental scarcity of soil, water and food that in turn intensify environmental 
degradation and result, taking the specific national and international context into 
account, in environmental stress that may lead to different outcomes. 
 
These may be resolved, prevented or avoided primarily by national political decisions 
and supported in some cases by diplomatic efforts. The political process on the inter- 
and transnational level may contribute to the following outcomes: 1) a successful 
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resolution by cooperation, or in the worst case, possibly also to, 2) conflict at the 
internal or international level, and 3) increased human mobility. 
 
Depending on the system of rule and on the level of economic development, the 
interaction between the state, the economy, and the society differs, as will the role of 
knowledge due to scientific innovation to enhance the national coping capacities for 
adaptation and mitigation. (Brauch, 2005) 
 
The above models visualize some of the interactions between environmental change and 
socio-economic responses. There are no widely accepted concepts to describe and to 
forecast these interactions. However, environmental policy-makers definitely need to 
better understand the environment-society interactions and to foresee the effects of 
planned policy-interventions (mainly in the phase of ‘ex-ante analysis’ of policy 
implementation). The models of  ‘environmental change – socio-economic responses’ 
not only help to understand these interactions but may contribute to the development of 
potential future scenarios, and to the underlying of future policy objectives. 
 
The model based scenarios can be used by foresight developers to facilitate the 
consensus formation process with stakeholders. The methods of participative foresight 
can support the learning-by-doing activities and the fitting of environmental policy 
design to socio-economic reality. 
 
Policy effectiveness 
 
Policy effectiveness in general 
 
As Anthony Giddens, the well-known sociologist, suggests: ‘The state is back. We will 
need active industrial policy and planning, in respect to economic institutions but for 
climate change and energy policy as well.’ (Giddens, 2009, p1) Parallel to this ‘return 
to planning’ concept, the interest in powerful and financially affordable ways to 
improve companies’ and individuals’ compliance is steadily increasing. But what does 
‘return to planning’ mean in the context of climate change? ‘It means taking a long-term 
view of things, with a time horizon stretching over three decades and more into the 
future.’ If climate change represents, as the Stern report says, ‘the biggest example of 
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market failure ever’, it is largely because markets have no such view or vision of the 
future. Market forces can certainly be used to affect long-term processes – as happens in 
a routine way with pensions or insurance for instance – but they always need a 
regulatory framework, usually provided by the state, to do so.’ (Giddens, 2008 p9) The 
importance of planning gained recently implies the need that policies and regulatory 
measures must serve both long-term and short term goals effectively. The increasing 
importance of planning strengthen the traditional, plan-supporting role of futures 
research in shaping the long-term objectives.  
 
Definitions associated with policy effectiveness 
 
Policy effectiveness is not a well clarified term. The majority of the studies contain 
neither well specified definition, nor maintain effectiveness computations. The most 
frequently used approach in this context is called ‘policy assessment’ (a.k.a. impact 
assessment) that either means qualitative evaluations, or denotes discussion of the 
conclusions drawn from the comparisons of specific goals (or trends) and factual 
figures. Hence, policy assessments are indispensable condition of effective regulation.  
 
It is necessary to clarify the definitions associated with policy effectiveness because the 
approach of the science and that of the policies differs in many cases, and the altering 
approaches sometimes produce confusion. It seems reasonable to make distinction 
between the terms ‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’ since both of them are used as key-
terms. Effectiveness is the extent to which an activity fulfils its intended purpose or 
function. Effectiveness is a measure of the ability of a program, project or task to 
produce a specific desired effect or result that can be qualitatively measured. 
‘Effectiveness of a measure’ is a judgement about whether or not the expected 
objectives and targets of the policy measure have been achieved. This requires 
comparing the effects of the measure with its intended objectives. (Guedes Vaz et al., 
2001, p9) Efficiency is the extent to which an activity achieves its goal whilst 
minimising resource usage. Efficiency can be measured by the volume of output 
achieved for the input used and, hence, is closely related to productivity. In harmony 
with many other reports, OECD mentions the two key terms together in its recent study: 
‘It is also increasingly possible to reach environmental goals by implementing effective 
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and efficient market-based instruments’ (OECD, 2006, p95). Evidently, if the outcome 
of a policy is far from the expected target, than this policy is ineffective.  
 
These definitions imply the hypothesis that it is easier to quantify and use one 
dimensional assessments and neglect the second (or more) aspect(s). In the case of 
effectiveness this dimension is the ‘extent to which an activity fulfils its intended 
purpose or function’ and at the same time cost aspects are neglected.  
 
Contrary to the above efficiency definitions always contain the cost element either by 
maximizing the achievements while costs are fixed, or by minimizing the costs while 
expected output is fixed. The policy-makers role is to decide which combination of 
‘level of fulfilment’ and ‘costs’ would be preferred. 
 
In the practice it is extremely difficult or even impossible to perfectly quantify the ‘level 
of fulfilment’ and to consider all ‘costs’. But there are approximations. A widely used 
methodology to compare outcomes (effects) and the associated expenditures (costs) of 
two or more courses of action is the so-called cost-effectiveness analysis. In a pioneering 
report the European Environmental Agency defines the cost-effectiveness of a measure 
as: ‘a comparison of the effects of a set of measures with the costs of implementing 
them. A more cost-effective measure will have achieved greater results for less money’ 
(Guedes Vaz et al., 2001, p9).  
 
Regarding the above uncertainties, it seems necessary to use the term ‘effectiveness 
study’ (a.k.a. effectiveness analysis, effectiveness report, etc.) in two different ways. 
The first denotes a pure qualitative or quantitative comparison of the ‘intended purpose’ 
and the ‘extent to which it is fulfilled’. The second reflects on the studies in which 
(besides the above first meaning) the term efficiency, cost-effectiveness, process 
effectiveness, etc. are not clearly used. Of course, the latter studies are not coherent with 
the clearly defined terms discussed above, but many publications use it. 
 
After clarifying what effectiveness means, we need to define ‘policy effectiveness’ and, 
first of all, to discover the potential differences between its assessments. Concepts of 
policy effectiveness can be distinguished, among others, by their ‘scope’. ‘Scope’ of 
regulation, in this context, reflects to the relevant activities of and impacts on all 
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stakeholders, and to the associated actions, processes, side-effects, policies and 
measures considered when assessing the particular effectiveness of a regulation.  
 
When discussing ‘policy effectiveness’, the most widely used concept considers the 
‘implementation’ stage, the most important part of the policy cycle. This basic 
understanding can be expanded in three incremental steps: 
 
- the first expansion step considers all other stages of the policy cycle; 
- the second policy effectiveness approach analyses the activities of all 
stakeholders, including the policy organization, the financial burdens on businesses, the 
undesirable side-effects, and the specific cost items associated with the regulation, etc.  
- the third considers other policies that may interact with the assessed policy. 
 
Hence the ‘scope’ of all assessments of policy effectiveness has far-reaching 
consequences. Most of the policy effectiveness concepts and studies use the basic 
concept, which, as indicated above, focuses on the implementation phase of the policy 
cycle. This concept also implies that, in most cases, one policy target and only the 
administrative costs are considered.   
 
It is essential to make clear in each assessment of policy effectiveness that whose 
(administrative) costs are being assessed. Since the release of the Hampton Review 
emphasis has been put on the reduction of the administrative burdens of regulation on 
businesses. However the administrative burdens on the regulatory organizations have 
also high relevance. The position of the Better Regulation Task Force is clear in this 
context when it states: ‘Every government department should use a standardised 
approach to measure the existing administrative burden which it imposes on business 
through its regulatory activities. The measurement should include all the administrative 
obligations imposed by central government departments and regulatory agencies under 
both national and European legislation.’ (Better Regulation Task Force, 2005, p4) The 
UK Government's methodology for measuring climate change costs and benefits (titled: 
‘Greenhouse Gas Policy Evaluation and Appraisal in Government Departments’) can 
serve as a starting point for assessments of environmental policy effectiveness. 
(Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2008). 
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The wider scope concept is shared by many organizations and scientists. For example 
the opinion of the European Environment Agency is clear in this context: ‘for 
environment policy to deliver effective results, the institutional setup can be as 
important as the design of the policy itself.’ (EEA, 2005, p2) Rousseau and Proost state 
that ‘In order to compare different environmental policy instruments in a more realistic 
way, it is useful to look at the different stages in the regulatory process. The comparison 
of environmental policy instruments should take these various regulatory stages into 
account.’ (Rousseau, Proost, 2005, p340) 
 
‘Environmental policy effectiveness’ is the application of the concepts of ‘policy 
effectiveness’ in the area of environmental issues. Both the conceptual and empirical 
assessments of environmental policy effectiveness (and cost-effectiveness) should start 
with the declaration of the considered objectives and costs of the given environmental 
regulation. In practice these are often unclear.  
 
An environmental policy may have at least one out of three types of aims: 1. welfare 
maximization, 2. achieving environmental targets, and 3. behaviour modification. The 
costs of environmental policies are much more difficult to categorize. A frequently used 
cost-type is the so called ‘policy implementation cost’ which may contain the financial 
burdens on both the companies and regulatory organizations. (Cost categories may 
consist of very specific type of costs too, like ‘cost of non-compliance’, ‘costs of 
inactivity’ and ‘negative costs’.)  Effectiveness of environmental regulation can be 
assessed along any of the combinations of the above, for example by analyzing the 
achievements of environmental targets and the linked implementation costs. 
 
When looking for the most effective environmental regulation it is not evident how to 
select the appropriate constellation of aims (outcomes) and cost alternatives. In practice, 
there are a (theoretically infinite) number of optimal or close-to-optimal solutions. The 
reason for this abundance is the fact that most of the environment-related factors (e.g. 
the interests of the future generations, the economic values of specific ecosystem 
services) can not be converted into economic terms directly; consequently their utilities 
are usually assessed differently. This uncertainty is one reason (among others) why 
politicians and policy-makers assess environmental policies in different ways.  
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 A short historical overview of environmental policy effectiveness research 
 
Most of the policy reports and scientific studies deal with the theoretical considerations 
of environmental policy effectiveness. For now we are well equipped with ‘general 
concepts’ and ‘overall expectations’. But parallel to this, a surprisingly low number of 
scientific studies deal with the assessment of effectiveness of specific environmental 
policy implementation processes. In a recent study the European Environment Agency 
admits that ‘Very few studies have assessed the effectiveness of adaptation measures’.  
(EEA, 2008, p16)  
 
The policy analysis ‘movement’ from the end of 1960s erupted into American political 
life. Their legacies are still evident in social science, in administrative institutions, and 
practices at all levels of government. Social scientists and the mediating contributions of 
policy analysts are vigorously contested, raising issues concerning the future of policy 
analysis training and practice. (Lynn, 1999) 
 
The first steps in the domain of environmental policy effectiveness research were linked 
to environmental taxation. Since the ‘Environment and Economics’ Conference in 1984 
the OECD has encouraged the use of economic instruments in environmental policy. 
The Conference emphasized that economic instruments stimulate innovation in 
environmental technologies and promote efficiency. From that time OECD has been 
publishing a series of important reports dealing with environmental policies, policy 
evaluations and environmental effectiveness. For example in 1993 OECD published a 
report on ‘Improving Regulatory Compliance: Strategies and Practical Applications in 
OECD Countries’ that was a landmark in the OECD’s discussion of the issue. 
(Braithwaite, 1993) The report gave an overview of emerging issues for regulatory 
compliance. It categorized the level of (non-) compliance into three types: the degree to 
which the target group (1) knows of and comprehends the rules, (2) is willing to 
comply, and (3) is able to comply with the rules. 
 
One of the main drivers of environmental regulation research and environmental policy 
analysis, at global level, is the European Environment Agency (EEA). EEA started 
publishing its environmental policy effectiveness related reports in the middle of the 
1990s. The first report, titled ‘Environmental taxes – implementation and environmental 
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effectiveness’, provides an overview of the main issues involved in environmental taxes, 
with a particular focus on their environmental effectiveness and on the political barriers 
to their implementation (EEA, 1996). The first experiences, extended with the results of 
later studies have been summarized in a recent report, published ten years after the 
pioneering study (EEA, 2006).  
 
The next relevant publication of the EEA (published in 2000) states that tax rates in the 
EU Member states are insufficient for all internalisation of external costs, for giving the 
correct signals to the market, and for establishing a more efficient and equitable fiscal 
system…and that insufficient eco-taxation means unfair fiscality and impedes progress 
in sustainability in the market economy. As the Executive Director of the EEA stated 
‘Environmental taxes are absent at the EU level’ (EEA, 2000, p5) which indicated the 
size of the problem European countries had to face. 
 
In 2001 European Environment Agency (EEA) published a report called: ‘Reporting on 
environmental measures: are we being effective?’ (Guedes-Vaz et al., 2001) The report 
was the first comprehensive conceptual overview of the problem published by the EEA. 
It confirms the general lack of scientific and policy level knowledge about the 
effectiveness of past policies for most areas. The report sets out an agenda for the 
assessments of environmental policy effectiveness, conceptual approaches, and 
methodological frameworks.  
 
In 2006 the OECD Competition Committee held a roundtable discussion and published 
the results under the title: ‘Environmental Regulation and Competition’ (OECD, 2006). 
The participants concluded that environment and market are two of the highest priority 
policies. Environmental programmes and policies should be designed to achieve their 
objectives without unnecessary market restrictions. Commercial bodies should help 
environmental policy-makers to find alternatives to achieve environmental goals that 
restrict competition as little as possible.  
 
In 2007 OECD published a report, titled ‘Instrument Mixes for Environmental Policy’ in 
which they addressed the impacts on environmental effectiveness and economic 
efficiency of using an ‘instrument mix’, rather than a single instrument. The report is an 
important step in the domain of the assessment of more effective solutions of 
Environment-Society Interactions and the Effectiveness of Environmental Policies 
 
 
102
environmental regulation (OECD, 2007a). The OECD Environmental Performance 
Review Programme, whereby all OECD countries are engaged in reviewing each 
others’ progress in achieving their environmental policy objectives. The analysis and 
recommendations are supported by a broad range of economic and environmental data. 
 
The next study, in which EEA has been engaged in evaluating policy effectiveness, was 
published in 2008, titled ‘Effectiveness of environmental taxes and charges for 
managing sand, gravel and rock extraction’ (EEA, 2008). Although the report focussed 
on some very specific business sectors and on one type of policy instrument (according 
to the authors) some of the lessons learnt can be generalized. The end result of the 
lessons learnt is that differences between countries can be considerable. Even the 
different segments or regions of the same country may show different patterns (e.g. in 
compliance). This is one reason why policy-makers must be very cautious in adopting 
best practice and evidence from different cultures and economies. 
 
Another branch of research of environmental policy effectiveness is within the frames of 
European research projects and networks. The aims of the ‘Competitiveness Effects of 
Environmental Tax Reforms’ (COMETR) project are (among others) to outline and 
clarify the competitiveness debate, to review the experience of environmental tax 
reforms in EU member states, with particular emphasis on carbon-energy taxation; to 
undertake a macro-economic analysis of the competitiveness effects of green tax 
reforms for individual member states as well as for the EU as a whole; and to review 
mitigation experiences and provide policy advice on possible strategies to improve 
efficient mitigation measures (http://www2.dmu.dk/cometr/). The aims of the 
‘European Network for Better Regulation’ (ENBR) project is to set up and operate a 
pan-European network aimed at improving and disseminating the current knowledge of 
regulatory processes as well as the degree and mode of implementation of impact 
assessment procedures in EU member states. (www.enbr.org) 
 
Scientists have also expressed their views about the effectiveness of environmental 
regulation. In 1997 Bridget M. Hutter published a pioneering book titled ‘Compliance: 
Regulation and Environment’ (Hutter, 1997). The author combines and analyses a broad 
range of factors which influence environmental regulation. The author emphasises that 
the concept of compliance and the expected result of regulatory efforts are central to 
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policy-makers. Hutter analyses the notion of compliance in two areas of our everyday 
lives, occupational health and safety and environment.  
 
Another book worth mentioning is Neil Gunningham and Sinclair D’s ‘Leaders and 
Laggards: Next Generation Environmental Regulation’ (Gunningham, Sinclair, 2002) 
published in 2002. The authors argue that there is an inherent uncertainty in the 
assessment of environmental regulation tools such as economic instruments and 
voluntary agreements. They state that agencies struggle with a lack of information about 
the details of regulatory measures, e.g. of what works and what doesn't. The need to 
improve the effectiveness and to harness the resources of both government and non-
government stakeholders are critical to improving environmental quality. The book 
addresses these problems by identifying innovative regulatory best practices in a 
number of specific cases, evaluating empirically the effectiveness of regulatory reform 
and providing policy advice. 
 
A recent book of Anthony Giddens ‘The Politics of Climate Change. Cambridge’, 
(2008) highlights the importance of the state policies in the fight against climate change. 
He argues that leaders must introduce long-term policies and encourage the shift 
towards long-term thinking, and urges large scale changes. Giddens also emphasizes 
that the state must keep climate change at the top of the political agenda, must intervene 
to enforce ‘the polluter pays’ principle and counter business interests which seek to 
block climate change initiatives.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This study gives a general overview of the environmental change-society interactions in 
association with effectiveness of environmental policy-making. It concludes that 
environmental change-policy interaction models can help to reduce uncertainties, to 
improve effectiveness, and can provide direct support to policymakers and policy 
advisors by using the methods of futures research, futures studies and foresight. 
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Sciences can support policy-making from problem grabbing, through different kinds of 
data collection and analysis, to counselling and in some cases to lobbying. The main 
policy-related contributions model-based futures sciences and foresight can provide:  
 
- support of policy-making in all stages of the policy cycle, 
- the study of organizational factors of policy success,  
- the research of the wider socio-economic and cultural determinants of policy 
effectiveness, 
- the improvement of social acceptance of policy, 
- theory development to solve particular regulatory problems, and 
- formulating proposals for both general policies and specific regulations. 
 
The majority of the social science based policy assessments focus only on one stage of 
the whole policy cycle: the ex-post analysis of the implementation phase. But if the 
research question is ‘general policy effectiveness’ then the analysis of the organizational 
and the wider socio-economic determinants of policy success are inevitable.  
 
Most of the scientific activities are strung together around the stages of the so-called 
‘policy cycle’. All stages of the policy-cycle, from issue identification, via measure 
implementation, to policy measure effectiveness assessment, should be researched and 
supported by the sciences, including futures fields. 
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Practice-Orientation and Scientific Approaches: 
Methodological Underpinnings of Foresight 
 
 
The methodological construction of foresight 
 
While foresight became a vogue word for some successful participatory, future 
orientated activities, the need for abstract definitions or theoretical underpinnings have 
arisen to improve efficiency. Defining foresight would certainly be easier, if foresight 
could be included into a special category of practice, or if foresight fell under some of 
the major categories of academic activities. Indeed, some of the futurists regard 
foresight as a practice, others would rather consider it as science. Practice orientated 
foresight approaches (Horton, 1999) focus mainly on strategy building, and usually 
confines its scope to a specific field of practice like technology or regional 
development. Their objective is to aggregate stakeholder’s opinions and experts’ 
knowledge about a specific field to support executive decisions. Scientific orientated 
foresight approaches (Slaughter, 2003) derive from future studies and social sciences. 
Here foresight is distinguished from other categories of futures studies by the 
application of participatory methods and the shifting of focus from an objective notion 
of future to the subjective interpretations of the future (‘future in the present’). In spite 
of the many similarities, the two kinds of approaches fundamentally differ. The centre 
of differences lies in the emphasis on the achievement of a consensus or the exploration 
of information about the future. Practice orientated approaches need a kind of consensus 
among stakeholders to ground strategic plans and find pure autotelic exploration. 
Scientific approaches on the other hand refuse to seek consensus, because of the 
presumed distortion in opinions within the process, and with it, the loss of objectivity. 
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The main differences between these two kinds of approaches to foresight explain the 
limitation of its application. Consensus distorts information and simple gathering fails 
to meet the needs of decision support. In this paper we develop a more comprehensive 
notion of foresight that involves both kinds of approaches. Realizing that foresight 
cannot be definitely interpreted as a kind of practice and cannot be efficiently applied as 
a scientific category, we reject to approach the notion of foresight from the application 
point of view. Foresight by its special nature should have a special place in our way of 
thinking; therefore we interpret foresight as an intellectual activity. This differs from 
the practice orientated approach in having no definite output and so no measure of 
efficiency. Indeed this also differs from a scientifically orientated approach, because the 
notion of foresight we wish to approach will never have testable and objective 
statements. We consider foresight as an activity consisting of several methods that are 
scientifically proven and applied carefully for special purposes. Thus, foresight is rather 
a collection of methods and know-how-s, than a practical or scientific solution for a 
given problem. Its efficiency is determined by its methods, and its applicability the way 
of usage of the methods. Therefore we call this approach the methodological 
construction of foresight. While this construction is based on the special usage of 
scientific methods, first we consider the special nature of these methods and set up a 
three-level categorization of the theoretical advances in science. We will show that this 
three-level categorization can be used to construct foresight by reverting the order of 
levels. How foresight applies scientific methods can be considered by discussing the 
questions of complexity, uncertainty and time in relation to the different levels. 
 
The ladder of theoretical advance 
 
The three-level approach to clarify the foresight process is inspired by the three-level 
approach of theoretical advances in science, the so called ladder of theoretical advances 
(Dopfer, 2006): 
  - working with aggragates: discovering phenomenon, 
  - looking behind aggragates: discovering the structures behind the studied 
phenomenon  
  - defining the dynamics: discovering how the system works, understanding the 
phenomenon. 
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In science, the phenomenon is discovered and described in the first stage. Here a 
common agreement about the definition of the phenomenon is necessary. In natural 
sciences usually the agreement is a controlled experiment that could be repeated and 
objectively measured, and therefore can be generally accepted. In social sciences there 
is no such a clear way to define a phenomenon, but this does not imply that an 
agreement could not be achieved. This level also includes a basic study of the 
phenomenon to the extent of its identification and its differentiation with regard to other 
phenomena. We should realize that this level bridges the subjective state of mind and 
the collective knowledge about the phenomenon. This means that we meet objective 
aggregates and also subjective narratives in methodology on this level.  
 
The Phenomenon is specified in detail in the second stage. This means an exhaustive 
study of the phenomenon and its relations to other phenomena. If the studied 
phenomenon is too complex to understand at first glance, different dimensions, 
projections or confinements are studied in parallel that by the nature of the phenomenon 
or because of the limits of our mental capacity may not necessarily be part of a single 
level. 
 
Rules, relationships between specified elements and time are revealed in the final stage, 
the dynamics of the system is defined. This stage represents the extent to which 
different segments of parallel studies could be joined. This level is not necessarily 
unique in respect to a given phenomenon, but under some well chosen constrains we 
may regard the level as unique, since it maximizes its scope of understanding. 
 
The three stages of this ladder are also referred to, as the roughness or the complexity of 
its variables as macro-, micro- and meso-level. Aggregates are considered macro 
variables, because these represent information compression or integration in respect to a 
special target or to a certain constrain. This is needed to purify information in order to 
find the relationship between the variables and subjective notions, ideas about the 
phenomenon. Detailed studies are conducted in the second stage, where information is 
present in its smallest, elementary form. Between macro and micro, the final 
understanding of the phenomenon is attained at the meso-level. We should notice that 
several inter-levels could be defined between the micro- and macro-level. As we move 
from the micro- to the macro-level through aggregation we may identify less and less 
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variables, less and less notions. This certainly helps to identify or take to the 
phenomenon, but does not necessarily help to understand it: through aggregation 
important dynamical relationships could be hidden and even lost. The dynamical 
completeness is revealed at the macro-level, but the usual segregation of this level 
prevents a comprehensive understanding. Thus, meso-level is defined where complexity 
is wrapped, but the dynamical diversity is still preserved. We see that the objective of 
science is the meso-level, because this level incorporates the most understanding of the 
phenomenon (Alács, 2006). 
 
The three levels of foresight activity 
 
Foresight is not, however science. We consider foresight not as an activity to predict the 
future (which would certainly be a scientific activity), but an activity, which seeks the 
right decisions today for a better future. Foresight just aims to provide ‘useful’ 
conclusions for the future for any stakeholder or decision maker. A reasonable process 
of foresight activity should therefore consist of the following three steps: 
 
  - Meso-level: assessing available knowledge. Identifying the seeds of change. 
  - Micro-level: studying knowledge in detail, how it is distributed among 
stakeholders. Determining the key dimensions of desirable futures. 
  - Macro-level: constructing a general view that helps to deduce the rules in 
relation to specific situations. 
 
Knowledge should be identified as a basis for foresight activity at the first stage. This 
should also include state of the art of scientific achievements that is meso-level 
knowledge. Also experts’ opinion is considered here as meso-level knowledge. Unlike 
in science in case of foresight activity, the meso-level consists of several types of 
information. This knowledge should be studied involving stakeholders at the second 
stage. Including scientific results, at the micro-level which in itself is of great help does 
not however make the micro-level of foresight superfluous. Here the elements of 
possible futures are present and using these elements the several dimensions and factors 
of desirable futures must be considered, that is choosing the way of description of 
desirable future. These logical operations are constructed in one aggregated view at the 
final stage. These operations are in accordance with the chosen direction of describing 
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the future at the second stage. In science the macro-level bridges our subjective ideas 
with common agreement about the studied phenomenon. In foresight the direction is 
just the opposite. The macro level of foresight represents the individual and common 
efforts of integrating micro information according to the chosen dimensions, creating 
principles to ease decision making. Foresight is not necessarily an organized activity; it 
is deeply influenced by human nature. This kind of activity is duly resigned to 
psychology. Excluding beliefs from foresight activity does not necessarily mean that we 
prevented the application of activity from expanding the influence of certain interests. 
This may be achieved by 
  - preventing the overlap of scientific results at the first stage as an input of the 
activity, 
  - the wide involvement of stakeholders at the second stage to determine key 
factors for a description of the desirable future (Note that stakeholders should agree by 
consensus only about key factors and not about the desirable future!) and   
  - developing the manner in which these key factors can be individually 
integrated into the world-view of every single stakeholder at the third stage, to ease 
decision making in every possible future situation. 
 
  Foresight and Information Theory 
 
In terms of Information Theory the three-level-approach can be interpreted as the 
creation of syntax, context and semiotics of foresight related information. The syntax of 
foresight information is defined at the meso-level. This means that dynamics, trends, 
prediction, forecasts or seeds of change are not discovered by foresight but only realized 
and coded for further process. Meso-level does not stand for purely scientific, but for 
purely dynamical. This means rather the coding of experienced dynamics by 
stakeholders, more so than the scientifically understood part of dynamics, although the 
wider usage of the latter would be favourable. The syntax of foresight relates to the 
gathered meso-level structures that define the ‘grammar’ for the later levels. 
Stakeholders at the micro-level learn about the regime of possible futures. During this 
encounter they should decide about the key factors of their desirable future and they 
should come to a consensus about these factors. Consensus enables the creation of a 
common context with regard to foresight information. The context will be defined 
through one or more emerging meso-level structures based on the chosen micro-level 
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factors of the desired future. Macro-level information focuses on the reasons for change, 
instead of the change in its dynamical sense. As a single stakeholder does not 
necessarily realize all the possible reasons for change and what change has actually 
emerged from, hence reasons should be communicated in a special chosen manner. The 
semiotics of foresight information is defined at the macro-level, but the meaning, the 
point of view could be slightly different for every stakeholder. The transfer from the 
context to the semiotics should be personalizing rather than simplifying, principle-
focused rather than moralizing. 
 
Special questions of methodology 
 
We have chosen three main attributes within the methodology used, to further clarify 
the foresight process: complexity, uncertainty, and time. Note that these attributes 
should be discussed in detail when specifying the methods to apply in the foresight 
process. The study of complexity determines the manner of information processing. The 
study of uncertainty determines generality and flexibility. Time determines the level to 
which the method is best suited: qualitative and quantitative methods for instance. Both 
qualitative and quantitative methods are used to assess knowledge at the meso-level. 
These two types of knowledge are not integrated at the micro-level, instead they are 
split or factored. Integration is possible at the macro-level by qualitative tools. 
 
  Complexity 
 
Complexity determines the manner of connection between levels. We distinguish two 
kinds of complexities methodologically (Alács, 2006): 
  
  - the top-down approach of complexity means that a given goal could be 
achieved in several similar ways that makes a mathematical optimization problem to 
have several equal solutions; 
  - the bottom-up approach of complexity means that the special manner of 
interaction among the elements makes the system as a whole work in a  strange way, a 
new phenomenon emerges that cannot be explained by the characteristics of separated 
elements. 
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We experience both types of complexities in the foresight procedure. As moving from 
the meso-level to the micro-level, we see the top-down approach of complexity. Several 
meso-levels are created in the first stage of the foresight process. In the second stage 
however, we need only a comprehensive set of meso-level information. This means that 
different meso-levels are compared, extended and optimized. We experience the 
bottom-up approach while moving from the micro-level to the macro-level. Choosing 
the dimensions of key factors means emergence studies and the application of methods 
that facilitate this emergence. 
 
  Uncertainty 
 
Uncertainty does not only represent lack of knowledge in the process of foresight, but 
also the lack of trust and reliability. A successful creation in the first stage of foresight 
should, however involve only the former, because at this level, the different meso-levels 
are dealt with independently. Approaching the consensus about key future factors at the 
micro-level, at least develops a weak connection between the meso-levels. Here 
uncertainty is utilized to enable flexibility for the development of these connections. 
Uncertainty arises at the macro-level with the appearance of distributed knowledge. The 
efficiency of the foresight process cannot be directly measured, failures of the methods 
or misinterpretations can only be revealed later.  
 
  Time 
 
Time can be interpreted in many different ways. The physical approach is well 
developed especially after the elaboration of General Relativity, however interpretations 
beside the most accepted astrological interpretation have also emerged like in 
philosophy, economics or in the social sciences (Sorokin,  Merton, 1937, Lewis,  Wigert, 
1981).  
 
The common line of thought in every interpretation of time is that the notion of time 
cannot be defined or understood without the understanding of dynamics: reasons and 
consequences make the states of the system follow a specific order or law. Therefore 
after defining the states of the system, a measure of this order, time, is usually defined. 
In this way the relationship between time and the evolution of the system is possible, in 
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our terms the meso-level is created. Forecasts must construct time first before further 
studying the system. E.g. the notion of the short/long term is sometimes more 
convenient, than the choice of astrological time. Note that this can highly differ 
depending on the field it is used in: the long term with regard to inflation is still far 
shorter, than the short term in relation to demographics. Foresight activity does not 
construct time. The objectives of foresight are timeless (not to be confused with eternal) 
and therefore at each level of the ladder a certain sublimation is applied to the notions 
we use. 
 
The meso-level is the level, which concentrates on the interaction between the elements, 
all information can be unified by comprehensive dynamics. Dynamics is the valid 
unifying order at this level, that defines time, and so time is unique. At least this must 
hold to each stakeholder, but does not necessarily mean that, on this basis, the foresight 
process as a unique time would exist (consider the cases of small, innovative and 
dynamic firms with government bureaucracy). 
 
The objective of the micro-level is informational enrichment, concentrating on the 
elements. At the micro-level informational enrichment of the system overloads the 
dynamical logical order, thus at this level several projection of micro information as 
well as several interpretations of time, not only co-exist but also interact with each other 
in a comprehensive conversation.  
 
The macro-level concentrates on the phenomenon, the points of views or an information 
axis in a descriptive way. Its historical perspective however is not to be confused with 
its relation to time. Revealing the effects, clarifying the phenomenon, it is targeting the 
stable and so timeless properties. The goal here is to find the coding, in which we can 
talk about the system in order to understand it. This coding must therefore be stable, in 
other words the macro-level is timeless. 
 
  Modeling Futures Studies 
 
The term Modeling Futures Studies (MFS) is used for the novel approach to study and 
understand the three-level methodological construction of foresight (Alács, 2006). The 
basic need for the creation of MFS was the incertitude in foresight’s practice towards 
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the in-depth application of scientific models. Apparently focusing on the achievement 
of a comprehensive consensus among participants is ‘unconcilatable’ with the partially 
informative scientific results of modeling. On the other hand scientific models are the 
ones which are supposed to be the least uncertain among all sources of information of 
foresight activity. The three-level approach of methodological construction within the 
foresight process assigns these models place at the meso-level. Now the question arises: 
how can we describe the features of this integrated activity? In this sense MFS theorizes 
the concept: it gives general answers to integration in practice. A special framework 
based on cognitive science, information theory, modeling philosophy and epistemology, 
was set up to study these features (Alács, 2006),. To shadow the real world information 
flow, proto-models were created at each of the three levels. The following features are 
represented in proto-models: 
 
 - Causality, 
 - Network of information actors, 
 - Interaction with the environment, 
 - Complexity of the environment, 
 - Non-perfect information channels, 
 - Time, 
 - The information pyramid. 
 
Proto-models are appropriate for general information, theoretic studies to represent the 
structure of information-flow without representing the information content. This is a 
pregnant simplification that allows us to use simple mathematical formulations, to 
describe information flows in all the three-level models. In these terms we can use bits 
to represent information. The bit is the elementary unit of information that represents 
the state of an elementary part of the system. In MFS the term information is rather used 
in the dynamical sense, i.e. information is not the state of the system, but the change of 
the state of the system. Changes may occur for several reasons, but at the meso-level we 
assume that all changes must have a reason i.e. another preceding change. This is 
causality. It is quite straightforward that at the meso-level where dynamics is a defined 
causality, it is classed as a necessity. Causality might be broken at the micro-level, 
because decision makers (information actors) are placed in and sense different model 
dimensions at the same time. Causality might be broken at the macro-level as well, if 
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the underlying meso-level is not comprehensive, integrating all the effects at the meso-
level means that exogenous sources of information must also be included. 
 
At the meso-level between the possible elementary states of the system, causality is 
represented by elementary decision rules. These decision rules are carried out by the 
Information Actors (IA) at the micro-level, but at the same time the meso-level is 
shaped by the IA-s. The mechanism is the following IA-s copy the decision rules from 
the meso-level. Having made several decisions they sense a certain amount of 
information flow, referring to that specific decision rule. IA-s are supposed to carry out 
the decision rules with the most information flow. To achieve this they can either 
change their position at the meso-level, and copy another decision rule, or change the 
decision rule (Figure 1). This however does not mean that constant states are less 
important (perhaps less interesting), but certainly need less information recourses. 
Obviously these recourses must be limited for all IA-s, which have two major 
consequences regarding MFS. Firstly, recourses must be optimized by the IA-s. 
Secondly, copying (learning) is also a recourse-intensive activity, and therefore decision 
rules at the meso-level must be simple. The network of IA-s at the meso-level consists 
of simple decision rules, where decision rules are changed in a sort of evolutionary 
process to maintain the maximum flow of information, optimizing the limited 
information resourses of the IA-s. At the micro-level this information flow is divided 
among IA-s. If we consider a group of individuals as IA-s, intra-IA information flow 
will represent the social network. 
 
In the previous paragraph we described the relationship between the micro- and the 
meso-level. Now we will focus on the relationship between the meso- and the macro-
level. The macro-level from the point of view of the meso-level, is similar to the 
relationship between a system and its environment, where the system as a whole affects 
the environment, and the environment's reaction affects the entire system. In MFS 
environment is represented by a complex decision rule that takes all meso-level 
information as an input and produces an output that is accessible to each meso-level 
decision rule. The macro-level is in fact an environment for the meso-level evolution of 
decision rules described in the paragraph above. But unlike what happens at the meso-
level, the macro-level decision rule is constant.  
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Figure 1. The relationship between the micro- and the meso-level  
 
 
 
IA-s A, B and C copy the meso-level information structure M, which is placed in its 
environment (described on the macro-level). The structure on the micro-level consists 
of the social network (inter IA-) and informational network (inner IA-) dimensions. 
 
Contrary to the situation at the meso-level, where decision rules are optimized by 
adaptive evolutionary dynamics, at the macro-level some consideration must be made 
by choosing the one and only, constantly present decision rule. Firstly, the 
comprehensiveness of the meso-level must be considered. This means that the macro-
level decision rule might also depend on some information that is not present at the 
meso-level (exogenous information). Secondly, the complexity of the decision rule must 
be considered. Complexity represents the nature of the modeling dimensions. A 
straightforward and comprehensive environment results in a focused and effective 
meso-level. If the macro-level complexity is low, it can be assumed, that the simple 
meso-level decision rules easily adapt, and form a completely different structure than in 
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the case of a highly complex macro-level, that permits only a low degree of adaptation. 
Thirdly, the decision rule must either be considered to be deterministic or stochastic. A 
deterministic but complex macro-level could result in several quasi-stable meso-levels. 
Determinism can be assumed in case of simple constrains or transparent mechanism. 
Stochasticity at then macro-level represents our limited knowledge of the inner 
structure of the macro-level. This is not to be mixed up with either not-knowing the 
structure (uncertainty), or with the exogenous information, as discussed above. 
Although stochasticity means that some sources of information are excluded from the 
meso-level, these sources are perfectly known, studied and described as a random effect 
by statistics. In the case of an exogenous source of information such as knowledge, it is 
not accessible. 
 
In MFS, information channels represent communication between the different parts of 
information holders. Information channels transmit changes of information states, but 
they are assumed to have a limited capacity. This means that transmitting the change 
consumes resources and these resources are limited. Thus, if a new change arrives to the 
information channel, the channel might be blocked, saturated in a way that information 
(about the changes of the states of other parts of the system) is lost (information 
dissipation). Information loss is an essential property of real world systems. It 
represents the fact that meso-level information can affect only the states that are in the 
neighborhood, in relation to the meso-level information network, as discussed above. 
Information dissipation is also present at both the micro- and macro-level. At the micro-
level it represents the resource intensive activity of IA-s. At the macro-level it 
represents the lagged effect of the environment meaning that changes take on an 
accumulating nature at the macro-level, and thus responses can be sensed with a delay.  
 
Here one may observe that at each level the most important resource in the processing 
of information is time. Indeed, information channels define the information flow and 
information flow defines time. Time is sensed locally by the intensity or speed of sensed 
changes, but it has radically different meanings at each modeling level. At the meso-
level where dynamics presume the existence of a unique time, time is defined by the 
reactions of the environment. This absolute time gives sense when talking about the 
past, present and future, that is valid for all the specific meso-level. At the micro-level 
time cannot be sensed absolutely, only subjective time exists, that the IA-s sense. This 
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means that time per se does not exist. At the micro-level we can hence talk about the 
time of a specific IA or just the present. At the macro-level, permanency prevents any 
definition of time. The macro-level is timeless and permanent.  
 
Several proto-model structures can be created throughout the three-level approach of 
MFS in different modeling dimensions. First the effect of the macro-level complexity 
was studied. We showed that in the case of higher complexity, the meso-level 
information structure is more spread, less concentrated, it has fewer centers and these 
centers are only loosely connected. This structure ensures that information dissipation is 
low, new innovations (decision rules) are created faster, in other words: higher 
flexibility. We could study macro-level complexity in relation to meso-level time 
(Figure 2). Higher complexity results in slower time, flexibility is information intensive. 
MFS however must also deal with several modeling dimensions at the same time. 
Modeling dimensions filter micro-level information in a way that ensures the 
maximality of the meso-level. In the case of several modeling dimensions, one must 
take into account that in an informational sense, dimensions co-exist only at the micro-
level (Figure 3). IA-s can now allocate their informational resources among several 
dimensions, which in some configurations result in specialized, in other configurations 
rather mixed IA-s. We understand a completely different complexity this way. The 
micro-level complexity differs from the macro-level complexity in several ways: it is 
not the permanent, unknowable, but the known (in the present), but always changing 
(unpredictable) complexity.  This complexity is highly influenced by the information 
capacity of the IA-s and the structure of the social network. Unpredictability refers to its 
chaotic nature. 
 
Efficient foresight activity 
 
Through the methodological construction of foresight we aim to increase the efficiency 
of the process. Efficiency here means the setting up of clear conditions and goals for 
each stage of the process to increase and to make more reliable information flow. The 
results of the foresight process are not measurable because these are distributed and 
shared among the stakeholders’ attitude and world-view. Methodological construction 
means that this is achieved through the careful selection and in-depth methodological 
study of the applied tools and methods.  
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Different foresight processes could be constructed by different methods, but there are 
some typical methods at each level of the process. We apply a method at the first stage 
for the construction of foresight-specific time dimensions taking the compatibility with 
the scientific meso-levels into account. In our experience, the future cannot be revealed 
in its whole complexity, it could be understood in some special, suitable, well-chosen 
dimensions. In science the construction of one specific meso-level is targeted to find 
special aspects where better understanding is feasible.  
 
Figure 2. Social time measured in case of high and low complexity of macro-level 
 
 
The meso-level is the suitable point for scientific method to enter the foresight process. 
At the meso-level, foresight studies explore available information and knowledge to 
support sufficient information for further decisions. Further knowledge should be 
created by soft methods in cases of a narrow space of available time-dimensions. 
Microsimulations, the Delphi method could be applied to explore the future and find the 
relationship between decisions of stakeholders and time. These methods should not 
replace nor compete with scientific achievements, because this would decrease 
reliability and efficiency. On the other hand these methods should expand scientific 
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achievements, because they are obviously not supposed to create the comprehensive 
knowledge base for the wide-ranged needs of foresight. 
 
Figure 3. Multidimensional MFS 
  
 
IA-s A, B, C and D allocate their informational resources different towards the 
modeling dimensions M1 and M2. 
 
At the second stage of the foresight process consensus key factors of the individuals 
desirable futures should be achieved. This means: 
 
  - contact with the scientific community to reveal the state-of-the-art meso-levels 
in science, (Note that the meso-levels of science could be defined as the consensus of 
the scientific community, but in some cases this is not easy to distinguish from external 
(non scientific) interests that are not pure scientific constructions.) 
  - contact with the stakeholders of the foresight process to gain access to their 
point of view and way of understanding, to reveal the meso-level of practice (individual 
definition of time). These meso-levels however must be in accordance with each other 
and the scientifically proven meso-levels. 
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  - expand the revealed meso-levels with additional dimensions to support 
comprehensiveness. 
 
Without consensus about the key factors, no main message could emerge. At the micro-
level efficient methods should be developed in helping the choice of key factors that 
represent an emerging meso-level message. It is not necessary that based on the chosen 
key factors a single meso-level could be determined. Special study of non-scientific 
meso-level knowledge entered. Here data mining and expert panels can both be applied 
to access specific micro-level information in this sense, and seem to be suitable choices 
of methods at this stage. 
 
The foresight process can be considered successful if stakeholders’ decisions to achieve 
their own desirable future are sufficiently supported. Therefore the chosen messages at 
the micro-level should be disseminated to the stakeholders in order to help them agree 
and accept to change their attitude and world-view if necessary. The chosen meso-level 
cannot be transferred directly because of distributed knowledge. Therefore macro-level 
foresight methods should set the importance factors for all stakeholder groups in 
relation to targeting and the choosing of channels. Typical methods such as visioning 
and networking use various channels of communication to facilitate the personalization 
of the foresight message. 
 
Finally we present three of the major theories of knowledge that are also supposed to be 
good candidates to theoretically underpin foresight activity. We also study how data, 
uncertainty and complexity is introduced in theses theories and conclude the extent to 
which methods based on these theories can be involved in the three-level approach of 
the methodological construction of foresight. 
 
Social Constructivism   
 
Data. Data is what stakeholders or participants reveal from their own, specific world-
view. The micro-level is poorly defined however the method connects the meso-level to 
the macro-level. Thus the data are the interpretations of the participants of the 
‘Construction’. Some authors, who consider a consensus in the foresight process as a 
must (Barnes, Bloor, Henry, 1996). Consensus shall not be aimed to achieve at the level 
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how stakeholders interpret the data: so foresight would be just a way of manipulating 
opinions. The key question is just that participants should keep their world-view as their 
representation of reality. 
 
Time. The whole evolution of time through Social Constuctivism is partial: meso-level 
time is sensed differently to the micro-level aspects of the participants. In social 
construction, time becomes irrelevant only its mechanism counts. 
 
Uncertainty. Applying Social Constructivism to foresight we may ask what aspects its 
methodology should focus on. Arguing that achieving consensus should be dealt with as 
a goal. It is rather a favorable outcome. Indeed it is questionable whether we are able to 
construct our future through forced consensus, if we are detached from reality. The goal 
from the point of view of methodological construction would be just the opposite: to 
create competing futures representing the uncertainty of future. 
 
Complexity. The different partial consensuses represent the complexity of the selected 
issue’s social construction.. Consensuses also define cliques or communities of 
stakeholders sharing the same beliefs to a certain extent. A stakeholder may belong to 
several consensus-cliques. But the complexity of the methodological construction in 
Social Constructivism lies in finding, raising issues, topics etc. where global consensus 
can be achieved. These issues, directions if in existence could serve as the basis for a 
common future. This could be opposed if these common futures were based on trivial 
grounds and important manners were suppressed. In this sense the foresight process 
would not simply be the creation of consensus, but the creation of the battlefield. This 
outcome is not however favorable. The question is whether all actual issues could be 
reconstructed in terms of non-conflicting issues, creating the macro-level. 
   
  Grounded Theory 
 
Glaser’s and Strauss’s original idea of Grounded Theory (Glaser, Strauss, 1967) could 
help to underpin the methodological construction of foresight between the micro- and 
macro-level. The foundation of the theory is that the researcher studying micro data 
shall also address the orientation of the theory.  
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Data. In foresight Grounded Theory might be useful to deal with the stakeholder’s 
different interpretations of reality. Communities and differences shall be recorded in a 
way that the largest variety of possible emerging theories could fit the data.  
 
Time. Grounded Theory is timeless: several categories emerge, but do not create 
comprehensive dynamics. Note that there can be several laws, rules and dynamics that 
fit the data, but only a few that are also accepted as an explanation. This is the main 
difference by which Grounded Theory is applied in the social sciences and in foresight: 
the former focuses on possible theories that may emerge and forgets about the 
orientation of the data for discovery; the latter focuses on the orientation supplying this 
macro-level knowledge to the stakeholders, and lets them work with possible 
emergencies in their individual world-view. 
 
Uncertainty. ‘Theoretical sensitivity’: the researcher's subjective point of view, in 
relation to that study of data. Induction can be heuristic.  
 
Complexity. Micro-level definition and collection of data: at this stage the theory must 
exist in some form.  
 
  Evolutionary Theory 
 
Data. Evolutionary Theory works with micro-level data: entities with full-depth 
complexity of their properties and the usually also complex properties of the 
environment. 
 
Time. When focusing on Evolutionary Theory, the following question may be raised: 
what are the possible states of the system that fit to a given environment and which 
states can be achieved in a gradient, continuous manner. This means that Evolutionary 
Theory constructs the meso-level based on the micro-level. Note that according to 
different definitions of entities (micro-level) different meso-levels can be constructed. 
This however does not mean that the theory would consider the macro-level in-depth.  
 
Uncertainty. The purpose: Evolutionary Theory does not operate at the macro-level. But 
the purpose of the model can be defined only at the macro-level. What is the 
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phenomenon that we attempt to model? Foresight Evolutionary Theory shall be applied 
to help stakeholders develop their word-views and improve their interpretation of 
micro-level data. Uncertainty arises, because the definition of micro-level may differ 
among the stakeholders. 
 
Complexity. Complexity of the data. In foresight evolutionary models shall be applied to 
show features that are decisive. This helps to reduce the complexity of each 
stakeholder’s world-view, but may increase the complexity of the whole foresight 
process, as misunderstanding among the importance of different features increase.   
 
Conclusions 
 
We showed that the three-level-approach to foresight not only extends the foresight 
activity, but also clarifies its methods. We shall also realize that the foresight should be 
a continuous activity as our knowledge changes. However this is only possible if its 
methods are clear and transparent to all of the stakeholders. Involvement and 
transparency are both key factors in foresight’s efficiency. Tools at different levels of 
the foresight activity may have different theoretical underpinnings. For instance, 
Evolutionary Theory offers substantial fundaments for tools with definite uncertainty, 
moderate complexity and fully constructed time at the meso-level. At the micro-level, 
this could be extended by a generalized usage of the data based on the Grounded 
Theory. This is conceptionally different from methods designed for the macro-level. At 
the macro-level for instance Social Constructionism could support principles of shared 
knowledge for specific methods. 
 
The foresight activity itself has diverse goals, but we define clear objectives for the 
methods at each level. This can make the foresight activity more reliable, more efficient 
and even more successful. 
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Interpreting and using weak signals in futures studies 
 
 
"You cannot teach a man anything;  
you can only help him find it within himself." 
(Galileo Galilei) 
 
 
The constructivist world consisting of processes and interactions 
 
The baseline of the constructionist approach 
 
The constructionist approach is based on the individual who constructs the world for him-
/herself, and reality for all people differs, depending on the cognitive mind that they have 
constructed for themselves. Based on this, it is evident that not all information reaches all 
people in the same way; accordingly, their response is also very different. Defining weak 
signals under the constructionist approach, we assume that a weak signal is weak because 
not many know about it, or if they do, then most do not really know what it refers to and 
what process it fits in. 
 
  The characteristics of the processes 
 
If we consider the events, happenings, developments and changes of the world in their 
continuum, we will ask what role the different processes have, how old trends continue, and 
what kind of events has the potential to start a new process? A futurist is interested in 
seeing trends that will prevail in the future, and looks for signs indicating the emerging 
future processes which can reduce instability, also helping decision-making in the present. 
Most processes can be described as an S-curve (Nováky, 2007): imagine a coordinate 
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system where time is indicated at the horizontal axis and the characteristics of the process 
such as its acknowledgement or spread are represented at the vertical axis. The first section 
if this S-curve the process is having low acknowledgement yet, there is not much 
information and only a few of us recognise its emergence. Weak signals are such signals 
that can be emitted by a changing element of the environment.  
 
Humanity continuously evolves in its physics, soul and spirit alike (thinking within the 
concept of evolution or intelligent design). Within this framework processes appear 
cyclically: there is always something new appearing that is spreading and becoming 
prevailing. The processes that are still at an early stage of their development also emit 
signals called weak signals indicating their existence. We can consider the system of 
processes as fractal and extend it without limits, increasing or decreasing the time-length of 
a process. Each process consists of infinitely small processes, and, theoretically, each 
process fits in with a bigger one. It is the same approach as the one used for the analysis of 
economic cycles, i.e. seasonal cycles, business cycles, the Kondratieff cycles, etc that are 
not mutually exclusive, rather, they are complementary as regards different time 
perspectives. As a consequence, theoretically, each event or process is a weak signal 
because we can always find a curve in which it is an initial manifestation. It is not always 
possible to notice, identify and observe processes, and their source also varies according to 
the period of the process we are in. 
 
Each process (environmental, societal, economical and political) that occurs in the world 
can be notified, hence emit sings. Under another approach, each process has their own 
initial manifestation, however, we cannot receive, sense, interpret and evaluate it. If a 
process reaches a certain level or crosses a threshold, then it becomes clearly visible and 
evident, and as such it is treated as a fact. But before that happens, it is still a long way to 
go: the question is how we can transform the initially received signals into information that 
is useful for others, and can contribute to development, as weak signals can only be 
considered weak in the framework of the whole process. 
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 Interpreting the signals emitted by processes  
 
The signals of the evolving futures can be observed in the present: they carry a message for 
us about futures. In the present there is a lot of information that refers to the future. They 
are sometimes obvious, sometimes not, but they still provide an indication of how the 
future can evolve – we can think of bills, investments or demographical trends. The futures 
extrapolated from the present are only one or more possibilities, but we have to leave 
possibility open to other futures as well, and be prepared for them – like the jettison of the 
bill, the fail of the investments or new diseases’ or treatments’ upcoming. The signs of the 
past and the present referring to the future can be observed, but we cannot obviously make 
conclusions in respect of the future based on them.  
 
A signal, according to Coffman, means the following: a happening in which an individual 
or some other part of the environment transmits a message through or as a result of their/its 
action or behaviour (Coffman, 1997). Spencer uses the concept of signal in the economics 
of asymmetric information, where, simplifying the filter theory, employees emit signs, in 
this case study or the qualification, and so the employer knows that he/she faces a ‘good 
worker’ (Kun, 2004). In line with this, we can see the analogy: this bears relevance to us, as 
these signs are realised in a form that is different from what they refer to (for example a 
good worker is supposed to be qualified, and educated, proving that he/she is suited for the 
job).  
 
Not all signs are visible, observable and comprehensible (Coffman, 1997). There are three 
groups of signs according to comprehension: 
- signs that we cannot receive, 
- signs that we receive, but which we cannot sense, 
- signs that we receive and sense. 
These three groups match the signs emitted by the processes identified in futures studies. 
These three cases are complemented with a fourth case when we not just understand the 
information, but also use it, integrating it into our dynamic system, in our cognitive 
structure – this is when a weak signal becomes a message. The different levels of signs and 
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their characteristics are shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Type of signals  
 
The name of the sign The characteristic of the sign 
unreceivable signal we cannot receive it 
silent signal we receive it, but we cannot sense it 
information we can receive and sense it 
weak signal = message we integrate it into our cognitive structure 
 
 
The first kind of signals is unreceivable signals. They do exist, and as elements of the 
interactive system they indicate change in this level, but we cannot receive them without 
appropriate equipment. The emphasis is on the goodness of our perceptors: it would be 
useless to train ourselves to receive radio waves with our ear or other parts of the body, 
because only the radio has this function. The aim is to transform these signs into perceived 
signals, and, towards this end, we need to hone our perceptors in order to be able to 
perceive more and more from the world. In the next category there are signs which we can 
receive with the appropriate equipment, but which do not get identified consciously. Silent 
signals are impulses that are perceived by the individual, but which are not perceived or got 
incorporated into our conscious. However, they do exist in the unconscious, so we carry 
them in a deeper level, and, if is necessary, we can develop them. In the third category there 
are those received and perceived signs that affect our behaviour, the signs that could be 
turned into messages. At an informational level we perceive the signal, it is identified 
consciously, but is not incorporated into our system, it is just a specification: data that do 
not have a place or a role in our mental models. Even if it is not necessary to interpret all 
information about a change, it would be useful to structure all information due to the 
complexity of our world.  
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Under the theory of information, there are two approaches: according to Wiener’s 
information theory, information is related to order, so information is the opposite of 
entropy; while Shannon’s theory refers to the fact that information can be measured 
according to its novel content. Thus, on the one hand, signs orient us and contribute to our 
understanding of the world; on the other hand, they surprise us and carry novelty. To be 
able to recognise, identify and utilise novelty, we should not let them disappear in the the 
information of the first category. Weakness is derived from the fact that, in interpreting 
signs, we do not know which information can really project the future, because if we knew 
that, they would not be weak signals. Weak signals have two characteristics of the 
information mentioned above: they bring order into a system – usually in a developing 
system that is taking shaping, one that is just emerging, and of which we do not know much 
and so we would like to understand its function. Furthermore, they carry novelty because 
they are information that we did not have before, and they are probably surprising – if they 
were not, we would have known what to look for and which source to use. Weak signals 
are signals that, theoretically, could be reached or interpreted by anybody if we were more 
open and we had all the available knowledge. 
 
The sources of weak signals 
 
Weak signals never refer unequivocally to one thing that is why they are weak. Those signs 
that are considered weak do not reveal unequivocally the process they belong to, or those 
that refer to a process that is not unequivocal where they evolve, and have the potential of 
not becoming a prevailing trend. Detecting all signs of change is not possible for humans, 
thus signals are weak in many cases.  
 
Researchers of weak signals usually propose to start from sources from which there is a 
chance for a future trend to grow, like artistic works, patents, blogs or science-fiction 
(Hiltunen, 2007). For this last we do not have to look far, we know Jules Verne! 
Concerning art we can see that they capture societal problems very sensitively, and reflect 
to those much more early than other official forums (Karakostova, 2006). Blogging is a 
brand new genre, and its use has spread fast: they are exquisite sources for finding weak 
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signals, which show what is going on in the world. Figure 1 shows that in the certain levels 
how weak signals are spread or appearing the process (which we cumulate in order to get 
an S-curve), and we can also see where we can find weak signals, what their main sources 
are.  
 
Figure 1. The appearance of weak signals 
 
 
Source: Choo (2006), adapted from Hiltunen (2007). 
 
In the phase of Idea Creation an idea is born expressing something new. This can be a 
piece of art (e.g.: avant-garde (Karakostova, 2006)), science fiction, primarily a book or a 
film (e.g.: the books of Jules Verne), extreme and alternative press (e.g.: Civil Radio – not 
profit-oriented, thus there appear such themes that are relevant but which carry no profit), 
professional press (e.g.: medical press), patents (e.g.: patents on genetics have been already 
in the 80’s), PhD dissertations (e.g.: ecological sustainability in the 90’s). These signals are 
weak for the others, that is why it is important to notice and support these opportunities that 
are yet very weak and can be influenced and strengthened or weakened as we would like to 
reach or avoid the future that they project. However, there is a risk in being weak since it 
can also be deviated and influenced according to one's selfish interests. The signals of Idea 
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Creation are very weak also for futurists; hence, it is difficult to make them useful and 
‘marketable’.  
 
The inner newsletters (e.g.: information for dealers by multinational companies), research 
results of analysts or banks (e.g.: occasional papers of the National Bank of Hungary), 
professional journals (e.g.: on IT or geology), scientific-technologic journals (e.g.: ‘Life 
and Science’), popular science journals (e.g.: ‘Life and Literature’), journals for decision 
makers (e.g.: ‘Economic Review’) are all part of Elite Awareness. This is the phase when 
many are not aware of the process just a few of a given background. In this phase weak 
signals are known in a wide range, and primarily the interdisciplinary thinking and the 
complex view can reinterpret the signals showing a new way for the signals and projecting 
a new process. The signals in this phase are weak because they cannot yet project the whole 
system; rather, they are present only in certain sectors. Futurists focus on these signals 
primarily, because they can mediate the processes from one sector to another, and influence 
the future to exercise complexity and so the many specialities would be harmonised.  
 
In the phase of Popular Awareness we can get information on the processes through radio 
and TV programmes (e.g.: survey of the laymen on the street), daily journals (e.g.: ‘Daily 
Economics’ - there is always something about ‘interesting’ issues), general magazines (e.g.: 
InterPress Magazine), publication of interest groups (e.g.: KOVÁSZ, ecological journal at 
the Corvinus University of Budapest), surveys (e.g.: voting via the Internet), fiction and 
non-fiction (e.g.: the list of the best-sellers could be interesting). Popular Awareness does 
not include weak signals for most of the people, even though it can be still weak for some 
people, as the consequences are not well developed and known. Futurists have a possibility 
with these kind of information as well as they would be and should have been used more 
often in decision making, because they are typically those that we aware of, only we do not 
know what to do about them or how to relate to them – a typical example of which is global 
climate change: we know about and we are aware of the existence of the process, but there 
is no global commitment from the different entities even if they are fully aware of the 
possible consequences.  
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The phase of Government Awareness means participation in decision making, so when the 
process is no longer a weak signal and reaches a level where the government’s decision-
making takes it into consideration. The process can manifest itself as reports and studies 
supported by the government (e.g.: economic issues, like investments), papers on 
governmental policy (e.g.: tax issues), legislation drafts and bills (e.g.: introduction of 
GMO agricultural products in Hungary), open discussions (e.g.: environmental issues). 
 
When the process reaches its Procedural Routinisation phase it is a known and regulated 
phenomenon. The sources for this phase can be: governmental policies and regulation (e.g.: 
regulation on accessibility in Hungary, while it has recommendations in Sweden), 
institutional staff (e.g.: the changes in the role of the government commissioner of the 
cyclists), government filings (e.g.: bio fuels), professional associations (e.g.: associations 
for social interests), educational training (e.g.: manuals of Internet-use).  
 
In the phase of Record-Keeping media attention directed at the process is low again, as it 
have become the part of the everyday practice like legislative documents (e.g.: 
privatisation), authorities’ or institutional archives (e.g.: compensations), government 
filings in historical archives (e.g.: the proposals for the reform of the pension system), 
studies analysing the history (e.g.: economy of the socialism).  
 
The subjectivity of weak signals and their connection to the cognitive structure 
 
 The weak signals in the cognitive structure 
 
At the beginning of the third millennium humans face other problems than our ancestors 
did. For today the flow of information has speeded up, and on the Internet almost 
everything is accessible. Today we have fame not for information itself but also we are 
tending to frame a cognitive structure and grab its dynamism. Modern education focuses 
not on lexical knowledge but on the analysis of the interconnections. Today a signal is 
unworthy if we are not able to put it in a context, find a place for it in our ‘box’ in the 
cognitive structure.  
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One of the real challenges is to shape consciously our cognitive structure. The questioning 
of the results of natural sciences, the development of social sciences by leaps and bounds 
and the growing demand for esotericism all show that individual search has begun and the 
individual consciousness is in the focus for some decades. This also means that everyone 
has an own thinking pattern. What we believe in and how we see things is important, but 
also in which level and where we put it in a mental model. The signs can be perceived by 
everyone, but is not weak for all.  
 
Let’s see what the elements of the system are along which we think. We suppose that we 
shape our thoughts in a structure that is provided for the individual (that could be also an 
enterprise or some other unit that is homogenous), and the individual is embedded in the 
environment. The environment influences the individual, and also the individual influences 
the environment. If they are in interaction, then the system does dynamically change. 
Individuals should adapt to changes, or pro-actively go beyond them and shape future and 
the changes. Individual change only when they feel that they have an interest in it. The 
individual brings about changes when there is a push or change from the environment, the 
question is that what is that impulse that starts the intention of change in the individual and 
when he/she become aware of that impulse.  
 
The environmental elements do always change, and not all the changes can be predicted, as 
there are many futures. The elements of the environment in their dynamic change and shape 
show the way where they go, and the individual can get information about that. But it 
becomes useful information just when the signals are evident for the individual and he/she 
can build them in his cognitive structure.  
 
An upcoming theory, method or principle should be first built in the cognitive structure to 
be accepted and become general. In general, this starts from individual level and if it 
reaches the critical mass then it can be integrated in a higher level as well by others as well. 
If we are able to sense and interpret well the signs then we will able to take part actively in 
the shaping of our own future. For this we have to understand that is not enough to keep our 
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eyes open, we ought also to be open-minded enough to integrate and comprehend in the 
sense of being able to put novelty in our cognitive structure understanding change is not 
convulsion: if we notice changes in time we will have time to adapt and influence, and 
future not just happen to us, but we also have an active role in it.  
 
Weak signals are such information that refers to the functioning of the system, and carry 
information about its change. If we are not ready for change, then it will not settle in the 
cognitive structure and it will remain empty data. If we are able to understand that and 
build them in our cognitive system, then they will be weak signals. Weak signals remain 
weak also after identification, so the chance of supervention is another issue.  
  
Weak signals are always subjective and depend on the cognitive structure. Consequently, 
we cannot unequivocally say that this or that is a weak signal: for someone a sign is a weak 
signal and for another one the whole process is sensible. For the observer the cognitive 
structure, comprehension, information and the intensity of the knowledge matter.  
 
  The subjectivity of weak signals  
 
The most problematic question about weak signals is to define when a signal is weak and 
when it is not. Everything is subjective, that is what makes a signal weak for someone. To 
ease the interpretation of this concept we better clear up what we consider a relevant 
process and what kind of groups we can form of these. If we do this, we can see that weak 
signals can be identified and handled easily without the dilemma that there is an endless 
number of processes and we do not know which signal refers to which process. We think 
better in a complex system of interactions that show the possible changes of the future by 
all the perspectives of the participants. Hence, weak signals are interpreted from the aspect 
of the observant, and thus it defines the subjectivity of weak signals as well.  
 
To be able to notice the signals and see the world around us in new ways, we have to get 
out of everyday habits. We should use other point of view to be able to understand and 
receive information on the conscious level instead of ignoring it. An example for this is 
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Chinese economic boom: China’s economic fall into the line is a consequence of its 
comparative advantage by labour, and the economic growth is still widening that is a risk 
for European producers. With a protective policy it should have been prevented many 
decades earlier if we would not project China from our history books, but we see it as a 
competitive and rich in labour competitor.  
 
Weak signals in futures studies 
 
Futures studies has a special role in science: it intends to strengthen the role and 
significance of actions by individuals and society to draw the attention to the 
interconnected relationship, and it also emphasise its aim of improving future thinking and 
thus raising consciousness. Futures studies is interdisciplinary as it integrates knowledge 
from all scientific disciplines and uses the holistic approach to decrease the instability of 
the future felt in the present (Hideg, Korompai, Kovács, Nováky, 2006). Weak signals are 
signs that exist in the present, potentially evolving in the future and are difficult to detect 
(Hiltunen, 2007). Weak signal research is a possibility to futures studies to deal with 
instability, and channel information to the individuals and societal groups with a new 
approach.  
 
 Alignment according to the way of change 
 
The weak signals can be aligned according to the change that they can potentially induce. 
This means that weak signals, as they evolve, have the potential to induce change, and we 
can group changes according their main issue. Adapting a holistic approach we usually use 
STEEP, to differentiate societal, technological, environmental, economic and political 
topics. Simplifying this we can reduce it to three main groups: natural, societal and 
technological that refer to the process in which weak signal potentially strengthen, and that 
process what characteristics has and in which aspect does it play a role. A further advantage 
of this is that within these groups we can see other partial processes as well in general that 
helps more the research, interpretation and use of the weak signals.  
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Natural weak signals usually refer to phenomenon that was not a possibility before or to 
one that was known before and we have evidence that represents it in a different matter 
showing new possibilities. Societal weak signals can be delineated easier than natural ones, 
even tough there are many types of it. If we would like to simplify it, we will say that there 
is a classic pattern: idea creation, spread and evolving/effect that could be concerned to all 
of the weak signals. Technological weak signals are the easiest one to define: idea creation, 
planning/implementation and use/spread. Societal and technological could be more aligned 
to get weak signals interpreted in the partial processes as well. The further aim of the 
alignment of weak signal is to segment them when we build a database.  
 
 The futurists’ task with weak signals 
 
The main characteristics of weak signal that they are not obvious, and that is why decision 
makers do not like to deal with them – why spend time on such things that are nearly 
invisible? The answer is pro-activity, which helps us to avoid the situations where we have 
to respond to changes, but we cannot be part of them, and we do not have any chance to 
shape the future. Futurists as interdisciplinary scientists have he task of channel the 
information that weak signal represent. E.g. in participatory futures studies the opinion of 
the few is important as well, and maybe they are knowing something that is a weak signal 
for others, e.g. to decision makers; during their work futurists can channel information, that 
in the case of weak signal is especially important. Another example is the interconnection 
of different disciplines, that maybe have something to say to each other, but without 
knowing it they do not communicate, but if they would, maybe it would have been easier to 
both of them. That is why futures studies with its interdisciplinary approach have a critical 
role in the interpretation and in the use of weak signals.  
 
 Weak signals and the scenario method 
 
The futurists have the responsibility to shape adequate and acceptable future alternatives, 
and communicate them towards the stakeholders (Nováky, 2007). One problem with weak 
signals is that it is difficult to communicate them and make their existence and potential 
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accepted. Since they are weak it is easier to sweep them off, moreover their uncertainty 
suggest ignoring them. Weak signals are interesting until they show exciting and new 
futures as a stir. But when the responsibility and the necessity of action come up with weak 
signals, people are more rejective, as change and changing are always a difficult task for 
everyone.  
 
The method of scenario analysis can integrate weak signals in the futurists’ work. When we 
build scenarios the small possibilities do count as well, scenarios can treat the strengthening 
of weak signals moreover it seeks for them. Scenario method is very important as it helps 
weak signals to be built in the cognitive structure. As it is a method that collects ideas of 
the actors, and could do more than just mention weak signals: it describes and tells in the 
scenarios the possible consequences. Thus, weak signals become comprehensible, and they 
are also protected from automatic rejection, and become integrated in the shape of the 
future.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Futures studies has special potential to treat weak signals and find them a place in the 
complexity of the world. The objective of future studies is to collect weak signals, to 
explore interactions and offer broader understanding to the society. Weak signals need to be 
treated, referred to use for shaping the future. The weak signals could be used together with 
well-known methods of futures studies, among them with the scenario method. 
 
We always have to keep our eyes open, making it possible to discover new futures and 
shape them. The task of futurists is to manage and harmonise these actions, and channel the 
information for those who are not aware of the future possibilities and threatens. 
Uncertainty grows around us, but if we handle it, we can live in the present a more valuable 
life too. Until today we were not able to manage change as we should have done, but if we 
are look for signals and act in time, we will be able to avoid those threatening processes 
that we have provoked for ourselves.   
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Technology Foresight and Its Contribution to Advancing 
Participatory Democracy1 
 
 
Foresight as a new, democratic means for shaping the future 
 
Futures studies into global world models and social future models has revealed that 
these models cannot yet be regarded as forecasts but rather as possible social futures, 
and their implementations depends strongly on human values, expectations, choices, 
actions, and taking risk and responsibility. This recognition has led to the emergence of 
a new futures theory. During the 1990s a new futures theory was elaborated with the 
appearance of critical futures studies (Hideg, 2002). These critical futures studies 
defined the ‘future’ as something that already exists in the thoughts and emotions of 
people. According to R. Slaughter’s definition of foresight: ‘ .. a universal human 
capacity which allows people to think ahead, consider, model, create and respond to 
future eventualities. Founded on the rich and inclusive environment of the human brain-
mind system which, crudely put, has sufficiently complex neural ’wiring’ to support an 
extended mode of perception whose main functions are proactive and facilitating. 
Future thoughts and perceptions affect present occurrences and form an organic part of 
human ’life- world’’ (See Slaughter’s Glossary). This human ability is called ‘foresight’ 
in critical futures studies.  
 
The key feature of Slaughter’s definition is that foresight exists at individual level but it 
can also be extended to the community or the whole society. An individual is able to 
envisage both his own and his community’s future. Both types of future thoughts and 
perceptions are forming and reforming the process of social dialogues and are 
embedded in the process of social innovation until the phase of shaping the future. 
Consequently, futures existing in the present are open and are humanly constructed; 
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thus human and social future hinges strongly on human values, choices, actions and 
responsibility.  
 
Foresight as a new meaning of the future places not only the future in the present 
context, but it expresses that the future, as a human affair, belongs to every human 
being as well. The issue of democracy has also been placed in a new context in this 
way. Shaping the future is a human and democratic action in this meaning of foresight. 
The development of anticipatory democracy is very important therefore foresight should 
be an everyday practice. From another aspect, the fulfilment of anticipatory democracy 
can also be regarded as a tool for democratisation of society. (Pateman, 1970).  
 
During the 1970’s futures studies served to introduce the idea of anticipatory democracy 
(Toffler, 1970, Bezold, 1970). In Toffler’s words (in 1970): ‘To master change, we shall 
therefore need both a clarification of important long-range social goals and a 
democratisation of the way in which we arrive at them. And this means nothing less 
than the next political revolution in the techno-societies – a breath-taking affirmation of 
popular democracy.’ (Toffler, 1970, p477) Bezold and Toffler recognised that 
successful management of changes would need the involvement of people in the process 
of shaping our future. From the 1990’s foresight, as interpreted by critical futures 
studies, regards human participation and cooperation in the process of mapping out the 
future as evidence or as basic characteristic of every foresight activity. Since that time, 
the fulfilment of anticipatory democracy has become a central issue in the development 
of different foresight procedures. 
 
Critical futures studies has developed several new tools, especially subjective methods, 
(e.g. futures wheel, futures workshop techniques, causal layered analysis etc.) in order 
to bring more and more future thoughts to the surface and to stimulate more and more 
people to participate in discourses about the future (Inayatullah, 2005). Different 
foresight procedures have been produced to promote democratic participation. Foresight 
training procedures have been worked out to expand future orientation of individuals, 
including their ability to share in participative foresight activities (Major et al., 2001, 
Schultz, 2003). Foresight management and institutionalisation at organisation level, is 
also under development. An important goal is for more and more employees to be 
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involved in the future shaping process in various organizations (Daheim, Uerz, 2006). 
Theories of technology, regional and social foresight have been elaborated for helping 
policy and decision making (Miles et al., 2002). A number of other foresight case 
studies are presently in progress to define suitable foresight procedures for advancing 
democratic participation.  
 
Analysing foresight procedures in the aspect of anticipatory democracy we have found 
that an increasing number people take part in shaping the future, alongside experts and 
futurists (Keenan at. al., 2006). People take part in the foresight process as active 
participants, so-called ‘stakeholders’, who bring into play a certain social sphere, or as 
citizens who express their expectations concerning a certain social sphere. Involvement 
of stakeholders and citizens in the foresight activities has become an attribution of 
foresight. Besides free expression of opinion, there are widespread discussions about 
futures issues among foresight participants. Main common features of these foresight 
procedures, in the aspect of anticipatory democracy, are as follows:  
 
 -  involvement of stakeholders and citizens in the foresight activity, 
- voicing free criticism about the present and the past, including the course of 
development during the foresight procedure,  
 -   free expression of stakeholders’ ideas about futures, 
- free discourse about futures possibilities, with the participation of different  
stakeholders, 
-  extending stakeholders’ knowledge about the future, or help them to 
understand each other at least, 
-  induce changes in stakeholders’ mindset, to bring them to cooperate and act 
responsibly for achieving the future, 
-  make efforts to find connections between future ideas and present actions in 
the network of interconnections. 
 
Studying foresight procedures it can also be seen that every foresight procedure 
mentioned is developed in a way that it can be fitted to a given phase of democratisation 
of the whole society. Foresight training procedures are materialising to improve future 
orientation of young and/or everyday people. This activity can contribute to the 
education of conscious and responsible citizens. Organizational/corporate foresight is 
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aimed to develop employees’ participation and to use employees’ foresight capability in 
shaping the future of organizations. Organizational/corporate foresight works to 
promote involvement of employees. Technology, regional and social foresight is 
designed to involve people as stakeholders and citizens in the future shaping process in 
their communities and to involve them in policy and decision making. In this way they 
can contribute to the democratisation of policy and decision making.  
 
There are notable differences between foresight procedures, based on the kind of 
democracy ideals they are founded on. Some foresight procedures serve the idea of 
representative democracy, while others serve the idea of participatory democracy. It is 
worth to differentiate in this respect, even if the aim of every foresight procedure is the 
fulfilment of anticipatory democracy. Given the fact that anticipatory democracy is also 
a tool for democracy and an integral part of the democratisation process, therefore its 
content depends on the idea of democracy, taken into consideration as a starting point 
by foresight professionals. The analysis made from this aspect shows that foresight 
training procedures and  organizational/corporate foresight are based mostly on the idea 
of participatory democracy, while foresight procedures that can be linked to policy and 
decision making, are mostly based on the idea of representative democracy. Developers 
of both foresight training and institutional/corporate foresight procedures endeavour to 
involve all their students and employees in the process of future shaping. This opens the 
way for working on the idea of direct participatory democracy. On the other hand, 
developers of foresight procedures serving policy and decision making want to involve 
experts and representatives of different stakeholders, among them representatives of 
citizens. This is understandable, because they are working under the given social-, 
institutional conditions. The foresight procedure applied by them has to be tailored to fit 
to existing social conditions.      
 
Main characteristics of technology foresight, from the aspect of democratisation 
 
It is apparent (in the previous chapter) that technology foresight has developed on the 
basis of representative democracy. This characteristic feature clearly distinguishes it 
from all other foresight procedures. Some other characteristics also derive from the fact 
that technology foresight has followed its own course of development, such as: 
Éva Hideg 
 
 
147 
 
- building close connections to policy and decision making, 
- helping to implement the principle of subsidiarity in practice, 
- applying the principle of representative democracy in the selection of 
stakeholders and in determining the role of stakeholders in the technology foresight 
procedure,  
- involvement of the authorities as stakeholders in the technology foresight 
activity, 
- consensus building among stakeholders, this being the main goal of this 
foresight activity. 
 
Existing close connection with policy and decision making certainly guarantees faster 
development and propagation of technology foresight. This practice of technology 
foresight is gaining ground particularly in the European Union (Keenan et al., 2005). Its 
institutionalisation has also begun. Nevertheless, it is yet unclear whether this foresight 
activity serves the dissemination of future ideas, developed by present key stakeholders, 
or whether it will bring to the surface future ideas of stakeholders and allow their free 
discussion. Meanwhile, signs of increased bureaucracy can be observed in the process 
of institutionalisation of technology foresight. For example, only one procedure is 
acceptable for preparing technology foresight, in case it is not in harmony with the aim 
and object of an ongoing foresight procedure.  
 
The ambiguity and formal solutions, applied by technology foresight, with referred 
special characteristics, endanger free discourse among stakeholders as well. Consensus 
building is overemphasised, regardless whether it is possible to arrive at it or not, or 
even the time factor. Too much attention to consensus building in the process of 
technology foresight can also be harmful from the aspect awareness about uncertainty of 
the future and bringing to the surface of a wide range of possible future ideas which 
differ significantly from the ‘consensus future’. Applying the principle of representative 
democracy in foresight activity cannot offer a plausible solution to achieve anticipatory 
democracy, because present power relations are expressed in the process, whereas the 
future is supposed to be open and shapable. Based on the present power settings, this 
practically means that future alternatives and the ‘consensus future’ prepared within 
technology foresight procedures do not differ from futures tuned to ‘business as usual’ 
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tone. The new outlines of technology thus taking shape reflect the interests and 
expectations of developers and manufacturers, while long-term environmental and 
social impacts are not taken into consideration. For example, researches and 
implementation of new results in the area of biotechnology take place without social 
endorsement and preliminary analysis of environmental hazards. This example and 
similar occurrences signal that democratic character of technology foresight is 
endangered even in case an increased number of stakeholders are involved in the 
foresight procedure.        
  
We need to mention the aspirations of technology foresight in Europe. Some foresight 
professionals say that foresight should brake away from the futures studies and follow 
foresight procedures developed in the area of technology foresight. Namely, the 
foresight activity that builds close connections with policy and decision making can 
qualify as the only foresight with a European character and therefore worthy of 
institutionalisation and propagation (Keenan et al., 2003). This aspiration is harmful in 
terms of futures studies, because it leads to separation of foresight knowledge segments 
instead of supporting synergy of experience acquired in the course of various foresight 
activities. In a period of instability, the possible sidelining of foresight activities that do 
not harmonise in methodology and goals with the given and preferred technology 
foresight, can become an unwelcome feature in European foresight theory and practice 
(Hideg, 2007). 
 
Technology foresight has accumulated wide experience in the area of democratisation. 
It has developed the way of involving key stakeholders of researchers, manufacturers 
and authorities in the spirit of representative democracy. Technology foresight activities 
have not yet become the organic part of democratisation of technology management 
and governance. Foresight activities are not carried on regularly and they connect to 
technology management and governance only in ad hoc way. Its institutionalisation 
would not serve well further democratisation, either in the field of technology foresight 
or technology management and governance. If further development of anticipatory 
democracy is important for technology foresight then the course to be followed by 
technology foresight development is clear: to find new solutions for fulfilment of 
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anticipatory democracy that can contribute to strengthening participatory democracy in 
technology management and governance at different levels and fields.  
 
Why does the development of technology need anticipatory and participatory 
democracy? 
  
It is reasonable to ask why future development of technology needs democracy? There 
is huge competition in the field of technology development, especially in the field of 
forefront technology development. Each new, hopeful idea and innovation is qualified 
as secret strategic information. Many experts, among them foresight experts, think that 
only a few innovators, with very creative minds, are needed for achieving breakthrough 
results. If there are sufficient economic resources for financing innovations and their 
coming onto the market, then the ‘islands of excellence’ can generate spectacular 
development for a country. I think the idea of ‘islands of excellence’ is not sufficient to 
get to the forefront of technology development or to speed up the socio-economic 
development of a given country in the beginning of the 21st Century. The forthcoming 
decades will pass in the spirit of knowledge-and interactive society (Hideg, Vág, 2004).  
 
The idea of knowledge society is based on minimising social loss of information 
paradigm. In other words it means that opportunities of information paradigm should be 
utilised in a socially effective way. Therefore it is not sufficient to be well informed but 
also to be capable of transforming information into knowledge in our era of 
information. Creation of new knowledge should not only become continuous activity 
but also be a part of the social reflexive learning process. This means that new and 
socially useful knowledge is placed in context and is used creatively. Knowledge 
develops by being shared among people and by use in a concrete situation. This type of 
knowledge creation is characteristic not only to technology development and innovation 
but also to a wide range of other activities as well. For this reason the development of 
individual and social knowledge base, closely linked with one another, has become a 
key issue of social development. In the context of democratisation this means that the 
emergence and propagation of active and reflexive participation should be part of the 
evolving knowledge society. 
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The idea of interactive society takes another step ahead.  We should know not only how 
to act in a given situation but also how to become constructive as components of a 
complex system. To this end, we need to know how to define our position in a complex 
system, how to communicate, cooperate, perceive signs, respond reflexively, think and 
act responsibly in our position. This so-called ‘interactivity’ can be seen as a way of 
functionality in post-modern society (Leydesdorff, 2001). If the new knowledge is 
‘created’ through interactivity of different contexts and ongoing social dialogue, then 
this knowledge creation could also measure the performance of society. This new 
knowledge, including the technology knowledge, not only propagates simply from the 
centres but is also generated by society in a different context. We can therefore state that 
democratisation by participation belongs also to the advancement of society (Barber, 
1984 and Baiocchi, 2003). Participative democracy, in its different complexities, 
constitutes a new position for the human being to competently exercise his influence.   
 
Studying new ways in innovation, Chesbrough proves that innovation, as a process, 
becomes open in the aspects of actors and new needs that need to be satisfied. This 
opening up innovation can be meant as a new emerging paradigm of innovation 
(Chesbrough, 2003). Hippel states that user-developed innovation is very effective way 
of innovation activities (Hippel, 2005). The technical, economic and social development 
in Finland can show a case of this line of innovation development (Markkula, 2002).  
 
At the level of expectation and scientific communication it is established that new 
knowledge is generated by its use and sharing. Every new technology needs natural, 
economic, social and intellectual resources. Among them the social resource, i.e. an 
environment that inspires learning, is of great importance because it enhances 
intellectual capacity. Given that technology can produce dangers as ‘side effects’ and 
this fact should be made public in the introduction of an innovation. Innovation is not 
only new knowledge, embedded in new technology, product, service, but also reflexive 
knowledge that gives meaning to novelty in social, organizational cultural and human 
quality terms. Harmonized cooperation is also needed among different actors during the 
whole life cycle of innovation, because even a knowledge particle can contribute to new 
technology. Actors are people who have competent knowledge and can reflect, i.e. they 
are able to generate new knowledge thus contributing to the development of new 
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technology. Emergence of cooperation among actors is not only a simple matter of 
organization, but a functional way of participatory democracy. With a view to the 
above, participative democracy does not equal with dilettantism but with the mode of 
generating new, reflexive knowledge.  
 
Another result from this line of thought is that technology foresight can be understood 
as a scope of creating new reflexive knowledge on technology. It deals with creating 
expectation knowledge regarding new technology including extension of socio-cultural 
function on a time scale. Therefore, the whole social process of developing new 
technology, that also comprises technology foresight. Technology foresight, generating 
new reflective knowledge, also has a democratic character in terms of anticipation and 
participation. 
 
Some methodological issues concerning advancement of participatory democracy 
in technology foresight 
 
If technology foresight is interpreted in the mentioned way, then the next question that 
arises: how should technology foresight be developed to meet changing social needs? 
One possible answer to this question is that the development of technology foresight 
should promote open foresight activity. 
 
The idea of open foresight emerged from the area of organizational/corporate foresight. 
Open foresight is based on the assumption that business can shape future contexts and 
markets through communicating the dynamic interaction between social, technological 
and economic forces, in an open dialogue (Daheim, Uerz, 2006). It can be characterised 
by transparency, methodological variability, context orientation and participation. It 
focuses on interactivity of communication and open discussions among the participants. 
Openness of foresight can be explained from three aspects. It means (1) the involvement 
of competent stakeholders of different areas and levels who can be associated with the 
topic of foresight, (2) it should be open to environmental issues, (3) it should be 
organised as an open communication process. This idea of open foresight tallies with 
the idea of open innovation. If innovation could be opened up for users on a wider scale, 
then technology foresight should also be supported by users and potential users, besides 
traditional key stakeholders.  
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First steps to be taken towards open foresight include recognising the importance 
capturing even weak signals and wild cards. Hiltunen suggests that every employee in 
an organization should look out for signs coming from ‘wherever’, this would be 
important in the life of an enterprise. After communicating and filtering these signals, a 
part of them could be entered into the information database of foresight activity 
(Hiltunen, 2006). In other words, mapping weak signals and wild cards could be more 
effective if every employee could participate in capturing such signals or ‘giving’ 
signals, namely recognising the importance of signals.  
 
The development of information resources by expanding participation can also be of 
great importance for technology foresight. This can be the first step that should also 
involve other methodological revivals which can be connected to the development of 
foresight democracy. Four methodological connections of technology foresight should 
be developed in this context: 
 
  - rearrangement of stakeholders’ choice and the way of their involvement,  
- giving stakeholder status to the natural environment,  
- building up a technology foresight network,  
- institutionalisation of technology foresight as an inner phase of technology 
management and governance. 
 
The re-assessment of social function of technology foresight, under new social 
conditions, requires that the sphere of stakeholders should be extended to include all 
potential actors, e.g. scientific researchers, producers, service providers, users, 
managers, policy makers etc. Solving this problem is not a simple task, because the 
range of potential actors and their competences are also to be defined, hypothetically. 
This can give additional dimensions to the matter of stakeholders’ choice. The need to 
find stakeholders is evident in present circumstances, but to find possible stakeholders 
of the future depends on the expected social function of the new technology. In this 
aspect the principle of representativity should be abandoned. But what would be the 
new criteria for the choice of stakeholders in place of representativity? To answer this 
question we should pay attention to the competence of potential actors. One possible 
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solution would consider both the competence and ability of an actor to become a 
stakeholder in a certain technology foresight project in such a way that demands at least 
a minimal level of diversity of new thoughts. Detailed methodological elaboration of 
this solution should be a new research topic of technology foresight. 
 
The other new issue is the consideration of the natural environment as a stakeholder in 
technology foresight. Since technology foresight is an interactive communication 
process among stakeholders, issues that are not of immediate interest to stakeholders are 
undervalued during the communication process. The natural environment is seen as just 
another important issue in the area of technology foresight. The stakeholder of natural 
environment should be sought after from among environmental scientists/researchers 
and organizations. An additional methodological problem that arises is: how and in 
what phase of technology foresight can the stakeholder of natural environment be 
involved so that his activity does not counter fresh thoughts about the development of 
technology?   
 
Applying any kind of methodologically acceptable solutions, in response to the 
questions raised, technology foresight can result in different conflicts among 
stakeholders. These conflicts may be the subject of further discussions, but may also be 
a valuable means for new findings in technology foresight. Bringing to light conflicting 
future thoughts and merging them (if possible) into different alternatives, should be 
regarded important in the process of reaching a ‘consensus future’. Conflicts among 
stakeholders concerning alternative futures signal the fact that there is no consensus 
concerning technology future, but it can also signal that certain stakeholders’ groups 
would like to develop an alternative technology. Democratic societies should also make 
possible to seek alternative technological paths. Methodologically it is essential that 
every expectation concerning the future of technology should be transparent and 
stakeholders should take responsibility for them.          
 
Organization techniques also need improvement, if an increasing number of competent 
stakeholders are to take part in the process of technology foresight. Networking is the 
preferred working method (Bezold, 2006). It can be acceptable, provided that the 
network is open to every stakeholder who wants to join the technology foresight 
activity. It is the task of the foresight manager to encourage stakeholder involvement. 
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This means that there is no available well-founded methodology for the free 
involvement of stakeholders, besides the general methodology of networking. While 
looking for methodological solutions it is very important to emphasize that technology 
foresight requires – as input information – diversity of thoughts regarding technology 
future, and concurrent filtering through discussion by competent stakeholders. Use of 
the Internet is encouraged, because applying the old ‘hand-made’ solutions (like using 
experts’ or public Delphi, brainstorming etc.) does not make possible the collecting and 
processing of all  technology future ideas, without jeopardising free participation and 
expression of future ideas. In addition, these ‘old’ procedures are extremely time-
consuming. The establishment of an open website for technology foresight networking 
is a very simple and frequently applied method for open discussion or dissemination of 
special issues and results. The methodological development of its working for achieving 
free participation in the whole process of technology foresight is yet unsolved. This is 
not fortunate, at a time when the meaning of technology foresight is also changing and 
the strengthening of democratic participation is an emerging new line of technology 
foresight. This methodological development itself could be another important foresight 
research project.  
 
Strengthening of democratic participation in technology foresight cannot be achieved 
without responsibility for the future expectations and ethical future actions by 
stakeholders (Nováky, 2006). For this reason, technology foresight should not only 
become a continuous activity with regular feedbacks, but also a means of technology 
management and governance. Up until now, technology foresight has established close 
connections to policy and decision making. The present overemphasis of a ‘consensus 
future’ can be regarded as the ‘price’ of these close connections. If the democratisation 
of technology management and governance, including and technology foresight could 
be brought together, on the basis of development of participatory democracy, then the 
development of methodology of participation in technology foresight could be achieved 
through cooperation between foresight professionals, working in the area of technology 
foresight, and professionals dealing with the development of management and 
governance (Heinelt, 2002). This should prove to be a better way for institutionalisation 
of technology foresight, rather than further strengthening connections with the present 
form of policy and decision making.  
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New conditions and tasks mentioned in the area of technology foresight and special 
development routes for technology foresight also make possible for technology 
foresight to contribute more effectively to the achievement of anticipatory democracy. 
In view of the fact that recommended methodological issues are not essentially in 
conflict with research issues/projects of other foresight activities, therefore it is 
recommended that technology foresight should also strengthen its connections to other 
areas of foresight.  
 
Note 
 
1 This study is based on the presentation ‘Methodological Experiences in Hungarian 
Foresight Activities’ held at 5th workshop of the Forum ‘Foresight, Roadmapping and 
Governance’ (7-8 December 2007, Budapest) organised by Forschungszentrum 
Karlsruhe, Florida Institute of Technology and the Hungarian National Commission For 
UNESCO. 
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Methodological Experiences in Hungarian Foresight 
Activities Based on Critical Futures Studies1 
 
 
Introductory thoughts 
 
We are living in unstable socio-economic processes, with significant social changes 
occurring and decisions being made with controversial effects on the population. This 
time, it is not sufficient to foresee trends, given that possible futures were developed by 
way of studying the facts of objective reality. Neither can we consider future 
expectations and planned actions by key stakeholders, because the affected population 
may act against future conceptions and decisions that can be regarded reasonable and 
professionally well-founded. Therefore, we should become familiar with the views, 
opinions and expectations of the individuals and the population regarding the future. 
 
People tend to realize that they need to live with their future-shaping power for the sake 
of their individual future, embedded in the future of their wider environment. More and 
more people wish to be involved and do not regret the time and energy invested. 
Futurists should not make decisions or evaluate observed processes on their own. 
Stakeholders, attentive public and opinion leaders should be involved in the foresight 
process. This is the reason why we are working to improve foresight procedures which 
opens the way to participatory approach.  
 
We have gained substantial methodological experience in foreseeing the future for 
education, regional development and in the macro sphere of society. The first social 
foresight study prepared in Hungary for the future of education was in (1992-1994 and 
1995-96) and the second one was carried out in 2006. We have elaborated public 
foresight procedures for regional foresight in two cases (Tuzsér, 2000, 
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Kiskunfélegyháza, 2003). We also used participatory futures study methods to look for 
future alternatives for Hungary, beyond tomorrow. We are of the opinion that 
methodological experiences thus gained can also be used in the area of technology 
foresight. 
 
Foresights in the field of vocational education 
 
In Hungary the first social foresight was prepared for the future of education and 
vocational training (between 1992-1994 and 1995-1996) (Hideg, Nováky, 1998). The 
foresight project was conducted and accomplished by authors of this paper. The first 
phase was part of a World Bank programme to develop education of Hungarian youth, 
while the second phase was ordered by the Hungarian National Institute of Vocational 
Training. 
 
The aim of this foresight activity was to elaborate complex, long-term development 
alternatives for domestic vocational education. The most important stated goals were to: 
 
- underpin development of the Hungarian system of vocational education, 
- explore expectations of stakeholders of vocational education regarding the 
future, 
- establish the position of vocational education in social future-models, 
- provide possible, desirable, complex and consistent futures alternatives to 
policy makers and other stakeholders, 
- influence policy makers towards the most desirable and affordable direction of 
development.  
 
During that time, the know-how of forecasting was generally known and popular, so we 
started our researches as if it were a social forecast activity. During preparatory works 
however, we soon realised that proceeding with the project cannot be a forecasting-type 
activity, because domestic trends were changing after Hungarian political 
transformation (in 1998) and international trends also showed signs of shifting in 
education and vocational training tendencies. Consequently, we had to develop a new 
methodology to solve the given futures task (Hideg, Nováky, 1999). Under these 
conditions we had to reveal whether Hungarian society showed signs of change, new 
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thoughts, expectations and intentions that would imply modernization of the education 
system. We therefore asked socially determinant actors of education and vocational 
training how they saw the problems, possible avenues of development of the Hungarian 
educational system. In addition, we wanted to offer an international outlook and to 
include its results to the stakeholders’ expectations. Therefore our attention was focused 
on the following three areas: 
 
- Placing the problem in an international context, we were mainly interested in 
how certain well-developed countries and region, known to be spearheading even faster 
development of the time, defined socio-economic functions of vocational education and 
corresponding tasks. 
- What was the position of the decisive players in Hungarian vocational 
education system on the problems and prospects for future development in this area?  
- Were there any clear future alternatives which could be developed, based on 
the expectations of different stakeholders and which could be seen as local solutions of 
global and regional problems of vocational education?  
 
Our study of international outlook was focused on products of futures studies, the aim 
of which was to describe social future-models and which concentrated on the long-term 
development strategy of education and vocational education. This work was done by 
experts of foresight in the form of study writing. 
 
In the first phase of the project, stakeholders were given the task of studying 65 schools 
of vocational education which took part in the World Bank programme. School 
directors were asked about their ideas of development of the Hungarian vocational 
education, by using two-round Delphi method. It was noted that there was yet another 
involved and important stakeholder in vocational education, namely the Hungarian 
population, because people had attended, were attending or might attend school at any 
time. Representatives of the Hungarian population were asked by using one-round 
Delphi, so-called public Delphi method. We were interested about their future 
orientation and the role of schooling in their life.  
 
The second phase of this foresight activity was carried out in terms of extending the 
circle of stakeholders and deepening vision of possible future alternatives for 
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developing Hungarian vocational education. In the second phase, selected circles of 
stakeholders were as: 
 
- schools involved in vocational education as providers of school service, 
- children participating in vocational education as students, 
- parents directly associated with some form of vocational education, whose 
decision and expectation influence the schooling of youth, 
- employers, as ‘consumers’ of vocational education, who require qualified 
workers in their working process. 
 
That foresight activity was extended to include the whole Hungarian society therefore 
the involvement of stakeholders was carried out through their representatives. The 
method used was the one-round Delphi. Our hypotheses, that (1)each group of 
stakeholders was competent in different scope if issues, (2) valuable information could 
be gained about the Hungarian society and economy (as the environment of vocational 
education), about social functions and possible systems of vocational education, if 
different questions were put to the different types of stakeholders and, (3) stakeholder 
involvement was achieved in different ways, which in time proved to be correct, on the 
basis of historical valuation of future alternatives of vocational education, elaborated 
during that foresight activity which is still under discussion.  
 
After surveying opinions and expectations of stakeholders, comparative and consistence 
analyses were carried out by foresight experts. The aim of consistence analysis was to 
fit the valuations of situation (given at the time) as problems and expectations regarding 
the future of that time as possible problem solutions for vocational education to one 
another, also with a view to results of international outlook. 
 
Futures workshop technique was applied in Hungary, firstly in foresight activity. In the 
first phase a futures workshop was held with the participation of so-called ‘World Bank 
schools’. The results of stakeholders’ workshop were feed-backed to the futurists’ 
workshop for using additional future information in the development of future 
alternatives concerning Hungarian vocational education (Hideg, Kappéter, Nováky, 
1995). 
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In the second phase, even more workshops were held, because more stakeholders were 
involved in the foresight procedure. The results of experts’ and stakeholders’ workshops 
were also feed-backed to the futurists’ workshop to finalize the two possible 
development alternatives regarding the education and vocational education system in 
Hungary (Hideg, Nováky, 1998).  
 
The second social foresight activity in the field of vocational education was organised 
for the elaborating the idea of setting up a network of regional vocational examination 
centres in Hungary. It was carried out in 2006 on behalf of National Vocational 
Training Institute2 (Bartus, Hideg eds., 2007). The foresight project was led and 
accomplished by Éva Hideg. 
 
The purpose of this foresight activity was to work out future ideas for a network of 
regional vocational examination centres, their possible establishment and forms of 
professional operation in terms of prevalent and future domestic conditions; including 
social acceptability and/or eligibility for support for the 2007-2013 period. The proposal 
for the establishment of the regional examination centres was based on research 
conducted in the following topics: 
 
- The shared points of development paths of Hungarian and European Union 
societies and economies and the resulting considerations; 
- Experiences of reforms with comparable objectives and subjects undertaken in 
other European Union Member States; 
- The statistical and critical analyses of Hungarian vocational examination 
practice in the period 2000-2005; 
- The ideas of stakeholders of vocational examination practice, such as 
examining teachers, examination board chairs, regional training centres, chambers of 
commerce, industry and agriculture, representative associations of employers, working 
to improve and develop the current examination system. 
 
Research of the first three topics mentioned was carried out by experts through making 
analysis and development studies. Exploration of future conceptions of key stakeholders 
of vocational examination practice at that time was made by directed study writing. 
Some questions were put and while answering them, stakeholders could express their 
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views and expectations about the present and future system of vocational examination. 
The stakeholders could answer freely because the questions provided only the 
framework for their answers. The content of answers was not influenced and the length 
of answers was also not limited.  
 
We were unable to involve all important stakeholders, due to the limited time available 
for the research. The research did not extend to the opinions and ideas of examinees and 
persons ordering examinations. Our view is that they should be involved at the stage 
where professionally justified ideas have already been mapped out. One of the ways that 
this can be ensured – apart from publishing the results of the research – is to hold 
workshops for the various groups of examinees and future examinees, where the various 
vocational examination centre ideas and the models of their potential feasibility and 
operation would be presented and participants could try these models and express what 
they would accept and what they would want to change and why. In addition to these 
live workshops it would also be expedient to create an interactive online website for a 
limited period to ensure that the opinions and suggestions of the widest possible 
spectrum of citizens is taken into account during the transformation of the vocational 
examination system. Our position is that the involvement of those at the receiving end 
of vocational examination services could play an important role in the utilization of 
research results, e.g. during the process of detailed planning and/or a pilot programme. 
 
We have gathered a total of seven different regional examination system concepts from 
the ideas presented by the stakeholders concerned. After gathering the opinions and 
expectations of stakeholders, a number of different filters were used to tone down the 
subjectivity of stakeholders. These filters included comparative and consistence 
analyses, professional workshops with different compositions and number of 
participants. After filtering we utilized these ideas during our synthesis work by 
aligning the ideas of the stakeholders to the views on the environment and the system of 
expectations gathered by studying the first three topics referred to above. That is why 
the final concept does not fully correspond to any of the ideas put forward by the 
stakeholders. Another reason for this is that within the various ideas of the stakeholders 
we strove to find  
 
- common cores and elements, 
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- those shared points in terms of which the various ideas can complement, enrich 
one another, and 
- possible sources of conflict, which must be resolved by finding possible modes 
of resolution in the course of our synthesis work. 
 
The guiding principle of synthesis work was to define and interpret vocational 
examination in a manner that is professionally well-grounded and can aid the 
development of domestic practice and to draw up the new institutional concept, the 
main functions of operation, the possible framework and feasibility of operation in line 
therewith. 
 
Workshops were the most definitive forms of synthesis work. We have developed the 
concept of the new vocational examination centre network during these synthesis 
workshops. In addition, we have also identified the larger issues, where we have 
encountered diverging interpretations and have found an interpretative framework, 
which allows us to handle and answer questions in a manner that fits into a consistent 
system. One of the most significant tasks to be achieved during the workshops was to 
draw up alternative proposals for feasibility, estimation of material, labour and 
infrastructural requirements, as well as envisaged costs of implementation.  
 
The concept and implementation ideas of the regional vocational examination network 
emerged through a series of workshops where participants were representatives of key 
stakeholders as experts of vocational examination, representatives of economic 
chambers, the representative of National Institute of Vocational Education and the 
leader of this foresight activity. Results of these series of workshop were sent to a larger 
group of experts and stakeholders as a working document, who then proceeded to work 
on the concept and possible modes and forms of implementation within the framework 
of a one-day discussion and workshop. Participants of the wider scope one-day 
discussion and workshop were representatives of would-be stakeholders as trade 
unions, multinational and national enterprises, the Confederation of Hungarian 
Employers and Industrialists and representatives of the Labour Ministry as authority, 
besides representatives of key stakeholders mentioned. The main reason of involvement 
of extra stakeholders was that the outcome of the series of workshops, according to 
which the circle of actors of vocational examination system should be expanded in the 
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future so that vocational examination can serve better people’ adaptation to labour needs 
and life-long learning. 
 
We have also taken into account critical observations and proposals for further 
development, made at the wider scope one-day discussion and workshop. The synthesis 
study, the result of this foresight procedure, was primarily based on the experts’ studies, 
discussed, filtered and feed-backed future ideas of stakeholders, the outcomes of 
synthesis workshops and the wider scope one-day discussion and workshop in this way. 
A ‘consensus future’ has not emerged because of conflicting interests among different 
stakeholders (especially between the economic chambers and other stakeholders) but 
three future alternatives have taken shape.  
 
Public foresight for regional foresights 
  
The future of Tuzsér village and the small region of Felsı-Szabolcs 
 
The research was carried out in 2000, using public Delphi (Nováky, 2000). Participants 
were from Tuzsér (a small village in North-East Hungary, in a not so rich region) and 
people who are somehow related and feel responsible for the future of this region. The 
first round of the surveys mapped topics of the future that the participants thought 
responsibly about, and changes they thought would define the future of the region. The 
second round investigated what the possibilities were for development, and their 
expected time-horizon. The time-horizons were 1998-2002, 2003-2010, 2011-2025, 
2026-2050, after 2050 and never. The intervals are widening with a view to neutralize 
growing instability. The third round, based on the results of the second round, examined 
events that were anticipated in each time-horizon and what the expected order of the 
events could be. 
 
In the first round participants mentioned changes, referring to actual trends (e.g. 
education in the elementary school has a focus on environment protection) and weak 
signals (e.g. Tuzsér becomes a conference centre). The appearance, evolving and 
strengthening in the future of the top-down (e.g. development of vehicle traffic) and the 
bottom-up (e.g. cooperation of local communities) processes could be observed from 
the answers. The changes can be grouped according to their most important effect, such 
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as economic, social, technological or environmental relevance. According to the 
answers, most of the events would possibly happen in the between the years 2003-2010. 
Two subjects regarded as ‘never to happen’ and ‘the present situation would never 
change’; these were the kind of events participants were very much concerned about 
and thus they would not change without external initiation. These two critical questions 
were: ethnical conflicts and the development of the local bus transport; participants 
could not imagine that a turning point could come, so professionals’ mediation is 
required.  
 
Societal changes were considered to happen later than the economic ones: this is an 
acceptable and normal phenomenon, considering different time requirements of these 
processes. In environmental and technological topics people were very open to the 
changes, and they were willing to act for them, even though in some cases of external 
determination they were sceptical. About changes that were visible, appreciable and 
known they thought to happen relatively early and they seemed ready to act for them. 
Consequently, they were willing to take action for changes they can see the outcome of, 
but for processes of long-term result or long-term effect they were not so committed. 
Hence decision-makers, professionals and futurists have indispensable responsibility for 
the future, splitting the long-term projects into smaller cases and objectives, making 
them more familiar and accessible. 
 
Events of unstable outcome in the questionnaire (e.g. nearly similar possibilities in two 
different and far time-periods) offered the alternatives for the future. Three alternatives 
could be created, regarding the focus of development: economic, societal and economic-
societal. In the first alternative the economic development is in the spotlight, that later 
will cause the societal recovery. This carries the risk of inefficiency and increases the 
possibility of unwelcome developments in the small region. If the development of 
societal processes is significant, it will be based on modernisation, like expanding the 
Internet for education or communication purposes. In this case the unstable factor that 
threatens accomplishment is an ethnical conflict, which should be resolved. In the third 
alternative societal and economic processes are strengthening each other, but only in 
case that the system has a positive feedback, creating new possibilities and these 
changes have positive effects. The future orientation and responsibility of decision 
makers and the stakeholders is required to this end (Nováky, 2007). People are open to 
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implement changes they are motivated for. To advance long-term changes, people have 
to be conscious about their possibilities, and also be aware that long-term future will 
come eventually, and we have to prepare for it in the present. 
 
 The future of the Hungarian  town Kiskunfélegyháza 
 
Kiskunfélegyháza is a small town in Southern Hungary. Its future was studied, based on 
its population’s expectations until the year 2020, with the aspect of substantiating the 
development plans of the town. The research (Nováky, 2003) concluded that dealing 
with the future has become more important, the future belonged to everyone, so 
everyone should be involved in designing the future. Inhabitants’ opinion was collected 
with a three-round public Delphi method. The three aspects of the questions were the 
following: (1) external processes that influence the town’s societal-economic 
development, (2) forces inherent in the local management and the civil communities’ 
and (3) townspeople’s expectations of the future. The examined intervals were: until 
2005, between the years 2005-2010 and 2010-2020, and after 2020 and never.  
 
The results of the first round show that inhabitants were not particularly innovative, 
they were interested about the future just to break away from the present. Despite this, 
their thoughts about the world were complex and coherent. People were the most 
undecided about the factors on world economics, on the EU and on the labour force. 
The majority thought that most of the events and changes would happen between 2005 
and 2020. They thought that local management is not sufficiently innovative or creative. 
They agreed that the role of civil movements/communities was important, but the 
relationship with the local governance is not successful yet, thus it should be developed. 
At the end of the third round it became clear that they were very uncertain in a lot of 
questions. One of the uncertainties was linked to Hungary’s joining of the European 
Union. The research took place before our EU membership, so people could not know 
what to expect from it, what effects it would have. Some favourable events, like the 
increasing protection of the environment, job creation or canalisation, were considered 
to happen in the distant future. This vast instability means that they did not trust the 
positive influence of certain processes, and this ultimately leads to inactivity.  
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With some answers the participants foresighted the situation of not only 
Kiskunfélegyháza, but of the whole country, like how development projects fell 
through, despite given possibilities. We now know that in present-day Hungary we are 
not able to benefit from various opportunities, economic growth is slow and funds from 
the EU-tenders are not allocated well. Many answers alluded to this, even though we 
were two years from joining the EU and that time the only factor that could turn the 
climate of opinion optimistic about Hungary’s EU membership were the high 
expectations about possible EU support.  
 
Alternative scenarios were designed for the future of Kiskunfélegyháza, based on the 
evaluation of instability and possibilities: like expectations about reliance or fear and 
whether possibilities are appreciated or depreciated. The four alternatives are: 
‘Successful Future’, ‘Pusillanimity’, ‘Confidence’ and ‘Unhappy Future’. 
 
The ‘Successful Future’ turns true, if the development does not run into any material or 
personal obstacles; a preferable scenario. Expectations filled with fear, hinder the 
development in the case of ‘Pusillanimity’, but it can be avoided with a strong guidance 
that overcomes fear and strengthens favourable processes. Its advantage is its risk as 
well: a pusillanimous community can be easily led and used. If ‘Confidence’ rules a 
community the way out from depreciated possibilities is conscious future orientation, 
which can open up new possibilities to for development. In an ‘Unhappy Future’ 
attitude, local development options can fail due to inadequate guidance, illusory 
expectations about EU or other funds, moreover there is no constructive relationship 
between the town governance and the population to resolve this situation. 
 
These alternatives are simplified visions of the future and a mixture of these could 
probably come true. A common feature is that the decision makers have two tasks: 
examination of the stability of processes, to see clearly which ones could be changed 
and which ones are the most sensitive; to shape and making real and conscious the 
future-designing forces and expand the studies of future orientation and improve the 
future-consciousness on this basis. Without these activities the expected development 
will not be successful or it will take more time. But communities and the future cannot 
wait and we have to take actions in the present! 
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Looking for future alternatives for Hungary beyond tomorrow, by using 
participatory futures studies methods  
 
This is the third long-term future image for Hungary, completed in the year 2000. The 
first one was constructed in the early 1970s, focused on the NNP per capita with top-
down approach. The second complex future image, of the mid-1980s, concentrated on 
individual necessities. The third future image of Hungary is the study ‘Hungary beyond 
tomorrow’ (Nováky ed., 2001). Its aim is to find acceptable alternatives for the future, 
instead of finding and shaping the most probable future. In the study more methods are 
used and the results are presented with scenario building, because some facts were 
evident: the emerging and differentiating future orientation of individuals, societal 
institutions and enterprises; the observation of many seeds of change in the present; and 
generally the feeling of the unstable circumstances. The approach is dynamic and 
complex, offering the possibility to top-down and bottom-up observations.  
 
We know from previous examinations of future orientation (Nováky, Hideg, Kappéter, 
1994, Hideg, Nováky, 1998) that in the 1990s people’s future orientation had practical 
reasons: the main goal of the activities was to assure the right future for the family and 
the children, plus to organize the work rationally. Participants did not perceive that hard 
work and other activities was the source of qualitative changes, because they thought it 
was difficult to cope with the circumstances. The future of enterprise orientation is filled 
with fear, and enterprises are thinking and doing very little about the future. 
Consequently, the economic situation and its factors were analysed in ‘Hungary beyond 
tomorrow’.  
 
Different future alternatives were formulated, according to the possibilities of political 
and economic (Hungary and the global world) development. These scenarios or 
versions of the future are not based on trends, but on future possibilities, built upon 
alternativity and instability-based bifurcations. Eight versions of the future were 
developed: all of them were possible, but not all were acceptable for society. The eight 
versions were examined from three other aspects to highlight the question of acceptance 
and support: expectations of joining the EU, changes in values and individual 
aspirations. Hungary’s EU membership divided the population therefore people’s 
relation to the eight versions was not homogenous: hope, pragmatism, ability and 
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disability were the four groups that could be identified. From changes in values another 
four groups were created, based on the idea that similar values were important for 
somebody: new consumer values with varying life-styles; environment-friendly values; 
peace, security of the family, happiness and material welfare; trustworthy, responsible, 
brave, rational and helpful values. People with different values could accept and support 
different versions of the future (Masini, 1994). Individual aspirations as the third aspect 
could be the future of the family and of the children; influencing the future; ‘space-age’ 
perspective; education and work in the future. The eight versions of the future were 
filtered through these three aspect groups, and it emerged that two of the versions (the 
2nd and 7th) were acceptable from some aspects, while everyone was ready to accept one 
of the eight versions (the 1st). This latter one is a future, based on regional integration, 
on economic policy with prominence national interests and on balanced development 
within the European Union. To reduce the high number of versions, another two aspects 
were introduced: possibilities, thence stability or instability of the processes and the 
environment, and expectations that favour changes or not. 
 
In the first alternative, possibilities and expectations are in balance, they are both stable, 
so it causes idleness and postponing actions and changes. In Hungarian we call this the 
‘Pató Pál-effect’, which is similar to the Spanish ‘Maana’: i.e. leave everything for 
tomorrow. The second alternative contains ‘the societal claim for change’ that typically 
generates revolution, without unstable processes, like it happened in Hungary in1848 
and in 1956. The third alternative offers the possibility of change, but with the lack of 
interest surrounding it (due to unfulfilled possibilities and fear of change) – after a while 
this future can be termed ‘the ship has sailed off’. In the fourth alternative, Hungary is 
ready to make favourable changes and societal expectations – ‘the winner takes it all’! 
 
The 2nd and 7th versions, that were termed as ‘partly acceptable’ for everyone were 
collateral with the fourth alternative (possibility of big changes), while the 1st version, 
that everyone could accept, was part of the second alternative (where processes and the 
environment need to be changed). As a consequence we can state that the ability of 
innovation and the presence of future designing forces are definitely necessary for 
reaching a breakthrough.  
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Today we are aware that expectations connected to EU membership were too high, and 
activity was lacking to make changes happen. The study on ‘Hungary beyond 
tomorrow’ projected this drawback. The only way to change the future is to think about 
it, then take action for it. The activities can be followed by expectations, but 
expectations without action will not change anything. 
 
Methodological experiences for technology foresight 
 
We are of the view that our methodological experience gained while leading social 
foresight activity can also be applicable in the field of technology foresight. Technology 
foresight consists not only of a list of new possible scientific solutions, embedded in 
technology novelty, but also of new socio-economic relations to technology and its 
development and  human acceptance of possible new technology. The latter two 
relations are of particular importance if technology foresight is carried out. Human 
relations to technology foresight could be strengthened by taking into consideration of 
our methodological experiences.  
 
1. In social foresight projects discussed, working with participatory tools 
developed in critical futures studies were preferred to involve stakeholders, 
including non-professionals as well, and to integrate their future expectations 
into the future shaping process. The main aim of methodological solutions thus 
developed was to produce synergy between future thoughts and expectations of 
professional and non-professional stakeholders.  
2. Stakeholders have different ideas and expectations depending on their future 
orientation and position in the system, their future is the object of foresight. 
Their ideas and expectations constitute building blocks in foresight activity and 
vice versa the ideas and expectation of stakeholders develop by participation in 
foresight activity. 
3. Given that stakeholders are competent in different scope of issues therefore their 
involvement in the foresight procedure should be achieved in different ways 
depending on the aim, task and object of foresight activity. 
4. Important are not only the typical future thoughts of stakeholders, but also the 
extreme ones, if they can become the object of discussion and generate new 
future alternatives during the process. Therefore, maintaining the right and 
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possibility of freedom of speech and free expression of opinion, is the focal point 
of the whole foresight procedure. 
5. Both direct and indirect subjective methods should be used for exploring, 
generating and applying future thoughts of stakeholders. 
6. Comparative analysis of futures ideas and expectations opens the way to look 
for consistency and inconsistency among stakeholders’ opinions. Dialogue 
among stakeholders can serve both consensus building and mapping of future 
alternatives. 
7. Futures workshops help to highlight potential conflicts among stakeholders that 
can ultimately lead forward to another trajectory, which is different from the 
present one. 
8. Neither scientific experts nor futurists are able to find out or invent the future, 
but they can contribute to outlining the framework of possible futures.  
9. Dialogue between scientific experts and different stakeholders, also helps to 
bridge distances between scientific and practical knowledge about the future. 
10. Dialogue has proved to be a useful means to generate reflexive learning and 
knowledge production regarding the future.  
11. Methodology and methods used are also dependent on the aim and object of 
foresight. There is not one good foresight procedure and combination of 
methods for all purposes.  
12. Search for further opportunities of stakeholder participation in foresight 
activity, should be an important research topic for futurists. 
13. Laymen are mature enough to articulate their opinions and their future 
expectations, while futurists, using the tools of academic futures studies, can 
open the process and involve them in helping to develop future alternatives and 
foresight specialists.  
 
Notes 
 
1 This study is based on the presentation ‘Methodological Experiences in Hungarian 
Foresight Activities’ held at 5th workshop of the Forum ‘Foresight, Roadmapping and 
Governance’ (7-8 December 2007, Budapest) organised by Forschungszentrum 
Karlsruhe, Florida Institute of Technology and the Hungarian National Commission For 
UNESCO. 
Methodological Experiences in Hungarian Foresight Activities 
 
 
172 
2 The name of this institute has been changed. The National Institute of Vocational and 
Adult Education is the legal successor of the National Institute of Vocational Education 
from the beginning of the year 2007. 
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When Online Models Cross Real-Time Inquiry on Early 
Forms of Change 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In our world deep changes have been affecting different areas of complex society, 
values and our relationship to them for more than a decade in Hungary. Changes are not 
only ‘happen’ to us, but also – due to the democratic system change and increasing 
instability – we have the opportunity to form the changes according to our goals and 
values. For this we must constantly track the changes and signals of change within our 
environment. 
 
New information technique provides new conditions, which we might and should live 
with. We have to constantly track, interpret, analyse and evaluate information might 
signal changes and draw conclusions from them towards the future i.e. to construct 
different futures. Conclusions and expectations should not only be conceived to just one 
area and topic. Transforming and restructuring interrelationships among different fields 
and topics must be tracked constantly. Therefore it is necessary to focus on the future 
images again, as we might interpret and evaluate different changes in tendencies and 
signals of change relating one another. However, this kind of future image building does 
not mean the formulation of a distant, desirable future image, but a permanently updated 
complex set of future variants and future image alternatives, which are ambiguous from 
the aspect of our possibilities as well as our goals, values and activity intentions.  
Furthermore they depend on, how other social actors relate to their opportunities, and 
future shaping activities.  
 
In an unstable period we have to carry out these analyses and produce forecast and 
foresight information applying new procedure and also methods quite different from 
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older ones, along with making the process constant and rapid. Moreover it is essential 
and desirable that re-constructed future images should form the basis for activities of 
individual and institutional foresight, and the procedures of online future image re-
construction might be applied to test individual and community foresight as well. 
 
Based on the results of our earlier researches (Nováky ed., 2001, Hideg ed., 2001) in our 
paper we would like to show: 
 
- how it is possible to permanently refresh Hungarian future images within the 
environment of information technology, 
- how we might explore, perceive changes or their signals and determine the 
possible fields of change and give meaning them, or construct from them emergent 
social possibilities amid the circumstances of constant instability and changes. 
 
Methodological considerations 
 
There are many reasons for re-construction of a future image in a new way. We focus 
on only one main reason, namely whether changes can be happened in the future (in the 
objective tendencies) and/or our future conception/meaning (i.e. subjective judgements) 
is changing or not.  
 
What we do not suggest? 
 
If we approach to the future exclusively in a subjective way, we would intend to outline 
either the desirable future, or anticipate only catastrophic situations exaggerating threats 
and dangers. If we conceptualize the future as a set of desirable alternatives, we would 
intend to see only the favourable part of it. So we exclude the non-desirable alternatives. 
If we interpret the future as a series of negative situations, we would have to go without 
recording desirable alternatives (FOR-LEARN project, Miles, 1997). Approaching to the 
future only by subjective foundations means that we disregard the objective 
characteristics of unfolding processes. 
 
However, if we approach to the future in an objective way, exclusively focussing on 
presence and continuation of processes, then subjective point of view will be de-
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emphasized. If we concentrate only on objectively emerging phenomena, which we see 
with high probability, then we might get into the trouble that we only seek the most 
probable future variant. In this case we conceptualize forecast as prediction, and we 
exclude the less probable variants. 
 
Concentrating on subjective hopes or objective factors might in itself lead to a wrong 
way, as it restricts the set of future variants/alternatives. On the fertile ground of 
instability, when the future might unfold in many ways, this approach is not right. 
Therefore nowadays it is not reasonable to draw only desirable future images or 
catastrophic situations, and there is no room to predict the probable future (Hideg, 2002, 
Skumanich, Silbernagel, 1997).  
 
What we suggest? 
 
In our world with numerous changes we have to think in another way. We should not 
see just the desirable future, but we have to face non-favourable ones as well. We 
should not foresee only the well interpretable future unfolding from the past with high 
probability, but also uncertain, not yet formed futures, having weak signals, but which 
can turn up as possible alternatives, and can later be realized as a consequence of human 
future-shaping factors (Inayatullah, 2000).  
 
It should be cleared that objective processes and human sphere might change as an 
effect of external and internal (self-organizing) forces as well, and these changes 
interrelate with one another. As a result of them new situations might come to pass, 
which are relatively difficult to ‘hold in hand’. Therefore it is necessary to recognize, 
whether processes have changing capability, and if so, then what kind. At the same time 
we have to be aware of the possibility to intervene into the processes, i.e. whether 
human actions might change the flow of examined processes, and if so, then which 
activities of certain social groups play an important role within this (Inayatullah, 2002). 
 
Hence, at present times it is reasonable to examine first whether process are formable 
and changeable (i.e. whether they sensitively react to impacts, especially to small 
impacts), and second what future-shaping capability and power the individual and 
institutional human sphere with different values has (Slaughter, 2004). Examining 
When Online Models Cross Real-Time Inquiry on Early Forms of Change 
 
 
178
consequently the stability/instability of processes and the future orientation of 
individuals and institutions is of great importance. 
 
In our unstable world the question is not only, where we might go (on the level of 
recognized possibilities), but also where we should go (taking into account objectives 
and expectations) (Slaughter, 2004). Alternative characteristics of eternal objective and 
their elaboration are increasing, as there is an opportunity to move towards different 
directions in the era of high uncertainties. Relationship between objectives, future 
possibilities, future images and paths towards them must be drawn in a way quite 
different from the past. This has to be done in an idiosyncratic situation, on the ground 
of permanent transformation, when neither future images, nor direction of change could 
characteristically be outlined. Recognizing and managing changes, however, might help 
to establish development directions to societies and economies, and to seek desirable, or 
at least still acceptable development paths (Nováky ed., 2001). 
 
Amid present unstable circumstances we cannot construct either a theoretically 
underpinned, desirable or the most probable future image. In our world with deep 
changes we might only think in future images, future alternatives capable of adapting to 
changing conditions, ourselves and values. Continuous and up-to-date elaboration of 
them is a challenging job, however today we are able to tackle this problem (Karp, 
2004). We might only rule processes and changes, if we recognize, how deep and in 
what directions they might change, or they simply show arbitrary fluctuations. 
Recognizing the possibility of changes we might consider the form of intervention and 
alteration. 
 
Possible future images and future alternatives might effectively be explored following a 
two-way approach: we examine first the stability/instability of processes and changes, 
second the future orientation of individuals and social institutions as social filters 
(Nováky ed., 2001). Elements of the two-way approach should naturally be linked in an 
interrelated way to provide information underpinning strategy. 
 
Arising future images, i.e. future image alternatives should meet the expectations and 
challenges of the future, and the changes of the values, value systems. Therefore it is 
essential to somehow link economic competitiveness with social security, to mutually 
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interpret economic growth, social innovation, together with social, community level, 
institutional and individual adaptation in case of all future alternatives. Acceptability of 
future image alternatives draws the criterion that they should provide development 
latitude to society and its members, so they have to inspire individual and community 
level foresight, and enable to form and to move on different development paths. 
 
Following the traditional way of thinking and methods of futures studies we might get 
only to a narrow set of future alternatives. Renewed futures studies methodology and 
methods, however, enables to give adequate foresight on the basis of practical futures 
studies and new scientific results. According to our researches general evolutionary 
theory and chaos theory might provide the two new theoretical-methodological 
frameworks, on the basis of which new kinds of responses might be given to emerging 
questions quite different from the past (Nováky ed., 1995, Hideg ed., 2001, Hideg, 
2006). General evolutionary theory might verbally show the transformation from 
stability to instability, the emerging bifurcation mechanisms and the range of possible 
futures. It might help to answer, what kind of evolutionary possibilities and patterns of 
the future be explored and presented among complexities including subjectivity. Chaos 
theory is able to tackle chaotic behaviour derived from instability, together with its 
consequences. It provides the key to explore evolutionary paths and helps to answer 
whether a time series behaves stable or unstable. Sketching new emerging situations 
amid instability not only facilitates clearity among the variety of possible future paths, 
but also systematically generates them applying idiosyncratic quantitative methods. 
Chaos theory is significant, as it assists to identify conditions, among which the future 
state of the examined system cannot be followed in the traditional way. It might also 
help to recognize, how chaotic behaviour might be directed into a seemingly stable path. 
The subject of future image is seen as a complex emerging social system (Sawyer, 
2005) whose future cannot be forecasted but the fields of its change can be explored, the 
signals and early forms of social change and possible consequences of their cross 
impacts can be meant and constructed in this way.  
 
We are aware of that the objective-way approach is not purely objective: it is also 
weighted by human meaning. Similarly, the subjective-way approach carries in itself the 
impacts of outer worlds as well. Therefore our aim is to intertwine these two 
exaggerative approaches with one other in the process of shaping future images and in 
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the environment of information technology. This context makes possible to interpret the 
future in a dialectic way (Fuchs, Hofkircher, Klauninger, 2002) and formulate a new, 
more direct relationship with it in the practice. Society – actors, stakeholders, 
individuals – plays more and more important role in shaping the future (Hoffman, 
1993), hence we interpret the social future not only as a consequence of the past and the 
present, but that is shaped or constructed by social entities’ actions. New individual and 
institutional values and expectations, as seeds of change, are reflected in future 
alternatives, which make the permanent maintenance and refreshment essential.  
 
Re-creation of future images that can be updated – providing information basis 
 
Online application of procedures and methods enables to provide information about the 
future rapidly and easily, test possible consequences of different expectations for the 
future, and store and reuse future information, future images in the framework of 
different foresight and educational activities. We organized our researches and selected 
methods in accordance with these methodological fundamentals. Our methods are 
interesting not in themselves, but in their interlinked and online application. 
 
Steps of research activity 
 
During our researches we first determined the information basis, the application of 
which would guarantee the achievement of our goals, i.e. a wide variety of future image 
alternatives might be constructed, and the set of information is relevant both for strategy 
formulation and changing future orientation purposes. Furthermore it was important to 
make information available in qualitative and quantitative forms, the latter also as 
online database. At the same time we wanted to have not only these information in the 
database, but a more wide range, as our imagination involved that this information basis 
should be able to form multiple future image alternatives following other aspects 
(Nováky, 2006).  
 
Establishing online analytical, forecast and foresight information we laid emphasis on 
the stability-examination of selected time-series. We carried out the examinations not 
only relating to historical data, but also to the extrapolations of different trendfunctions, 
taking into account, how the data-series might behave in terms of stability assuming 
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different expectations. The choice of development functions were expanded by 
nonlinear difference equations, as they play an important role in the stability-
examination. This kind of stability-examination might answer the question, whether and 
how the trend can change, if new, future data are built into the data-series. 
 
Our other analytical-forecast examination was directed to explore possible relationships 
and their stability between information with different features, i.e. to what extent the 
data is sensitive, and how they might change time by time. 
 
We analyzed relationships not only on the basis of data available in the database, but we 
also collected actual information on future orientation of Hungarian society in the 
framework of an online survey. The results were feeded back into the database and 
applied during the creation of future images alternatives. On the occasion of 
refreshment – the re-creation of futures images alternatives – all the procedure needs to 
repeat.  
 
The role of World in Figures 
 
To carry out analytical and foresight examinations we used ‘World in Figures’ (WiF) 
(Vág, Hideg, 2004). ‘World in Figures’ is an online system of statistical databases 
extended with a couple of basic and advanced analyzing tools. This online knowledge-
base with direct access to a great amount of numerical data is a gateway to an integrated 
statistical database containing global, country and sub-country level information. The 
instruments and techniques of WiF help the user to discover associations between 
variables and manage ‘what-if’ type questions related to socio-economic development, 
environment, governance and human behaviour. With its wide scope, the project 
provides a solid background to describe possible future alternatives.  
 
The innovation of WiF can be described as (1) a wide range of data about different 
fields of life; (2) thousands of variables and millions of records available; (3) immediate 
access to results; (4) online statistical modules; and (5) advanced output to show or 
download the results. Apart from the data access, it offers modelling options, too. The 
online analyzer has basic and advanced functions, it contains data presentation and 
visualization modules, forecasting functions and downloading options. Data access is 
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free, except for some research and business statistics. Moreover: the user can find 
specific time series and methodological descriptions of the variables as well. WiF helps 
researchers, analysts and futurists in the field of science, education or business, with a 
new and effective online service, which facilitates the understanding of human life, 
accelerates the discovery of hidden causal relationships etc.  
 
WiF shows signs of integrating the ‘traditional’ variable-based analyses with some new 
modelling tools, like chaos models or multi-agent-models. Additionally, it contributes to 
the creation of a ‘floating’ modelling philosophy, which is the option of flexible 
selection of analytical and simulation tools, depending on the problem. A modelling tool 
of that kind implies high level of interactivity. This approach provides further 
opportunities, for example the access to the results by the large audience. Interactivity 
facilitates the permanent development of WiF project, e.g. with data supply and 
discussions. In this way ‘floating’ philosophy can be seen as a new synthesis of different 
modelling methods. 
 
The Demo Modelling Tool of WiF provides an easy to understand presentation of the 
tool. It is developed for online model construction. (See link to Demo models at WiF 
homepage (WiF) and Figure 1.) 
 
The online model builder and data analyzer of WiF, is a JAVA application and it is 
integrated with a statistical data browser. To illustrate the functionality of the online 
analyzer and forecaster, a dialog panel of it is shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 1. The display of WiFs online model-building tool 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A dialog window of WiF’s statistical data analyzer 
 
 
 
 
The re-creation of the Hungarian future image  
 
The aim of re-creation was to highlight the changing possibilities and expectations 
about futures of Hungary until 2010. For this purpose we wanted to collect future 
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related information both in subjective and objective ways. We also managed the 
interconnection of these two kinds of data.  Future related opinions and expectations 
were gathered, e.g. (1) life conditions, (2) social inaqualities, (3) economy and (4) the 
sustainable development in Hungary, via an online survey. The survey sample consisted 
of  leading Hungarian opinion shaping groups, like journalists, university teachers, 
scientists, company leaders, etc.  The survey topics were extended with data and models 
of WiF. Some of the analyzed indicators were as follows: 
 
- computers (per 1,000 people) 
- Internet hosts (per 10,000 people) 
- yearly growth of gross value added at market prices as % of previous year 
- GDP per capita in PPP, in international USD (million USD) 
- price indices of consumer products and services 
- unemployment rate (%) 
- average gross earnings of employees in industry and services, total 
(ECU/month) 
- thefts of private cars per 100,000 people 
- LIS Inequality Indices (gini) 
- population growth (annual%) 
- life expectancy at birth (years) 
- GDP per unit of energy use (PPP USD per kg of oil equivalent) 
- emission of carbon dioxide (metric tons per capita) 
- production of renewable energy, as share of total production of primary energy 
 
The time series of the above indicators were online analysed in the aspect of 
stability/instability. 
      
Results of time series’ stability-analyses and views of opinion forming groups were 
processed in the framework of an expertial foresight workshop. During this workshop 
making interconneciton of future information of two types and giving meanings of them 
were carried out. In the workshop we examined 
 
- in which fields changes are expected, 
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- what kind of changes are possible, if we simultaneously take into account 
instability of trends and different views of opinion forming groups, 
- how different and possible changes might associated with each other, and  
- what kind of complex future image alternatives might be considered from them 
for the next 5 years. 
 
Fields of change 
 
Seeds of change were sought in unstable trends, and in different future imaginations 
together with their relationships of university students and active white-collars (opinion 
forming groups) being committed towards the future. Changes are mostly expected in 
areas where trends are unstable, and at the same time future imaginations significantly 
differ from one another. Nature of changes were concluded from subjective future 
attitudes, possible actions derived from expectations and value content of expectations. 
If we found relationship between trend-stability and significantly different future 
expectations, we regarded the possibility and characteristics of changes as unstable or 
uncertain that could generate social conflicts. 
 
Trends of social and economic indicators, distribution of information techniques and 
technologies, population number, social inequalities and deviances show stability. In the 
next 5 years further spread of information techniques and technologies is expected, at 
the same time other social and economic processes have stable negative tendency. 
Indicators of expected lifetime, unemployment, economic growth, real wages, inflation, 
raw material- and energy request show the signs of instability.  
 
Future expectations of opinion forming groups are similar in the sense that information 
techniques and technologies are continue to spread to a greater extent, domestic 
population number decreases further, the role of local communities will grow and 
environmental awareness will become better in people’s behaviour. 
 
Different dominant opinions were formed by university students under 25 and white-
collars between 26-40 in the fields of increasing living standards, decreasing social 
inequalities, economic growth and inflation. University students under 25 
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unambiguously expect further worsening in these fields, whereas white-collars between 
26-40 look forward to positive changes. 
 
However, students under 25 are more optimistic in environmental issues. They hope and 
expect a significantly growing domestic use of wind energy and alternative firing 
material in the next 5 years. At the same time they rely on politicians to a smaller extent 
in increasing environmental awareness than white-collars between 26-40. 
 
Uncertainty appears in one field. Convergence of domestic wages to EU average is not 
underpinned by analysed indicators to the manner that opinion forming groups 
expected. 
 
Trend instabilities and different subjective imaginations per age-groups appear in the 
same fields. They show that Hungarian society and economy is still in the 
transformational period began at the time of political system change. The 
transformational direction is information society, however, its human quality and 
economic productivity is still in an unfolding form and is expected to stay in the next 5 
years. Seeds of change in the next 5 years are mostly available in human factors and 
attitudes represented by the age-group of 26-40. Unfortunately age-group under 25 does 
not see the chance that positive changes might go forth in domestic society and 
economy. If socio-economic indicators decrease at a high measure, then they might not 
only meet with pessimist attitudes of the age-group of under 25, but generate dispare 
and open social conflicts as well. It is positive, however, that they represent more 
environmental-aware values than the older generation. From the attitude of long-term 
future this is a favourable human factor and source of change. 
 
Re-created image alternatives – Hungary in 2010 
 
Hungary accessed to a regional integration, the countries of which have higher 
development level. Their economies grow slower, while their welfare system and 
attitude to natural environment is to be changed or amended. Outlooks of domestic 
economic growth are not stable. It is probable that we cannot achieve a stable growing 
trajectory in the next 5 years, unless positive external impulses affect domestic 
economy. These external resources might also come from different EU funds.  
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Domestic inflation and unemployment is not expected to have a decreasing tendency in 
the near future. Social inequalities will increase further, while population number will 
decrease and life expectancy will surely not rise unbroken. We cannot significantly 
reduce our development gap. Opinions and expectations expressed in the questionnaire 
to moderate wage-differences between Hungary and EU countries is not underpinned by 
data and changes concluded from them. 
 
The future of our environmental charging depends on economic growth and 
environmental intensity of economic development. If economic growth is realized on 
the basis of growing information economy, we would not have to count with further 
worsening. However, if industry and agriculture are the main drivers of growth, then 
environmental charging will grow together with GDP per capita. 
 
Evaluating the possibilities of domestic social development in the framework of online 
surveying and database we took into account two important presumptions. The first one 
is globalization, as a consequence of which thoughts of follower development in the 
future became meaningless. Globalization spreads every challenges and new solutions 
throughout the world almost immediately therefore we should not assume that we could 
go through all development levels in the future which were characteristic to the 
developed world. Every society must react to the challenges of globalization: they either 
formulate positive response reactions, or they have to bear them. The second 
assumption is that – accessing to the EU – we formally became a member of a cultural 
region, which – apart from adaptation – might bring new possibilities for the future. The 
latter is to be emphasized thoroughly, because if we do not count with the enhancement 
of future-shaping range and the openness of future, then we might only anticipate 
adaptation to external constraints in the future. Our long-run future is invariably open, 
therefore it is a matter of domestic society, how and to what form they can and wish to 
shape it. 
 
On the basis of analyses, forecasts, subjective future judgements and expertial foresight 
workshops we summarized possible changes in Hungary for the next 5 years in two 
alternative future images. 
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Getting into periphery 
 
According to the forecasts and imaginations of social opinion forming groups, 
information society is still a part of reality also in Hungary however it takes a dual form 
due to our development level and idiosyncratic domestic circumstances. Unfolding of 
information society is halting, limited and sticking, operation of economy and social 
institutions is characterized by applied industrial and information driven industrial 
technologies. Rapid social transformations and our helplessness towards globalization 
have brought down our social capital. If this erosion pursues and accession to the union 
demands further adaptation victims, then we might be crowded out to the periphery of 
Europe, even if our traditional development indicators might advance by adaptation. 
Social problems might strengthen, social inequalities might increase. The next 
generation will only be able to inherit severance. Internal social conflicts might become 
durable, hopelessness might become general, inertia and helplessness might come, pass 
not only towards globalization, but also towards the interests of the European Union. 
 
Moving towards membership of the developed Europe 
 
Positive expectations appearing in data and opinion forming forces give the hope that 
we might assume the unfolding of an alternative, which rises Hungary to a part of the 
developed Europe, both in economic and social sense (not just politically). This might 
only be realized, if positive economic and social indicators developed durably further, 
and favourable changes took place within the reduction of negative attributes. This is 
unimaginable without the requisition of additional external resources. These resources 
are not limited to classical capital injection. It is essential that we take part in different 
development programmes of European Union (eEurope, sustainable development etc.), 
and make use of funds actively and prospectively. Furthermore, responsible 
imaginations and activities of inhabitants, social communities and institutions for the 
future must gain an increasing role in society. Governmental and local policy should 
support, help and build upon these individual and local initiatives. Politics should 
inspire the distribution of responsible and active life-form, and the corroboration of 
environmental-awareness and solidarity in civil communities. Traditional solutions of 
welfare states cannot be probably applied to solve the problem of increasing social 
inequalities amid the circumstances of globalization and information society. 
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The two outlined ways faced by domestic economy and society show that Hungarian 
society and economy have the opportunity to choose between many pathways. In making 
use of possibilities provided by the latitude, renewal of socio-economic processes and 
renewing, creative power of human factors are essential.  
 
Conclusions 
 
It was showed a procedure in which the objective and subjective approaches were 
intertwined into a two-way approach for creation of future images. In this context online 
stability/instability analysis was done instead of simply trend extrapolation. Subjective 
future opinions and expectations were questioned in a way that questions were referred 
to the subjects of stability/instability analyses instead of questioning desirable future 
expectations of opinion forming groups. Changes are mostly expected in areas where 
trends are unstable, and at the same time future imaginations significantly differ from 
one another. A learning process was generated in this way. The renewed knowledge is 
embodied in our modified methodology and methods applied on the one hand and in the 
renewed and quickly refreshable future images information on the other hand.  
 
Our procedure and results of this case study can be used by different social groups, 
decision makers, learners’ groups etc, via the Internet, to develop their future images, to 
plan actions and for other purposes. The re-created future image alternatives can 
become the subject of further communication about the Hungarian future images. The 
procedure itself gives possibility to quickly renew future images conceptions of users. 
The research presented above shows neither the whole Hungarian population nor the 
opinion leaders’ view. The main purpose of it was to demonstrate the usage of a web-
based tool and the integration of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ foresight methods. 
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Strategy Analysis and Creation by Simulation – An 
Experimental Case in the General Game1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There are many cases when we cannot give a theoretically good answer such as in the 
case of the General Game (Mérı, 2007). One player’s success depends on the number of 
players, on all the strategies they give one-by-one, not to mention the fact that we don’t 
have any previous information about their behaviour. In this paper we try to find a 
solution for these uncertain situations through solving the General Game problem by 
simulation. 
 
We do not know the number of players, neither are we aware of their behaviour in the 
General Game, but if we had a good parameterized model for analyzing the possible 
behaviour of the whole group, then we could attain good solutions which could 
significantly outperform the average. This issue can be observed in a variety of fields 
throughout the world. People face this kind of problem when trying to optimize the 
marketing budget of a party among the districts (Merolla, Munger, Tofias, 2000). But 
many enterprises could face the same situation when there is a market which was ruled 
by a big monopoly, but where the monopoly disappears, and many competitive 
enterprises join the market and there is no relevant, available information, the only thing 
that remains is wide scale competition. 
 
The attributions of the General Game 
 
There are many types of what we call ‘The General Game’. The Colobel Blotto’s game 
(Partington, 2002) is the most well known. However we have created a bigger and more 
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complex problem, with slightly different rules based on Mérı’s ideas (Mérı, 2007). 
There are 12 towns that you can occupy with a total of 120 soldiers. There are two 
players in each game and both produce a strategy which details the number of soldiers 
they send to each town.  The town’s rule is that you cannot send more soldiers to one 
town, than the number of soldiers you sent to the previous town. This means that if you 
sent 30 soldiers to the first town, you cannot send more than 30 soldiers to the second 
town. 
 
There are two strategies playing against each other in each game, points are gained after 
the towns they occupy. 5 points are given after a town is occupied, which means that the 
occupier sent more soldiers than the opposite player. In the case when the opposite 
player has not sent any soldiers to that town, then that town is worth only 1 point. In the 
case where both players sent the same number of soldiers to a town, players are awarded 
2-2 points. Nobody is awarded points if a town has not been issued with soldiers. 
Everybody has to produce one strategy in the competition, and this strategy plays 
against every other strategy one by one. The final rank is based on the total points that 
one player achieves from all games that he played. 
 
Table 1. Example how to calculate the points of the General Game 
 
Towns 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
A’s strategy 15 15 15 15 10 10 10 10 8 8 4 0 
B’s strategy 30 30 15 15 6 6 6 6 6 0 0 0 
             
A’ points 0 0 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 0 
B’ points 5 5 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
In this example A gets 0+0+2+2+5+5+5+5+5+1+1+0=31 points and B gets 
5+5+2+2+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+0 = 14points. If there is ‘n’ number of player then A and B 
have to play ‘n-1’ games like this and the final rank comes from the total points they got 
from these ‘n-1’ games. 
 
First of all there is in no dominant strategy. Each strategy could hypothetically be the 
winning formula. (See proof in the Appendix!) To create a winning strategy in the 
competition, we should be aware of all the strategies that are in use. We naturally 
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cannot gain such information, and even if we could obtain all the other strategies, with 
hundreds of players, it would still be a very complex mathematical problem. 
 
When this game was created by Mérı with very similar rules, he wanted to observe the 
perfect mixture of competition and cooperation. In this General Game if we send 
soldiers to numerous towns, it means that we cooperate with the others, because the 
other players also want to gain more points. If we concentrate our soldiers into the first 
towns, it means that we are more competitive and we want to defeat our opponents, 
rather than collect more points. The most cooperative strategy is if we send 10 soldiers 
to all the 12 towns. It can be very efficient for cooperating, but it can be abused very 
easily at the same time. 
 
Choosing competition or cooperation could be the key problem of any strategy maker in 
this game. There is another notable problem in relation to this question, the iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod, 2006). A similar question was raised, which asked about 
the amount of competition and the amount of cooperation we should use in the well-
known prisoner’s dilemma if it is iterated. The Tit-for Tat strategy turned out to be the 
best, which tries to cooperate, but if the other is not willing to collaborate, his behaviour 
will revert immediately to competition. According to the experience of the Iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma we could think that we will find something similar to this in the 
General Game. We should cooperate, but compete a little at the same time. 
 
There are several experiments for Colonel Blotto’s game (Merolla, Munger, Tofias, 
2000), but there are very important differences in our rules (non-increasing the number 
of soldiers) which makes it incomparable. But László Mérı conducted some 
experiments on little groups with slightly different rules. There were only 12 soldiers in 
that game, not 120. He found that ‘the winning’ strategy was to send 2 soldiers to the 
first six towns. In three different small groups, experiments showed the same result. He 
interpreted this as the balance of competition and cooperation. The players cooperated 
half way, but they competed as well with each other. 
 
We have already seen that there is no dominant strategy and that even when knowing all 
the other strategies, it is hard to determine a winner strategy. However we are unaware 
of all the strategies, neither are we conscious of the number of the players. In this case 
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we could analyze the competition with only two players. With proof in the Appendix we 
can demonstrate that there is no pure Nash equilibrium. There must be a mixed Nash 
equilibrium (Forgó, Pintér, Simonovits, Solymosi, 2005), but each player has more than 
76 million possible strategies. In this case even with a computer, it would be hard to 
calculate the mixed Nash equilibrium. Not to mention a case where we have hundreds 
of players, and we do not know the number of players either. Given these facts we chose 
to use the method of simulations, and we do not want to find an optimal solution, rather 
a ‘good’ one. A Good solution is a strategy, if it gets more points than the average plus 
its variation. 
 
The General Game based on the simulation approach  
 
The Monte Carlo simulation is well-known from the Monte Carlo location, and its 
gambling history. In the Second World War it became a very popular method to analyze 
complex problems (Metropolis, 1978). This method is efficient to use when the 
complexity of the problem consumes the capacity of the calculation. We used Excel to 
build up our simulation, which satisfies all the conditions for random numbers that is 
required2. 
 
We used a 500 strategies sample in our analysis.  Two types of strategies were 
generated: one was a cooperative and another was a competitive type of strategy. The 
sample always contained only these types of strategies. We call the cooperative type of 
strategy ‘Independent Uniform Distribution’ (from now on ‘IUD’) and the competitive 
type of strategy ‘Digressive’. 
 
In this case we used the IUD strategy to generate 12 numbers then we normalized their 
sum to 120 and put them into a non-increasing order to attain an appropriate strategy. In 
this case the number of soldiers sent to any town is around 10 with a decreasing order. 
Figure 1 illustrates 245 strategies which were generated by the cooperative strategies 
method. 
 
We can see the 245 strategies on the X-scale and we can see the number of soldiers on 
the Y-scale. The 12 different dots show the number of the soldiers in the 12 different 
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towns. Because of the method, it is evident that the biggest number represents the 
number of soldiers in the first town. 
 
Figure 1. Generated sample by IUD (245 strategies) 
 
 
Generating Digressive strategy in this case we take an interval of 0-120 with a uniform 
distribution and we generate a number (called x) out of it. Then from 0-(120-x) we 
make another random number with the same method. And we generate 12 numbers like 
this. Usually at the end they are 0. We put then into a non-increasing order to get an 
appropriate strategy. (See the Figure 2.) 
 
In the Figure 2 we see 245 digressive strategies. On the X-scale the strategies on the Y-
scale the number of soldiers can be seen and the 12 different dots represent the 12 
towns. We can see that most of the soldiers are concentrated in the first 3-4 towns. 
Comparing to the IUD strategy, the Digressive strategy has a much more variations and 
they focus usually on the first 8 towns. It means that the Digressive strategies are more 
competitive than IUD strategies because it usually does not send any soldier to the last 
four towns. But the IUD strategy almost always sends at least 1 or 2 soldiers to each 
town. 
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Figure 2. Generated sample by Digressive method 
 
 
 
Set of the strategy samples and finding good strategies 
 
In reconstructing the real strategy sample, it is crucial to find good solutions to analyze 
and create appropriate strategy samples. We observe strategy samples which consist 
only of IUD or/and Digressive strategies. So a strategy cluster can consist of 100% IUD 
or Digressive strategies but can also consist of a mixture of IUD and Digressive 
strategies, too.  
 
We can see a strategy sample in Figure 3 which consists of 85% IUD and 15% 
Digressive strategies. From now on we will classify the clusters by the percentage of 
IUD strategies. As in the previous example we attained an 85% IUD cluster. We cannot 
determine an optimal strategy, not even a method that could determine generally 
optimal strategies, because it always depends on the specific sample. We define the 
good strategy in a given sample with a given mixture of IUD and Digressive methods, 
which as strategies can win at least five times in different but the same mixture of 
samples. We find a good solution by simulations where we create a sample with a given 
mixture, then choose the winning strategy. We keep this strategy and create another 
Gábor Neszveda, Fang Xin 
 
 
197
sample. If this strategy wins then we keep it. If another wins then we keep the new 
winner. We do it until one strategy wins five times in a row. 
 
Figure 3. Generated of IUD sample in 85% 
 
 
Table 2. Optimized strategies on different samples 
 
X 
FAE 
% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 0% 24 22 19 15 13 6 5 5 4 3 2 2 
2 5% 25 23 21 17 11 7 6 5 2 1 1 1 
3 10% 21 20 20 19 15 7 4 3 3 3 3 2 
4 15% 20 19 19 18 15 13 4 3 3 3 2 1 
5 20% 20 20 19 14 14 13 5 4 3 3 3 2 
6 25% 20 20 18 17 14 13 11 2 2 1 1 1 
7 30% 18 18 17 15 14 13 13 3 3 2 2 2 
8 35% 19 19 18 14 14 12 10 3 3 3 3 2 
9 40% 20 20 18 17 14 13 11 2 2 1 1 1 
10 45% 21 19 18 17 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 4 
11 50% 18 18 17 15 15 12 11 3 3 3 3 2 
12 55% 21 19 18 17 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 4 
13 60% 13 13 12 12 12 12 11 10 9 7 5 4 
14 65% 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 9 9 7 6 4 
15 70% 13 13 13 13 13 12 11 11 8 6 4 3 
16 75% 13 13 13 13 13 12 12 9 7 6 6 3 
17 80% 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 9 9 7 6 4 
18 85% 13 13 13 13 13 12 12 9 7 6 6 3 
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19 90% 13 13 13 13 13 12 12 9 7 6 6 3 
20 95% 14 13 13 13 13 12 11 9 8 6 5 3 
21 100% 13 13 13 13 13 13 11 10 7 6 4 4 
 
In this table we can find a good strategy for each mixture sample on a scale of 5%. It is 
interesting to see that in each case a good strategy sent soldiers to each town, even in the 
totally competitive one, in the 0% sample 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
 
Even though finding a good strategy is a very uncertain method in itself. It truly 
depends on the rate of the sample mixture. In the sensitivity analysis we observe that 
one strategy is based on the extent of sensitivity to change in the sample mixture. We 
use the scale of 5% or 10% of rate of mixture in our analysis. 
 
According to our simulations and analysis, a good strategy is not sensitive to the sample 
size but the rate of mixture. We have created a program to analyze this problem which 
makes 11 samples with different rate of mixture and compiles statistics about a strategy 
in each case. In Table 3 we can see the strategy all 10’s performance in each case. So 
the strategy which sends 10 soldiers into each town achieves this result. 
 
Table 3. The ’all 10’ strategy performance in different samples 
 
FAE 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 
Points 10377,67 10743,33 11096,33 11396,67 11825,33 
Sin Failure 1,800% 10,000% 19,733% 28,000% 36,067% 
FtF Failure 16,9% 19,9% 21,3% 25,3% 28,7% 
Opp. AVG 5853 6308 6883 7436 8239 
Opp. StDev 2111 2626 3078 3362 3692 
Effectiveness 214,2% 168.9'0 136,9% 117,8% 97,2% 
 
50% 6O% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
12195 12680 12982 13406 13944 13922 
42,133% 47,600% 50,600% 51,600% 43,800% 57,400% 
31,1% 34,2% 37,0% 40,6% 40,2% 50,6% 
9020 9988 10792 11740 12826 13837 
3834 3923 3770 3566 2849 1041 
82,8% 68,6% 58,1% 46,7% 39,2% 8,2% 
 
FAE represents the percentage of IUD strategy type. 
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Points represent the points that the given strategy attained. 
Str Failure represents the percentage of strategies which had better total points, than 
the given strategy. 
FtF Failure represents the percentage of strategies which could beat the given strategy 
face-to-face. 
Opp. AVG represents the average total points of the opposite players. 
Opp StDev represents the variation of the total points of the opposite strategies. 
Effectiveness gives the percentage based on the extent to which the given strategy 
exceeds the average, using the variation. 
 
According to this analysis we can state that a given strategy is more stable if it has a 0% 
Str Failure in more cases. This picture has an interesting conclusion in relation to ‘all 
10’ strategy which can be represented as the totally cooperative strategy. This strategy 
has the highest rank in the totally competitive environment, but in a more and more 
cooperative environment it has an increasing number of total points, even though it 
deteriorates in rank. It gives us two conclusions. Firstly, being cooperative can be a very 
good strategy even in the most competitive environment. Secondly, getting more points 
does not ultimately mean that a higher rank is achieved. 
 
Experiment 
 
We organized a game with the rules of the General Game and we gave everyone at the 
University of Corvinus Budapest 3 weeks to participate. There were some worthwhile 
prizes for the best. Everyone who participated in this game did so voluntarily. They 
could send their strategy through the internet or on paper. Each person could only send 
one strategy, and each strategy had to have a unique ID, which was the unique 
University ID of the student. At the end of three weeks we collected all the strategies, 
we then added 15 of our own strategies created by the simulations. Altogether there 
were 245 strategies in this experiment. 
 
Preliminary sampling 
 
The condition for finding a good solution is to know something about the sample. 
Without any previous research we cannot assume anything about the sample’s 
parameter. But we suppose that there are only cooperative (IUD) and competitive 
(Digressive) strategies and that there will be more than one hundred strategies, which 
means that the sample size will not significantly matter. We made a mini sample based 
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on university students (given the fact that students will play in the game as well). 
Eleven students were asked to create a strategy if they intend to participate in this game. 
They gave the following strategies. 
 
Table 4. Preliminary sample's result 
 
X 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total points 
1 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 4 4 4 379 
2 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 5 5 353 
3 18 18 18 18 18 18 2 2 2 2 2 2 338 
4 15 15 15 15 10 10 10 10 5 5 5 5 331 
5 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 0 0 0 0 330 
6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 283 
7 12 12 11 11 10 10 10 10 9 9 8 8 279 
8 30 25 20 10 10 10 8 5 1 1 0 0 232 
9 35 34 33 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 228 
10 60 20 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 201 
11 50 40 10 5 5 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 152 
 
Predictions about the rate of IUD strategies in the experiment were gained from Table 4. 
We generated different samples with a scale of 5% IUD differences and we calculated 
the average number of soldiers in each town, in addition to the standard variation of 
each town. We calculated the absolute differences between the generated samples and 
the preliminary sample and we consequently created an index number as the sum of the 
squares of the absolute differences. The most appropriate sample had the smallest index. 
 
Table 5. Distance in average between preliminary sample and generated samples 
 
 AVG 
FAE % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
0% 74.6 25.5 10.9 4.8 2.4 1.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
5% 73.2 25.5 10.6 5.0 2.5 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 
10% 70.3 24.0 11.1 5.7 3.2 2.0 1.3 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1 
15% 66.6 24.7 11.1 6.3 3.6 2.4 1.8 1.3 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.2 
20% 62.8 24.7 11.7 6.9 4.2 2.9 2.1 1.6 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.3 
25% 61.3 23.8 11.3 7.0 4.7 3.4 2.6 2.1 1.6 1.1 0.7 0.3 
30% 59.4 22.3 12.0 7.4 5.2 3.9 3.0 2.3 1.8 1.3 0.9 0.4 
35% 56.7 22.4 12.2 8.0 5.7 4.3 3.4 2.7 2.0 1.4 0.9 0.4 
40% 52.5 22.6 12.6 8.3 6.1 4.8 4.0 3.1 2.4 1.8 1.2 0.6 
45% 50.6 22.1 12.7 8.8 6.6 5.3 4.2 3.4 2.6 1.9 1.3 0.6 
50% 47.3 21.5 13.0 9.4 7.2 5.8 4.7 3.8 3.0 2.2 1.5 0.7 
55% 44.0 20.5 13.4 10.0 7.9 6.4 5.2 4.2 3.4 2.5 1.6 0.8 
60% 41.4 20.6 13.6 10.3 8.3 6.8 5.7 4.5 3.5 2.7 1.8 0.8 
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65% 38.6 20.6 13.8 10.6 8.7 7.3 6.1 5.0 3.9 2.8 1.8 0.9 
70% 36.6 19.2 14.4 11.3 9.2 7.7 6.4 5.3 4.1 3.0 1.9 1.0 
75% 33.2 19.7 14.3 11.7 9.8 8.3 6.8 5.6 4.4 3.2 2.1 1.0 
80% 30.7 18.9 14.6 12.0 10.1 8.6 7.3 5.9 4.8 3.6 2.3 1.1 
85% 27.6 18.2 14.7 12.4 10.7 9.2 7.9 6.5 5.2 3.9 2.6 1.2 
90% 24.6 18.1 15.1 12.9 11.2 9.7 8.2 6.8 5.4 4.0 2.6 1.3 
95% 22.1 17.6 15.4 13.5 11.8 10.1 8.6 7.1 5.6 4.2 2.8 1.4 
100% 18.8 17.1 15.5 13.8 12.2 10.8 9.2 7.7 6.1 4.5 3.0 1.4 
AVG 47.3 21.4 13.0 9.3 7.2 5.8 4.7 3.8 3.0 2.2 1.5 0.7 
 
Table6. Distance in Std between preliminary and generated samples 
 
 StDev 
FAE % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
0% 22.9 13.2 8.3 4.8 3.0 1.7 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 
5% 24.9 13.5 8.3 5.1 3.3 2.6 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.3 
10% 28.4 13.2 7.8 5.5 4.2 3.4 2.8 2.4 1.9 1.4 1.0 0.6 
15% 28.9 13.3 7.6 5.5 4.3 3.8 3.4 2.8 2.2 1.8 1.2 0.8 
20% 29.9 12.6 7.4 5.7 4.8 4.3 3.7 3.1 2.6 2.0 1.4 0.9 
25% 31.6 13.0 7.1 5.7 5.1 4.6 4.1 3.4 2.8 2.2 1.5 0.9 
30% 32.7 11.4 7.5 5.7 5.3 4.7 4.2 3.5 2.9 2.2 1.7 1.0 
35% 33.2 11.7 7.1 6.0 5.5 5.0 4.3 3.6 2.9 2.2 1.6 0.9 
40% 32.6 11.7 6.7 5.8 5.4 5.0 4.4 3.7 3.1 2.4 1.8 1.1 
45% 32.9 11.1 6.7 6.0 5.5 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.1 2.5 1.8 1.2 
50% 32.4 10.9 6.1 5.7 5.4 5.0 4.6 3.8 3.2 2.5 1.9 1.2 
55% 32.5 10.4 6.0 5.7 5.4 5.0 4.5 3.9 3.2 2.6 1.9 1.2 
60% 31.0 9.7 5.7 5.6 5.4 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.2 2.6 1.9 1.2 
65% 30.0 9.9 5.5 5.5 5.3 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.2 2.5 1.8 1.2 
70% 29.5 7.8 5.5 5.1 5.1 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.0 2.4 1.9 1.3 
75% 27.1 8.7 5.2 5.0 4.8 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.4 1.8 1.2 
80% 25.4 6.9 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.2 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.4 1.9 1.3 
85% 22.9 5.9 4.1 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.3 1.8 1.4 
90% 18.4 5.4 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.7 1.3 
95% 14.2 3.7 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.4 
100% 3.0 2.5 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.2 
AVG 26.9 9.8 6.0 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.1 2.6 2.1 1.6 1.0 
 
Table 7. Index for the distance in average 
 
FAE % AVG Sum of 
squares 
0% 47.7 6.3 5.0 6.9 7.0 8.2 6.9 6.9 4.7 4.1 3.4 3.4 2665.2 
5% 48.8 6.2 5.3 6.7 6.9 8.0 6.6 6.6 4.5 3.9 3.2 3.3 2749.4 
10% 45.9 4.7 4.8 6.0 6.2 7.3 6.1 6.2 4.2 3.6 3.1 3.2 2404.6 
15% 42.2 5.5 4.8 5.4 5.8 6.9 5.6 5.8 3.9 3.4 2.9 3.1 2052.8 
20% 38.4 5.5 4.2 4.9 5.1 6.4 5.3 5.5 3.6 3.2 2.8 3.1 1709.6 
25% 36.9 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.6 5.9 4.7 5.0 3.2 3.0 2.6 3.0 1566.6 
30% 35.0 3.1 3.9 4.3 4.2 5.4 4.4 4.7 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.9 1389.5 
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35% 32.3 3.1 3.7 3.8 3.7 5.0 4.0 4.4 2.8 2.7 2.4 2.9 1187.9 
40% 28.1 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.3 4.4 3.4 4.0 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.8 907.3 
45% 26.2 2.8 3.2 3.0 2.8 4.0 3.1 3.7 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.7 784.5 
50% 23.0 2.2 2.9 2.3 2.2 3.5 2.6 3.3 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.6 598.5 
55% 19.6 1.3 2.5 1.7 1.4 2.9 2.2 2.9 1.5 1.6 1.7 2.6 433.6 
60% 17.0 1.3 2.3 1.5 1.0 2.4 1.7 2.6 1.3 1.4 1.6 2.5 328.9 
65% 14.2 1.3 2.1 1.1 0.7 2.0 1.3 2.1 0.9 1.2 1.6 2.5 231.5 
70% 12.2 0.0 1.5 0.5 0.1 1.6 1.0 1.8 0.7 1.1 1.4 2.4 168.0 
75% 8.8 0.4 1.6 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.5 0.4 0.9 1.2 2.4 92.1 
80% 6.4 0.3 1.3 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.1 1.2 0.0 0.5 1.0 2.2 51.1 
85% 3.3 1.1 1.2 0.7 1.3 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.8 2.1 21.6 
90% 0.2 1.2 0.8 1.2 1.9 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.7 2.1 13.4 
95% 2.3 1.7 0.5 1.7 2.4 0.9 1.2 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.6 2.0 24.2 
100% 5.6 2.1 0.4 2.1 2.9 1.5 1.8 0.6 1.3 0.4 0.4 2.0 60.4 
AVG 23.5 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.7 3.0 3.3 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.7 641.4 
 
Table 8. Index for the distance in Std 
 
FAE % StDev Eltérés 
n.összeg 
0% 6.4 3.8 1.8 0.2 2.1 3.4 3.9 4.3 4.1 3.7 3.2 3.2 160.5 
5% 8.5 4.1 1.8 0.1 1.8 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.9 153.6 
10% 11.9 3.8 1.3 0.5 0.8 1.8 2.1 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.6 198.2 
15% 12.4 3.8 1.1 0.4 0.7 1.3 1.5 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.5 199.2 
20% 13.4 3.1 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.9 1.2 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.8 2.3 213.6 
25% 15.2 3.6 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.7 2.3 261.0 
30% 16.3 2.0 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.6 2.3 286.4 
35% 16.8 2.2 0.6 1.0 0.5 0.1 0.6 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.3 303.2 
40% 16.1 2.3 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.5 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.5 2.1 277.6 
45% 16.5 1.7 0.2 1.0 0.5 0.1 0.5 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.4 2.1 286.9 
50% 15.9 1.5 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.3 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.4 2.0 268.3 
55% 16.0 1.0 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.4 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 2.0 269.4 
60% 14.6 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.4 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.3 2.1 224.4 
65% 13.5 0.4 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.5 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4 2.0 195.5 
70% 13.0 1.6 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.4 2.0 185.9 
75% 10.6 0.8 1.3 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.4 2.0 129.2 
80% 9.0 2.5 1.8 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.1 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.9 106.1 
85% 6.5 3.5 2.4 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.9 80.3 
90% 1.9 4.1 3.0 1.6 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.9 60.1 
95% 2.3 5.7 3.6 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.0 1.5 1.8 95.1 
100% 13.4 7.0 4.6 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.2 3.2 2.7 2.1 1.6 2.0 324.2 
AVG 11.9 2.8 1.4 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.7 2.2 174.6 
 
According to these tables and statistics we can infer a strong cooperative environment 
which can be represented by the best in the 90% IUD sample. This technically means 
that the typical strategy sends soldiers to even the last town. 
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Constructing good strategies 
 
Based on our statistical findings, we got a 90% IUD sample prediction. Before the 
preliminary sample participants expected an 80% IUD sample. Finally we created 15 
strategies based on this information and we created 12 strategies optimized to a specific 
sample type, and 3 strategies which were given by the people who were working in this 
field and analysing it as a comparative research of simulated strategies and more 
intuitive strategies. In both cases all the available information was used, but in the first 
case a computer based algorithm produced the strategies and the second case was 
compiled by people. 
 
First we created samples with 75% 80% 82.5% 92.5% 97.5% IUD rates and in those 
samples we were looking for good strategies by simulations. We created two good 
strategies optimized in 100% IUD sample because we found a very strong cooperative 
environment in our preliminary sample, and our analysis showed that cooperative 
strategies generally produce good results. To make sure that this method will give good 
answers we also created strategies which were optimized on 20% 25% 40% 45% 50% 
IUD sample. These strategies were also useful, as their results could be compared to the 
more cooperative ones. As mentioned above there were three other strategies which 
were produced by people with all the available information. 
 
Outcome of the experiment 
 
Everybody participated voluntary from all departments and faculties of the University in 
the experiments. There were 245 strategies in the game out of which 15 were ours. As 
for the outcome, 7 of our strategies were in the top 10, but none of them were first.  
 
All the strategies were better than the average, and most of them 9 out of 15 were better 
than the average plus the standard deviation. These results show that the optimizing 
method was a success. 
 
Figure 4 shows the players’ total points in order, and the line of the average points, in 
addition to the two lines of the average plus and minus standard deviation. Based on the 
figure, stronger dots are the strategies which were created by us. Table 9 illustrates our 
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strategies, their rank, their total points and their IUD rate sample in which they were 
optimized. 
 
Figure 4. Results of the experiment and results of the strategies 
 
 
 
Table 9. The results of the generated strategies 
 
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Total 
point
s 
Opt. 
IUD % 
2 13 13 13 13 13 12 12 9 7 6 6 3 7495 75% 
3 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 4 4 4 7491 Human 
4 13 13 13 13 13 13 11 10 7 6 4 4 7489 100% 
5 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 9 8 5 3 7477 100% 
7 13 13 13 13 13 11 11 10 9 6 5 3 7401 92.50% 
8 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 9 9 7 6 4 7384 80% 
9 14 13 13 13 13 13 11 10 8 6 4 2 7365 82.50% 
11 13 13 13 13 12 12 12 12 9 7 3 1 7350 Human 
15 13 13 13 13 13 12 11 9 9 8 4 2 7317 97.50% 
34 18 18 17 15 15 12 11 3 3 3 3 2 7104 50% 
67 20 20 19 14 14 13 5 4 3 3 3 2 6839 20% 
68 22 18 18 16 16 12 4 3 3 3 3 2 6829 Human 
81 20 20 18 17 14 13 11 2 2 1 1 1 6730 25% 
82 20 20 18 17 14 13 11 2 2 1 1 1 6730 40% 
87 21 19 18 17 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 4 6677 45% 
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We can state that the human strategies were not significantly different from the 
strategies which were generated by the simulations. It is important to notice that human 
strategies were also attained by gaining all the information from the simulations and 
analysis. On the other hand, we can state that the more cooperative strategies were more 
successful. The strategies optimized less than 50% IUD sample were at the end of the 
list, and the strategies with more than 50% IUD were at the top of the rank. Our 
expectation turned out to be true. The environment was more cooperative than 
competitive, and in this case the strategies which were optimized to this environmental 
condition were more successful. Among the top 20 strategies’ total points, there was 
less than a 2% differences, which means that luck played a large role. 
 
How to generate the sample of the experiment 
 
We have never attempted such a large experiment, and we have not seen any similar 
experiments to this, where more than 200 volunteers would have played. It is interesting 
what kind of parameters would have described the best. We analyzed those, which 
generated a sample that would have best fitted, according to our index. 
 
Table 10. Distance in average between the experiment and the generated samples 
 
FAE % AVG Sum of 
squares 
0% 47.7 6.2 4.2 7.3 7.2 7.2 6.3 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.5 3.0 2628.0 
5% 46.3 6.2 4.6 7.1 7.1 6.9 6.0 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.4 2.9 2477.5 
10% 43.4 4.7 4.0 6.4 6.3 6.3 5.5 4.9 4.3 3.9 3.2 2.8 2150.3 
15% 39.7 5.4 4.0 5.8 6.0 5.8 5.0 4.5 4.1 3.7 3.1 2.7 1818.5 
20% 35.9 5.4 3.4 5.3 5.3 5.3 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.4 2.9 2.7 1496.2 
25% 34.5 4.5 3.8 5.1 4.8 4.8 4.2 3.8 3.4 3.2 2.8 2.6 1362.2 
30% 32.6 3.0 3.2 4.7 4.4 4.3 3.8 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.6 2.5 1197.3 
35% 29.9 3.1 3.0 4.1 3.9 4.0 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.5 1010.6 
40% 25.7 3.3 2.5 3.8 3.5 3.4 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.3 2.4 753.7 
45% 23.8 2.7 2.5 3.3 3.0 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.3 641.7 
50% 20.5 2.1 2.1 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.2 474.2 
55% 17.2 1.2 1.7 2.1 1.6 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.2 328.4 
60% 14.6 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.7 2.1 238.5 
65% 11.8 1.3 1.3 1.5 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.7 2.1 157.5 
70% 9.7 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.4 1.6 2.0 106.1 
75% 6.3 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.1 1.4 2.0 48.6 
80% 3.9 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.8 1.2 1.8 21.7 
85% 0.8 1.2 0.5 0.3 1.1 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.9 1.7 10.2 
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90% 2.2 1.2 0.0 0.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.9 1.7 19.2 
95% 4.8 1.7 0.2 1.4 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.3 0.6 0.2 0.7 1.6 44.4 
100% 8.1 2.2 0.3 1.7 2.7 2.5 2.4 1.8 1.1 0.1 0.5 1.6 99.9 
AVG 21.9 2.7 2.1 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.3 552.5 
 
Table 11. Distance in Std between Experiment and generated samples 
 
FAE % StDev Sum of 
squares  
0% 3.3 3.5 2.0 0.3 1.9 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.3 110.7 
5% 5.4 3.7 1.9 0.1 1.5 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 3.0 95.7 
10% 8.8 3.5 1.5 0.5 0.6 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.7 122.8 
15% 9.3 3.5 1.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.5 122.9 
20% 10.3 2.8 1.0 0.6 0.0 0.4 0.6 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.0 2.4 133.0 
25% 12.1 3.3 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.4 171.1 
30% 13.2 1.7 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.6 1.1 1.6 1.8 2.3 191.2 
35% 13.7 1.9 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.5 1.1 1.6 1.8 2.4 205.4 
40% 13.0 1.9 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.4 1.7 2.2 184.3 
45% 13.4 1.4 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.9 1.3 1.6 2.1 191.8 
50% 12.9 1.1 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.8 1.3 1.5 2.1 176.6 
55% 12.9 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.7 1.2 1.5 2.1 177.5 
60% 11.5 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.8 1.2 1.5 2.1 142.0 
65% 10.4 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.3 1.6 2.1 119.3 
70% 9.9 1.9 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.4 1.6 2.0 112.7 
75% 7.5 1.1 1.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.6 2.1 69.5 
80% 5.9 2.9 1.7 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.5 2.0 56.6 
85% 3.4 3.8 2.2 1.1 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.9 45.3 
90% 1.2 4.4 2.9 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 51.3 
95% 5.4 6.0 3.5 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.9 110.8 
100% 16.5 7.3 4.5 3.5 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.7 2.0 405.6 
AVG 9.5 2.7 1.4 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.3 117.5 
 
According to both average and standard deviation differences we can say that the 85% 
IUD sample is most similar to what was realized in the experiment. Although if we 
illustrate the generated 85% IUD sample and the sample from the experiments, then 
they could look very different, they are much more similar to each other than we would 
think, regarding points calculation. 
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Figure 5. The strategies of the experiment 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Strategies of the 85% IUD sample 
 
 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the strategies of the experiments and Figure 6 shows the strategies of 
the generated 85% IUD sample. We see 12 dots in a column which represent the 
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number of soldiers in the 12 towns. The majority of soldiers are in the first town and the 
least number of soldiers are in the last town. The X-scale shows the rank, which means 
the most successful strategy is the first column and the least successful is the last 
column. In the generated sample we can see that 85% of the strategies are cooperative, 
where soldiers are sent to each town and are divided quite uniformly. The remaining 
15% are the competitive strategies, where the number of soldiers can be very high in the 
first towns, and 0 at the final towns. 
 
Figure 5 of the experiment illustrates that in general, the more competitive you are, the 
least points you get in total. The number of ‘all 10’ strategies used is also remarkable. 
Many people chose the totally simple cooperative strategy and sent 10 soldiers to each. 
They cannot be in the top of the rank but they beat many of the competitive strategies. 
 
As we have two samples we could compare them according to a matrix which contains 
a frequency of the soldiers in each town, like in the first town in how many cases are 
there 120 soldiers, in how many cases 119 … in how many cases 10. We created this 
matrix with all the towns for the realized experiment sample in addition to the generated 
sample. If we observe them we can find that the distance between the two matrices is 
very small. This means that any strategy would get very similar points in both samples. 
In this sense the 85% IUD generated sample well describes the properties of the sample 
in the experiment. 
 
Attributes of the experiment’s sample 
 
There are other astonishing attributes of the experiment’s dataset. It is easily noticeable 
that there are some preferred numbers. The distribution of numbers is not the same in 
the randomly generated sample, and in the dataset of the experiment. We cannot 
observe any preferred number in the randomly generated sample. The experiment’s 
players did have some preferred numbers like even numbers or numbers which are 
divisible by 5 or 10 as well as the fact that it is hard to find any bigger prime number in 
the experiment. (See Figure 7 and 8.) 
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Figure 7. Preferred numbers in the experiment 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Frequency of the numbers in the generated sample 
 
 
 
Strategy Analysis and Creation by Simulation – An Experimental Case in the General Game 
 
 
210
If we analyze the modus of the strategies – the number which appears most frequently 
in one strategy – we will see differences between the experiment’s dataset and the 
generated sample. Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the modus distribution. There are numbers 
on the X-scale. On the Y-scale we see that if that number of soldiers were most 
frequently used in one strategy, then how many times the players used that in the same 
strategy. In the generated sample, randomness was used to find numbers, so it is not 
typical for the same numbers to appear frequently in the same strategy. But in the 
experiment we can see that there were preferred numbers even in one strategy, so one 
number could arise many times in the same strategy. 
 
Figure 9. Frequency of the modus in the experiment 
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Figure 10. Frequency of the modus in the 85% IUD sample 
 
In many ways we could improve our method to find good strategies. But we would still 
use the method of creating a sample with a given IUD rate, we would also improve the 
sample through their attributes, like taking preferred numbers or the modus into 
account. Using learning algorithm or evolutionary algorithm could also be an 
improvement. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
The general game has both complexity and the uncertainty which makes it very hard to 
handle and analyse. But in many cases we have to face decisions like the above. We 
supposed that there are only two types of strategies, and with them we can generate any 
sample which is relevant. We produced a method to find good and successful strategies, 
based on the predicted sample type and we tested them in an experiment. We found that 
with our method we can give outstanding strategies, but not the definite winning 
strategy. In the end we recommended the use of other methods to improve our results by 
using information about preferred numbers. 
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There are many problems which are very similar to the General Game. If the problem is 
complex and there is uncertainty about the number of the players who are involved in 
the problem, moreover no relevant information about the behaviour of the participants, 
then an exact mathematical formula for a solution cannot be given.   
 
The General Game is slightly more specific as a game, because in this situation we have 
to use a given amount of resources, in this uncertain environment. Moreover, this game 
is focusing on the question about the extent of our competitiveness and/or 
cooperativeness in this environment A political party has to face the same problem, 
when there is an electoral voting system and the party has a given budget to spend on 
marketing. In this case they have to decide how much they are willing to spend on 
marketing in each district. How much they should focus on only some of the districts, or 
whether they should spend money in all districts. According to our results they have to 
spend money in each district, but they have to focus on only some of them. The 
liberalization of the energy sector in Hungary raised very similar problems to the ones 
that can be found in the General Game. After the disappearance of monopoly, big 
competition for the market shares appeared, but without any information about 
competitive behaviour. 
 
The General game can be compared to environments where there is a state of large 
competition as a result of low entry cost. Typically the digital world is like this. It is 
very easy to appear on the internet, another significant question relates to the extent you 
should cooperate in addition to the extent of competitiveness with other sites and other 
services in the same sector. 
 
What advice has the General Game produced? The basic principle behind the 
construction of this game was to analyse the behaviour of competition and cooperation. 
Mérı created the game for this purpose and he observed all results from this aspect. We 
came up with a simulation procedure to prove it. Our results corresponded with the 
international papers on this topic. You should be cooperative but you have to be a little 
competitive as well. According to this, we can conclude that our general advice is the 
following: Be cooperative even in the most competitive environment, but never too 
much. But rather be too cooperative then too competitive. This result may be classed as 
being slightly in contradiction to microeconomic theories about perfect competition. It 
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says that in perfect competition everybody competes with each other and it is the best 
and most logical decision for them. 
 
In this day and age, we can see many cases which reflect the rate companies cooperate 
with each other while being in a state of perfect competition. There is an indirect 
method of cooperation like a price cartel when companies do not use lower prices than 
their costs just because of competition. The low budget airplane sector went bankrupt in 
the United States because of price competition. But there are direct methods as well. 
Nowadays it is typical that there are common innovation projects between companies 
which display total competition with each other in the same sector. There are such well 
known innovation projects for IBM, but Arcelor Mittal is in the same situation with the 
Open Innovations project. We think that in practice the conscious use of mixed logic of 
cooperative and competitive strategy creation can also be very useful in certain 
circumstances. 
 
As seen in our theoretical model and real life examples, thinking on the lines of a mixed 
strategy is something which is inevitable nowadays. What is more, in real life situations 
this mixed strategy means that we cannot afford not to think in terms of cooperation. 
 
Appendix 
 
There is no strategy which could not be defeated by any other strategy.  
 
Proof: There are two types of strategies. One is when the strategy is that we send all the 
120 soldiers to the first town, the second type is when we do something different. The 
first type of strategy can be beaten by the strategy when we send 10 soldiers to each 
town. All other strategies can be beaten by a strategy which is exactly the same, 
although the difference being: to the last town we send one soldier less, and to the first 
town we send one soldier more. This means none of the strategies is unbeatable in a 
game. And there is no Nash equilibrium among the pure strategies, if we have two 
players. 
 
Notes 
 
1 This study was developed on the basis of a paper titled ‘Stratégia-elemzés és –
kialakítás szimulációval a hadvezérjáték kapcsán’, prepared in the framework of 
‘Scientific Circle of CUB’s students’. The consultant was Éva Hideg.  The paper gained 
first reward in the Section of Futures Studies at the Conference of Scientific Circle of 
CUB’s students, in 2009. 
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2 The General Simulator can be available at: http://wif.uni-
corvinus.hu/tdk/otka/hadvezer_szimulator.xls 
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Data Reduction and Univariate Splitting – Do They Together 
Provide Better Corporate Bankruptcy Prediction? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
For many years the number of companies becoming insolvent has been increasing in the 
majority of Central and Eastern European countries recently accessed to the European 
Union1, and the crisis has substantially boosted this tendency. Accordingly an escalating 
interest can be noticed towards multivariate statistical bankruptcy prediction models in 
business life. Statistical based solvency prediction is most extensively carried out by 
financial institutions. Since the Basel II Capital Accord has been in forth for financial 
institutions, it is not the question whether to apply statistical forecast methods in credit 
appraisal and probability of default prediction, but it is a great problem, which methods 
should be applied and how. Therefore the discussion on methodological problems of 
corporate survival and solvency prediction is living its renaissance in many countries. 
 
Corporate survival and solvency prediction is a complex problem. Researching this field 
is encumbered and at the same time challenged by the ascertainments that no unified 
theory exists to explain and understand organizational survival, no method exists to 
guarantee unambiguous survival prediction, and it is noticeable that different empirical 
researches result in contradicting conclusions. Throughout the 40-year-history of 
multivariate statistical bankruptcy prediction no agreement was made among scholars in 
the field what explanatory variables provide the most reliable prediction. Consequently 
competitive and supplementary theoretical and methodological approaches coexist in 
the field (Kristóf, 2008). 
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For financial ratio based multivariate statistical corporate bankruptcy prediction 
discriminant analysis has been widely applied since the pioneer work of Altman (1968), 
which has been more and more replaced since the 1980s by logistic regression analysis 
(Ohlson, 1980). The recursive partitioning algorithm based decision trees (Frydman, 
Altman, Kao, 1985) also began to spread in the 1980s. Since the 1990s the neural 
networks have given a boost to improve the reliability of solvency forecast models. 
Neural networks were firstly applied for corporate bankruptcy forecasting by Odom, 
Sharda (1990). 
 
Several empirical researches were accomplished to compare the performance of 
different bankruptcy forecast methods, a summary analysis is provided inter alia in 
Virág, Kristóf (2005). According to the majority of the authors neural networks 
overperform the traditional methods; whereas some authors (i.e. Laitinen, Kankaanpaa, 
1999) arrived at the provocative conclusion that all methods provide similar 
performance. 
 
The aim of this article is to compete the most frequently applied bankruptcy forecast 
methods on a Hungarian corporate database. Besides predicting the solvency status, 
probability of survival values are forecasted for each company by each method. Within 
the framework of empirical research the performance of logistic regression, recursive 
partitioning algorithm and neural networks is compared. 
 
Besides developing models using the original continuous financial ratios two 
transformations were applied with the hope to improve predictive power. The first one 
was principal component analysis to preserve explained variance of linear correlated 
variables and at the same time handle multicollinearity. The second one was chi-square 
based univariate decision trees to derive categorical variables from continuous ones 
with the aim to find relatively homogeneous risk categories. It was also tried to 
accomplish the two transformations together by splitting the factors. 
 
Our hypothesis was that data reduction and univariate splitting together provide the best 
prediction with each forecast method, and neural networks perform better than logistic 
regression or recursive partitioning algorithm. 
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The frameworks of empirical research 
 
The traditional objective of corporate survival and solvency forecasting is to find out 
with the highest reliability whether a company is expected to go into bankruptcy within 
one year after the turning day of its last annual report, and to estimate probability of 
survival values for each company. 
 
Size and breakdown of the sample, explanatory variables 
 
To ensure the applicability of models on any company it was set as a requirement 
towards data collection that data available for modeling has to come from public annual 
reports and company register. Balance sheets and profit&loss statements from 2004 
were collected. The sample contains 504 companies from which 437 are solvent and 67 
are insolvent. This magnitude of observations is statistically manageable; furthermore 
many companies and small/middle banks usually possess clientele of that size, 
accordingly it can be argued to be a typical modeling problem in business life. 
 
The empirical research equates corporate failure to the legal possibilities of insolvency, 
namely the declaration of bankruptcy procedure, liquidation or winding up. These three 
cases can be measured well empirically, and surely mean insolvency. From the 
insolvent observations 1 fell under bankruptcy procedure, 29 declared winding-up and 
liquidation procedure was announced against 37 companies. The legal category of 
insolvency was not differentiated later. Solvent observations were denoted by 0 and 
insolvent ones by 1. 
 
Explanatory variables were defined using information expressing corporate size, 
industrial classification, profitability, turnover, liquidity, capital structure, debt, cash 
flow and annual growth. Variable selection was preceded by an in-depth professional 
analysis. Altogether 31 financial ratios were defined. Calculation formulae of the 
financial ratios are summarized in Appendix 1.  
 
Data collection was followed by data preparation for modeling. It is often more difficult 
than modeling itself, since unpredicted problems with observations and/or variables 
might emerge. The calculation of two financial ratios was limited by the zero value of 
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the denominator. From the companies in the sample 6 had zero inventory and 11 zero 
trade receivables, thereby making it impossible to calculate inventory turnover and trade 
receivables turnover ratios. This problem was solved – by considering data mining 
experiences in the field of financial modeling (Han, Kamber, 2006) – in a way that 
missing inventory turnover values were substituted by the median value of other 
observations, and the missing trade receivables by the 97.5% percentile value as a 
truncated maximum. 
 
It was substantially more difficult to use three financial ratios distorted by double 
negative division. The coexistence of negative nominator and negative denominator 
concerned return on equity (ROE) in 28 cases, operating profit growth in 74 cases, and 
profit after tax growth in 67 cases. In the case of ROE it means that in the sample there 
are 28 companies, the liabilities of which first exceed their total assets and second they 
closed the financial year with loss, and despite these facts the ratio shows a positive 
profitability. This problem was naturally characteristic to the insolvent observations. As 
for the growth ratios of the two profit categories companies having negative profit both 
in the previous and in the actual year (even with further worsening operating or after tax 
profit in the actual year) could be wrongly characterized by positive growth. In such 
case a widely used data mining technique is to replace the ratio-value of companies 
having double negative items with the minimum ratio-value of the other companies, 
however, considering the small sample and the relatively large number of concerned 
companies these three ratios were discarded from the empirical research. It would have 
been unreasonable to discard the given observations, since in that case inadequately few 
insolvent companies might have remained in the sample.  
 
Distribution of companies in the sample could be classified into 10 national economic 
branches, 41 industries and 164 special-branches, the latter means four digit Standard 
Sectoral Classification of Economic Activities (SSCEA) code breakdown. 
Manufacturing companies represented themselves in the greatest share within the 
sample. 
 
Still before the 1990s some scholars (like Platt, Platt, 1990) extensively dealt with the 
problem how corporate ratios and industry performance together influence the 
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likelihood of insolvency. Since then the most efficient bankruptcy prediction models 
have been applying industrial distinction. To compare financial ratios of companies 
operating in different industries the differences from special-branch averages were 
considered instead of pure financial ratio-values. The correction was carried out by the 
following formula: 
 
Individual ratio value – Special-branch average value 
Special-branch average value (1) 
  
Correction by special-branch averages ensures the comparability between companies 
having pretty different fields of activities. From this point empirical research does not 
refer to the individual financial ratio-values, but to their variance from their special-
branch averages. Thereby time stability of the models is improving, since better or 
worse performance compared to the averages might remain a relevant perspective to 
evaluate insolvency after several years. 
 
To validate models and avoid overtraining the sample was partitioned on the basis of 
simple random selection to a 75% training and a 25% testing set. It is a thumb rule of 
bankruptcy prediction that if the modeling database (training set) contains less than 50 
insolvent observations, it is not reasonable to apply multivariate statistical methods 
(Engelman, Hayden, Tasche, 2003). This requirement was barely met in the empirical 
research, as within the training sample containing 371 observations 320 were solvent 
and 51 were insolvent, and within the testing sample containing 133 observations 117 
were solvent and 16 were insolvent. 
 
Data reduction, univariate splitting 
 
Data reduction was carried out by principal component analysis (PCA), which is 
commonly used in financial modeling (see i.e. Hu, Ansell, 2007). PCA constructs 
uncorrelated components (factors) from the linear correlating variables. The essence of 
the procedure is that some components can explain a great share of the total variance of 
the variables; thereby it is enough to have fewer dimensions for modeling. PCA is 
proven to be able to handle multicollinearity and reduce data. For applying the 
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procedure it is key to decide on the number of components, which is most frequently 
defined with the help of eigenvalues above a certain threshold. Eigenvalues show the 
aggregation capability of input data variances for each component. Factors were 
constructed by considering the following criteria:  
 
- strong and significant linear correlation exists between variables, 
- from financial viewpoint variables have similar meanings, 
- eigenvalue is higher than 1, 
- Kaiser-Meier-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy is at least 50%, 
- the factor is significant using the Bartlett-test. 
 
Altogether seven factors were derived. Appendix 2 summarizes the factor equations 
together with eigenvalues, total explained variances and KMO values. All the factors 
were significant according to the Bartlett-test. 
 
According to our experience PCA might improve model performance, however, special 
attention needs to be taken when using data reduction in bankruptcy prediction, since 
the combination of PCA presuming homogeneity and classification procedures 
presuming subsamples might lead to the confusion of subsamples.  
 
Univariate splitting was accomplished by the Chi-squared Automatic Interaction 
Detection (CHAID) method. CHAID is a classification method for building decision 
trees by using chi-square statistics to identify optimal splits (Kass, 1980). The procedure 
first examines the cross tabulations between each of the independent variables and the 
outcome, and tests for significance using a chi-square independence test. If more than 
one of these relationships is statistically significant, the method will select the predictor 
which is the most significant. If a predictor has more than two categories, these are 
compared, and categories that show no differences in the outcome are collapsed 
together. This is done by successively joining the pair of categories showing the least 
significant difference. This category-merging process stops when all remaining 
categories differ at the specified testing level. 
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CHAID is excellent to explore the relationship-characteristics between the target 
variable and the explanatory variables one by one, and is able to select the variable 
which in itself has the strongest predictive power. The essence of this procedure is to 
form groups, which most differ from each other considering solvency. 
 
Appendix 3 contains the univariate decision trees. It was reasonable to build decision 
trees for nineteen original variables and six PCA factors. The trees can be interpreted by 
examining the distribution of solvent and insolvent observations within nodes. The top 
node incorporates the total sample having 13.3% insolvent rate. A category is regarded 
as risky if the insolvent rate substantially exceeds 13.3%, and not risky in case of 
substantially lower insolvent rate. Financial ratio thresholds are illustrated above the 
nodes. To make modeling easier the belonging to the categories was denoted by dummy 
variables, hence the CHAID split models exclusively contain 1/0 values. It was 
expected that the application of univariate decision trees results in a better predictive 
power. 
 
Applied forecast methods 
 
The following points briefly analyze the application assumptions, advantages and 
drawbacks of the applied multivariate statistical forecast methods. It was planned to 
apply discriminant analysis as well, however, according to our experience, this method 
results in a poor performance when considering categorical variables.  
 
Logistic regression analysis (Logit) is a widely used approach to model relationships 
between explanatory variables and the likelihood of a binary response. The procedure 
orders probability of survival/bankruptcy values to the weighted independent variables 
by fitting a logistic regression function estimated by the maximum likelihood method.  
 
The advantages of the method are robustness, exact appearance of relative contributions 
and easy interpretation. Drawbacks are the possibility of small-sample biasedness, the 
sensitivity to outliers, the accidental emergence of multicollinearity and the application 
of predefined function-type. If the solvency rate of the sample differs from that of 
population, the estimated probability of survival values might be modified by 
probability-calibration in such a way that the average probability of survival value 
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equals to the desired rate, at the same time the order of probabilities estimated for the 
observations must be preserved. 
 
The recursive partitioning algorithm (RPA)2 attempts to build a decision tree by 
iteration, using univariate partitioning, setting simple decision rules, and constructing 
branches. The aim is to establish the most homogeneous classes. The algorithm 
establishes branches as long as it finds partitioning variables. The first partitioning 
variable is found at the top of the tree. The roots of tree mean the solvent and insolvent 
classification after the partitioning. 
 
The advantages of the method are the few application assumptions and the obvious 
interpretation of the decision rules. Drawbacks are the accidental appearance of 
overtraining, the assumption of discrete classification capability and non-overlapping 
between the groups. No statistical testing can be carried out on the model, and the 
relative contribution of variables cannot be unambiguously determined. Probability of 
survival values can be estimated on the basis of decision rules. 
 
Neural networks (NN) are information processing systems constructed on the basis of 
biological neural systems having the capability to operate simultaneously in a shared 
way. Networks consist of interconnected, parallel functioning neurons, and gain their 
problem-solving capability by learning. Fundamental components of neural networks 
are the elementary neurons, which are organized in layers. Weighting of the networks is 
established through the learning process.  
 
The advantages of the method are the few application assumptions, the intelligent 
learning of relationships and the universal approximation feature. Drawbacks are the 
black box problem, the accidental appearance of overtraining, arriving at local minima, 
the indirect determination of relative contributions and the inability to carry out 
statistical tests. Neural networks can automatically estimate probability of 
survival/bankruptcy values. If the solvent rate of the population and the sample 
substantially differs from each other, probability-calibration might be necessary.  
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It has been proven in some earlier publications (see i.e. Ghiassi, Saidane, Zimbra, 2005) 
that dynamic neural network models provide more accurate forecast and perform 
significantly better than traditional neural networks, like feedforward or 
backpropagation. For that reason the neural network model in the empirical research 
was trained by the exhaustive prune technique (Huang, Saratchandran, Sundararajan, 
2005). With exhaustive prune, network training parameters are chosen to ensure a very 
thorough search of the space of possible models to find the best one. 
 
Analytical aspects, reliability-examination methods 
 
Theoretical and practical requirements demand the direct comparability of bankruptcy 
models constructed by different methods. This expectation can only be met if input data 
of modeling is exactly the same for each method, model outputs are measured on the 
same scale in the same intervals, and model performance is evaluated by the same 
reliability-examination methods. Identical input information is guaranteed in the 
empirical research.  
 
It was drawn as a fundamental criterion towards forecast methods that all the three must 
result in probability of survival values between 0 and 1. Logistic regression and neural 
networks automatically meet this requirement. In case of the recursive partitioning 
algorithm probability of survival values were estimated from the classification 
capabilities of decision rules. 
 
The requirement to determine the significance/relevance of certain variables presumes 
the exact measurement of relative contribution of the variables. It is easy to see that this 
measurement problem occurs when evaluating neural networks. The empirical research 
measured the importance of input neurons with the help of sensitivity analysis. In case 
of recursive partitioning algorithm it can only be concluded that the first partitioning 
variable has the highest contribution to the model performance. 
 
It can be drawn as a general validity that reliability-examination is an equal-ranking task 
to making forecast (Gáspár, Nováky, 2002). In case of bankruptcy prediction it should 
not be hauled up from predictions whether they took place in reality, but whether they 
provided appropriate information to make the necessary decisions (e.g. credit appraisal). 
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It is expected from reliable bankruptcy models that they promote to avoid potentially 
unfavorable situations. Model validation reveals how well the models are performing 
(Medema, Koning, Lensink, 2009). 
 
Reliability of forecast models is evaluated by using the Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) curve analysis. ROC curve is a useful analytical tool to evaluate 
the performance of classification rules in case of binary output and estimated probability 
values or scores (Stein, 2005). The ROC curve examines how reliable the estimated 
probabilities reflect the belonging to the output categories, if the a priori classification is 
known. The curve considers the observations in the sample in the sequence of their 
estimated probability of survival/bankruptcy. Horizontal axis represents the cumulative 
distribution of solvent and vertical axis the cumulative distribution of insolvent 
observations. The reference of ROC curve is the 45°-line, which represents random 
guessing. The evaluation of a bankruptcy model is better if its curve better drifts apart 
from the 45°-line (Agarwal, Taffler, 2007).  
 
The area under ROC curve (AUROC) is an objective statistical indicator. If the 
AUROC exceeds 50% then it has an added value compared to random guessing. Model 
having higher AUROC means better model. It is an established custom of ROC analysis 
to estimate the 95% confidence interval of AUROC. When evaluating bankruptcy 
models the ROC curves and AUROCs of the total sample and the testing set are 
considered for each forecast method. It is also usual to evaluate model performance 
using the GINI coefficient.  
 
Developed models 
 
Bankruptcy prediction models were elaborated using the observations and variables 
after industrial mean correction. Each method was applied using the following 
strategies: 
 
- entering the original variables, 
- entering the original variables together with continuous PCA factors, 
- entering the CHAID split original variables, 
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- entering the CHAID split original and PCA variables. 
 
Logistic regression based models 
 
In this empirical research the logistic regression models were constructed using the 
forward stepwise procedure. Variable selection was carried out by using the Wald entry 
and removal criteria. The entry criterion was defined as 5% and the removal criterion as 
10% probability value. 
 
Using the continuous financial ratios the Logit model contains four significant variables 
– two indebtedness, one size and one cash flow indicators – besides the constant. The 
final model was elaborated in eight steps. It is interesting that the dynamic profitability 
ratio was entered firstly and discarded in the last step in favor of the cash flow/liabilities 
ratio.  
 
Table 1. Main features of the logistic regression model 
 
  Explanatory variable β Standard 
error 
Wald-
test 
p-
value 
Long term indebtedness -.830 .257 10.429 .001 
Indebtedness 2.084 .358 33.816 .000 
Net_revenue -8.118 1.721 22.257 .000 
Cash_flow_liabilities -.073 .031 5.479 .019 
Constant -5.132 .656 61.119 .000 
 
On the basis of statistical testing it is visible that regression parameters are significant 
until 98.1% level. Model testing was carried out with the help of the asymptotic χ2 test 
based Omnibus-test. The value of χ2 is 126.6 (degree of freedom: 4), the p-value is 
0.000. Therefore the logistic regression model is regarded as significant at all level.  
 
The PCA model kept the two indebtedness ratios, and replaced the net revenue and cash 
flow/liabilities ratios by the size and cash flow factors. For this reason higher model 
performance is expected, since the factors involve the impact of other variables (total 
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assets, dynamic profitability ratio), which might have added value to predict solvency. 
Like in the previous case the final model contains four variables. 
 
Table 2. Main features of the logistic regression model 
 
  Explanatory variable β Standard 
error 
Wald-
test 
p-
value 
Long term indebtedness -.733 .247 8.804 .003 
Indebtedness 1.836 .353 27.108 .000 
PCA_SIZE -1.131 .235 23.118 .000 
PCA_CASH_FLOW -.651 .249 6.817 .009 
Constant -3.045 .309 97.014 .000 
 
Regression parameters are significant at 99.1% level. The value of χ2 is 125.6 (degree 
of freedom: 4), the p-value is 0.000. Therefore the logistic regression model is regarded 
as significant at all level.  
 
Using the CHAID split original variables, i.e. using the categorical variables a more 
diverse range of financial ratios were found to be significant. The first category of 
EBITDA margin has the strongest explanatory power which in itself expresses a 37% 
default rate (see Appendix 3). The inclusion of profitability, liquidity and growth ratios 
might inspire a better model performance compared to the models developed on the 
basis of continuous variables. The model is comprised of seven dummy variables. 
 
Table 3. Main features of the logistic regression model 
 
  Explanatory variable β Standard 
error 
Wald-
test 
p-
value 
CHAID_ROA_1 -
1.822 
.525 12.068 .001 
CHAID_FIXED_ASSETS_DEBT_1 -
1.009 
.515 3.841 .050 
CHAID_REVENUE_GROWTH_2 1.414 .479 8.712 .003 
CHAID_EBITDA_MARGIN_1 - .573 19.673 .000 
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2.541 
CHAID_INDEBTEDNESS_1 2.065 .525 15.483 .000 
CHAID_NET_REVENUE_1 -
1.473 
.551 7.154 .007 
CHAID_CASH_LIQUIDITY_1 -
1.831 
.538 11.562 .001 
Constant .904 .657 1.894 .169 
 
Regression parameters are significant at 95% level. The value of χ2 is 171.2 (degree of 
freedom: 7), the p-value is 0.000. Therefore the logistic regression model is regarded as 
significant at all level.  
 
Using the CHAID split original and PCA variables and through the availability of split 
PCA factors a similar model was resulted, however, instead of the fixed assets financed 
from debt and cash liquidity ratios the PCA_LEVERAGE factor was found to be 
significant, thereby making a six-variate model. Again the first category of the EBITDA 
margin is the strongest predictor, and the second one is the first category of the 
indebtedness ratio. Better model performance was expected compared to the two 
continuous ones, and similar to the previous categorical one. 
 
Table 4. Main features of the logistic regression model 
 
  Explanatory variable β Standard 
error 
Wald-
test 
p-
value 
CHAID_ROA_1 -1.909 .520 13.461 .000 
CHAID_REVENUE_GROWTH_2 1.333 .469 8.097 .004 
CHAID_PCA_LEVERAGE_1 -1.803 .520 12.014 .001 
CHAID_EBITDA_MARGIN_1 -2.847 .573 24.671 .000 
CHAID_INDEBTEDNESS_1 2.118 .508 17.401 .000 
CHAID_NET_REVENUE_1 -1.747 .549 10.117 .001 
Constant .631 .607 1.083 .298 
 
Regression parameters are significant at 99.6% level. The value of χ2 is 169.7 (degree 
of freedom: 6), the p-value is 0.000. Therefore the logistic regression model is regarded 
as significant at all level.  
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Comparing on the basis of the ROC curves it can be concluded that all the four models 
have favorable performance characteristics. Both the 88.5%-94.8% AUROC and the 
77.0%-89.6% GINI indicators show excellent classification capabilities. All the ROC 
curves have sharp increasing sections in the beginning, proving that they can classify 
the most insolvent companies with very good accuracy. 
 
Figure 1. ROC curves of the logistic regression models 
 
It is also obvious that no clear distinction can be made between two-two models, 
namely between the two continuous and the two categorical models. The ROC curves 
often intersect each other and have very similar shapes. However, one thing is sure: both 
categorical models have better performance than the two continuous models. Hence it 
can be concluded on the basis of this empirical research that it is reasonable to apply 
univariate splitting in case of logistic regression, and factor analysis is not worth the 
trouble. 
 
Table 5. Model performance indicators (n=504) 
Model AUROC (95% confidence interval) GINI coefficient1 
LOGIT_ORIGINAL 88.5% (83.9% – 93.0%) 77.0% 
LOGIT_PCA 88.5% (83.9% – 93.0%) 77.0% 
LOGIT_CHAID 94.8% (92.2% – 97.5%) 89.6% 
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LOGIT_CHAID_PCA 94.6% (91.5% – 97.7%) 89.2% 
 
Another thing which proves the better applicability of CHAID-split models is the 
performance-difference of the training and the testing sets, however, such results must 
be handled with caution, since the testing set involves only 16 insolvent observations. 
The two continuous models have 91.1% and 91.5% AUROC on the training set and 
only 80.7% and 79.7% on the testing set, whereas the two categorical models 95.6% 
and 95.4% on the training set and 92.3% and 91.5% on the testing set. Therefore the 
continuous models are rather overtrained, and cannot be applied effectively on new 
observations. This is another reason for using the CHAID split models in practice. 
 
Recursive partitioning algorithm based models 
 
The decision tree built by the recursive partitioning algorithm went through a pruning 
procedure to avoid overtraining. The pruning procedure attempts to accomplish risk-
minimization by defining different closing nodes. Increasing the number of closing 
nodes usually reduces the risk of specialization to the training set, and improves the 
cross-validation features of the model. 
 
Decision tree pruning could be influenced by different stopping rules, which prevent 
from the further splitting of certain branches. Stopping rules can be defined for the 
minimum number of observations for the parent and the child branches as well. This can 
be expressed in absolute value and in the percent of observations in the training set. In 
the current empirical research the possibility of forming parent branch was set to the 
minimum 7% of the records within training set, and that of child branch was defined as 
minimum 5%. The models were constantly backtested on the testing set, and according 
to the results of tracking it was concluded that no more rigorous conditions were 
needed. 
 
At the end of each decision rule classification can be done using the insolvent rates in 
the last nodes. The results can be interpreted as probability of bankruptcy/survival 
values. According to the idiosyncrasies of decision trees as many different probability 
of survival values are ordered to the observations as many kind of decision rule 
combinations exist in the tree structure.  
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Decision tree built using the original variables and the training set is illustrated in 
Figure 2. The first partitioning variable is the dynamic profitability ratio. Companies 
having worse than -3.026 value compared to the industrial mean face very high 
insolvent rate (62.2%). The second node splits further the middle-category using the 
natural logarithmic value of the total assets. It means that smaller companies are much 
riskier than larger companies in this dynamic profitability ratio category. The 260 best 
companies from the first viewpoint can be partitioned further using the cash liquidity 
ratio expressing that companies with good cash flow profitability and high cash 
liquidity are solvent in 99.5%. It is the indebtedness ratio which splits companies having 
good cash flow but low liquidity expressing that companies with lower indebtedness are 
less risky.  
 
The model contains four variables and six final nodes. Cash flow, size, liquidity and 
indebtedness ratios were regarded as relevant4 model variables, which is good from 
corporate financial viewpoints. 
 
The availability of PCA factors has made substantial difference in the tree-building 
logic. The first partitioning variable is another cash flow variable, and again lower cash 
flow means riskier category. Interestingly the equity ratio became the second variable in 
two cash flow categories, and the PCA_LEVERAGE factor expressing long term 
indebtedness, capital coverage and cash ratio was found to be a good classifying 
variable for the middle cash flow category. The revenue growth managed to separate 
companies having low cash flow but high equity rate articulating that companies with 
higher revenue growth are less risky. 
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Figure 2. Recursive partitioning algorithm based model 
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Figure 3. Recursive partitioning algorithm based model 
 
 
 
The model contains four variables and seven final nodes. Cash flow, leverage and 
growth ratios were regarded as relevant model variables. The size indicators might be 
missing from corporate financial viewpoint. Due to the significantly differing trees it 
should be let to the ROC curves decide which model performs better. 
 
Modeling with the CHAID split variables the RPA is like binary splitting. Only one 
category of a given variable is considered in one simulation step, and interestingly 
always the first categories were found to be relevant splitting variables. The EBITDA 
profitability became the first partitioning variable and the tree-depth achieved five 
levels. 
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Figure 4. Recursive partitioning algorithm based model 
 
 
 
The model contains eight variables and nine final nodes. EBITDA, cash flow, 
indebtedness, size, profitability and liquidity ratios were regarded as relevant model 
variables, which is very good from corporate financial perspectives. Higher model 
performance is expected compared to the continuous models. 
 
Supplementary using the CHAID split factors the tree is somewhat similar to the 
previous model. Again the EBITDA profitability became the first partitioning variable; 
however, companies having unfavorable EBITDA are split further by the 
PCA_CAPITAL factor expressing equity, indebtedness and working capital rates. From 
that viewpoint the logic resembles the previous decision tree, since there the 
indebtedness ratio filled this role. Liquidity ratios disappeared from this model, 
however, ROS turned up. 
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Figure 5. Recursive partitioning algorithm based model 
 
 
 
The model contains eight variables and nine final nodes. EBITDA, cash flow, 
indebtedness, leverage, size and profitability ratios were regarded as relevant model 
variables, which is very good from corporate financial aspects. Similar model 
performance is expected compared to the previous model. 
 
On the basis of the ROC curves it can be concluded that the continuous models have 
similar or somewhat better performance characteristics than the logistic regression 
models. Performance indicators show very good classification capabilities. However, it 
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is very hard to decide on the best RPA model, since all the ROC curves intersect one 
another. 
 
Figure 6. ROC curves of the RPA models 
 
Under such circumstances three viewpoints can be considered: first, which is the 
steepest curve in the section of the first twenty probability of survival percentiles 
demonstrating that this model classifies the most insolvent companies with the best 
accuracy, second, which has the greatest AUROC, and third, which model is least 
overtrained.  
 
Table 6. Model performance indicators (n=504) 
 
Model AUROC (95% confidence interval) GINI 
coefficient 
RPA_ORIGINAL 88.8% (85.1% – 92.6%) 77.6% 
RPA_PCA 88.9% (84.8% – 92.9%) 77.8% 
RPA_CHAID 89.8% (86.4% – 93.1%) 79.6% 
RPA_CHAID_PCA 91.1% (87.9% – 94.3%) 82.2% 
 
From all the three perspectives the decision tree containing categorical original and 
PCA variables is the best. The CHAID_PCA model has 94.2% AUROC on the training 
set and 86.4% on the testing set. The most overtrained model is the continuous PCA 
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model (92.0% AUROC on the training set and 78.4% on the testing set). Therefore it 
can be concluded on the basis of this empirical research that it is reasonable to apply 
both data reduction and univariate splitting in case of recursive partitioning algorithm, 
however, even the best RPA model has slightly worse performance characteristics 
compared to the best Logit model. 
 
Neural network based models 
  
The neural networks were trained by the exhaustive prune technique. The exhaustive 
prune technique starts from a network containing all independent variables as input 
neurons and having a great number of neurons in the hidden layers. Weights initially 
take random values. In the training epochs the procedure attempts to exclude neurons 
having low explanatory power from the input and the hidden layers. During training 
final weights are estimated very thoroughly by trying and validating several network-
structures simultaneously. Temporarily it might be necessary to take back some neurons 
into the layers. This procedure has much more computation-requirements than the 
traditional procedures using predefined structure; however, according to experiences it 
provides the best results. To avoid overtraining weights estimated on the basis of 
training set are constantly backtested on the testing set. Final model weights are saved 
when achieving the highest classification accuracy on the testing set. 
 
Using the original variables the exhaustive prune training found two hidden layers to be 
necessary. Five neurons remained in the input layer; the first hidden layer consists of 
two, and the second hidden layer of one neuron. In case of bankruptcy prediction the 
output layer evidently contains one neuron. 
 
The relative contribution of neural network model variables can be estimated by 
sensitivity analysis. As a result of sensitivity analysis a value of importance between 0 
and 1 is provided, where higher value means higher level of contribution to the 
predictive power of the model. The importance of the five variables in the input layer 
was the followings. 
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Table 7. Relative importance of model variables 
 
  Model variable Value of importance 
Dynamic profitability ratio 0.6894 
Indebtedness 0.5998 
Working capital ratio 0.5678 
Net revenue 0.5149 
Capital coverage 0.2890 
 
Cash flow, indebtedness, capital structure and size indicators are considered in the 
model, which is good from corporate financial point of view. 
 
The availability of PCA factors arrived at a bit more complicated model. The exhaustive 
prune training technique found again two hidden layers to be necessary. The input layer 
kept 9 neurons, the first and the second hidden layer includes 3-3 neurons. Instead of 
cash flow and size indicators the PCA_CASH_FLOW and the PCA_SIZE factors were 
entered into the model. Cash flow and indebtedness are the two most important 
variables, like in many other models. 
 
Table 8. Relative importance of model variables 
 
  Model variable Value of importance 
PCA_CASH_FLOW 0.7813 
Indebtedness 0.7467 
PCA_SIZE 0.4812 
Current assets ratio 0.3743 
ROA 0.2033 
EBITDA profitability 0.1835 
Capital coverage 0.1762 
Leverage 0.1671 
Dynamic liquidity 0.0954 
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Beyond the previous model profitability, leverage and liquidity ratios can also be found. 
For that reason it is expected that the PCA model performs better than the one with 
original variables. 
 
Using the CHAID split original variables a quite manageable network was created. The 
input layer encloses 7, the first hidden layer 1 and the second hidden layer 3 neurons. 
                        
Table 9. Relative importance of model variables 
 
  Model variable Value of importance 
CHAID_ROA_1 0.1129 
CHAID_INDEBTEDNESS_2 0.1067 
CHAID_REVENUE_GROWTH_2 0.1065 
CHAID_EBITDA_MARGIN_2 0.0925 
CHAID_CASH_LIQUIDITY_2 0.0653 
CHAID_LONG_TERM_INDEBTEDNESS_1 0.0596 
CHAID_EBITDA_MARGIN_1 0.0219 
 
Profitability, indebtedness, growth, EBITDA and liquidity indicators are considered in 
the model, which is acceptable from corporate financial point of view. The EBITDA 
can replace the impact of cash flow ratios, only the size ratios can be missed from the 
model. 
 
Supplementary using the CHAID split PCA factors a high number of neurons remain in 
the input layer (16). The two hidden layers contain two-two neurons. The model 
extensively used the split PCA factors. The low ROA category became the most 
relevant variable. 
 
Table 10. Relative importance of model variables 
 
  Model variable Value of importance 
CHAID_ROA_1 0.0581 
CHAID_EBITDA_MARGIN_2 0.0572 
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CHAID_LONG_TERM_INDEBTEDNESS_1 0.0571 
CHAID_PCA_LEVERAGE_2 0.0426 
CHAID_PCA_SIZE_2 0.0423 
CHAID_DYNAMIC_PROFITABILITY_3 0.0406 
CHAID_REVENUE_GROWTH_2 0.0396 
CHAID_EBITDA_MARGIN_1 0.0369 
CHAID_INDEBTEDNESS_1 0.0317 
CHAID_PCA_CAPITAL_3 0.0271 
CHAID_REVENUE_GROWTH_1 0.0144 
CHAID_PCA_LEVERAGE_1 0.0137 
CHAID_PCA_SIZE_1 0.0097 
CHAID_INDEBTEDNESS_2 0.0097 
CHAID_DYNAMIC_LIQUIDITY_1 0.0055 
CHAID_PCA_CAPITAL_1 0.0036 
     
Profitability, EBITDA, indebtedness, leverage, size, cash flow, growth, capital 
structure, and liquidity indicators are considered in the model, which is excellent from 
corporate financial point of view. Only the simultaneous presence of PCA_CAPITAL 
and both indebtedness categories is very hard to explain, despite the fact that the third 
category of PCA_CAPITAL contains the 80% best observations, whereas indebtedness 
categories are split in the share of 60%-40%. Even with this problem high model 
performance was expected. 
                 
On the basis of the ROC curve analysis it can be concluded that the performance of 
three models practically cannot be distinguished, since the ROC curves intersect one 
another and the AUROC indicators have little difference: the two continuous models 
and the CHAID split model. However, each model possesses good classification 
capabilities. The ROC curve of the CHAID_PCA model “covers” the others almost in 
the total probability of survival percentile range and has the highest AUROC, therefore 
this is the best model. 
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Figure 7. ROC curves of the neural network models 
 
 
As far as overtraining is concerned the continuous PCA model shows the greatest sign 
to be overtrained, since its AUROC is 90.8% on the training set and 83.1% on the 
testing set. The CHAID_PCA model provides the best result on the testing set 
(AUROC=87.7%). 
 
Table 11. Model performance indicators 
 
Model AUROC (95% confidence interval) GINI coefficient 
NN_ORIGINAL 88.7% (84.8% – 92.6%) 77.4% 
NN_PCA 89.1% (85.9% – 92.3%) 78.2% 
NN_CHAID 89.6% (86.2% – 93.0%) 79.2% 
NN_CHAID_PCA 93.5% (90.1% – 96.9%) 87.0% 
 
On the basis of empirical research it seems that in case of neural networks it is advisable 
to apply together data reduction and univariate splitting. Furthermore it has to be also 
remembered that even the best neural network model underperforms the best logistic 
regression model. 
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Conclusions 
 
Using the experiences of constructing 12 bankruptcy models on the same Hungarian 
corporate database it can be concluded that data reduction and univariate partitioning do 
make sense in the field of bankruptcy prediction. All the elaborated models are 
acceptable from corporate financial aspects, and all of them possess high classification 
power. On the basis of model performances it can be argued that univariate splitting 
adds more value to model improvement than data reduction. 
 
On the basis of AUROC indicators a sequence can be set to the classification power of 
elaborated models. In this sense the two categorical logistic regression models are the 
best ones, and they are followed by the CHAID_PCA neural network model, and then 
comes the CHAID_PCA decision tree.  
 
It is interesting to note that no difference can be reported between the reliability of the 
three forecast methods when using the original continuous variables despite the 
relatively small sample and the perceived superiority of neural networks in several other 
comparative empirical researches. It is also clear that based on this empirical research 
that PCA in itself does not substantially improve predictive power, and might result in 
more overtrained models. 
 
Studying the stability of the developed models it can be asserted that the application of 
CHAID split categorical variables results in less overtrained models, hence more stable 
models can be developed with the help of univariate splitting. 
 
The dilemma whether the simultaneous application of data reduction and univariate 
splitting can be recommended for modeling practitioners is not resolved 
unambiguously. It is reasonable to do so in the case of recursive partitioning algorithm 
and neural networks, however, in case of logistic regression the CHAID splitting in 
itself has very favorable impact, and PCA does not have added value at all. The 
simultaneous application is mostly recommended for neural network practitioners. 
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Appendix 1 – Name and calculation formula of the applied financial ratios 
 
Name of ratio Calculation formula 
Return on equity (ROE) Profit after tax / Average equity 
Return on assets (ROA) Profit after tax / Average total assets 
Return on sales (ROS) Operating income / Net sales revenue 
EBITDA margin (Operating income + Depreciation) / Net sales 
revenue 
EBITDA profitability (Operating income + Depreciation) / Average total 
assets 
Assets turnover Net sales revenue / (Average total assets  / 365) 
Inventory turnover Net sales revenue / (Average inventory / 365) 
Trade receivables turnover Net sales revenue / (Average trade receivables / 
365) 
Equity ratio Equity / Total assets 
Long term indebtedness Long term liabilities / (Equity + Long term 
liabilities) 
Fixed assets financing Equity / Fixed assets 
Indebtedness Liabilities / Total assets 
Leverage Liabilities / Equity 
Fixed assets financed from debt Long term liabilities / Fixed assets 
Capital coverage  (Fixed assets + Inventory) / Equity 
Current assets ratio Current assets / Total assets 
Cash ratio (Cash and cash equivalents + Securities) / Current 
assets 
Working capital ratio (Current assets - Short term liabilities) / Total assets 
Current ratio Current assets / Short term liabilities 
Quick ratio (Current assets - Inventory) / Short term liabilities 
Cash liquidity (Cash and cash equivalents + Securities) / Short 
term liabilities 
Dynamic liquidity Operating income / Short term liabilities 
Trade receivables / Trade payables Trade receivables / Trade payables 
Dynamic profitability ratio (Profit after tax + Depreciation) / Average total 
assets 
Cash flow / Liabilities (Profit after tax + Depreciation) / (Long term 
liabilities + Short term liabilities) 
Cash flow / Net sales revenue (Profit after tax + Depreciation) / Net sales revenue 
Total assets ln (Total assets) 
Net sales revenue ln (Net sales revenue) 
Net sales revenue growth Net sales revenue actual period / Net sales revenue 
previous period 
Operating income growth Operating income actual period / Operating income 
previous period 
Profit after tax growth Profit after tax actual period / Profit after tax 
previous period 
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Appendix 2 – Factor equations 
 
PCA_REVENUE = 0.04604 + 0.00002253×ROS + 0.0001337×EBITDA_margin + 
0.0005592×Cash_flow_revenue  
Eigenvalue: 2.999 
KMO: 73.2% 
Total variance explained: 99.964% 
 
PCA_ASSETS_TURNOVER = -0.2236 + 0.4252×Assets_turnover + 
0.7908×Current_assets_ratio 
Eigenvalue: 1.421 
KMO: 50.0% 
Total variance explained: 71.063% 
 
PCA_SIZE = 2.167 + 4.359×Total_assets + 4.118×Net_revenue 
Eigenvalue: 1.894 
KMO: 50.0% 
Total variance explained: 94.686 
 
PCA_CASH_FLOW = 0.001201 + 0.1387×Dynamic_profitability_ratio + 
0.05488×Cash_flow_liabilities 
Eigenvalue: 1.427 
KMO: 50.0% 
Total variance explained: 71.344 
 
PCA_LIQUIDITY = -0.1561 + 0.07052×Current_ratio + 0.05577×Quick_ratio + 
0.02629×Cash_liquidity + 0.007302×Trade_receivables_trade_payables 
Eigenvalue: 2.891 
KMO: 69.1% 
Total variance explained: 72.282 
 
PCA_CAPITAL = 0.06037 + 0.1937×Equity_ratio – 0.2464×Indebtedness + 
0.01361×Working_capital_ratio 
Eigenvalue: 2.084 
KMO: 54.7% 
Total variance explained: 69.476 
 
PCA_LEVERAGE = -0.05667 + 0.01232×Long_term_indebtedness – 
0.005985×Capital_coverage + 0.2839×Cash_ratio  
Eigenvalue: 1.390 
KMO: 52.1% 
Total variance explained: 46.330 
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Appendix 3 – Univariate CHAID decision trees 
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Notes 
 
1 In Hungary, for instance, the number of newly declared bankruptcy procedures, 
liquidation procedures and winding ups was doubled in 2008 compared to 2000, and it 
exceeded the level of 2007 by 14 percent. 
 
2 This procedure is also called as Classification and Regression Trees (CRT). 
3 GINI = (2×AUROC) – 1. 
 
4 Term ’significance’ does not make sense in case of simulation procedures. 
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